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The thesis addresses the problematic of the relationship between Christian love and 
justice as it regards political structures and institutions. In doing so we hope 
contribute to a better understanding of the relationship that ought to pertain between 
the Christian church and political authorities. We make a distinction within the 
concept of justice, distinguishing between a more general loving justice and temporal 
justice which belongs specifically to political authorities and is reactive to loving 
justice. We argue that it cannot be maintained that love simply becomes temporal 
justice, in the sense that the justice of temporal authorities should be the same as the 
loving justice Christians proclaim and hope for. Neither is there the opposite, a 
peaceful boundary between love and temporal justice. This is because there is 
another criterion for the interrelationship between love and justice to be deduced 
from what will be established in the thesis. Temporal justice is the space created that 
allows love to be actualized. The nature and limits of this interaction between love 
and temporal justice will be explained and the spaces of temporal justice argued to be 
neither negative nor positive but rather suggestive. The thesis provides a descriptive 
framework for how the interaction between love and temporal justice takes place and 
posits the criteria that should guide political action and political judgment. The entire 
argument of the thesis is substantiated by conversation with certain key interlocutors 
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-The Thesis and Its Interlocutors- 
A. The Context  
i. The Problem and the Question 
As is revealed in the Gospel-proclamation, God has determined himself as the one 
who both loves and is just. Therefore, those who stand under the proclamation of the 
Gospel of Christ understand themselves as the recipients of God’s love and God’s 
justice. As this gift is received there is initiated a reciprocal movement as the 
recipients are allowed and commanded to correspond to this great reception by 
themselves becoming loving and just. God is loving and just and, therefore, those 
cognizant of this will also seek, according to their creaturely potential, to become 
loving and just. Duncan B. Forrester has made a similar point: “Christians believe in 
a God of justice and of love; and more, they teach that God is justice as God is love. 
In our experience of God we encounter both love and justice and learn what they are. 
Christians therefore claim, however tentatively and provisionally, to know what 
justice is because God reveals himself in justice and love.”1 
But living in a reality that is both “already and not yet” the reality of the 
Gospel, we see only “through a glass darkly.” Therefore, as we proceed as ethical 
actors, under the freedom and command to be loving and just, there is much that is 
unclear to us. Importantly, for our purposes, it is unclear what exactly, in each and 
every instance, is the content of as well as the difference and relationship between, 
love and justice. 
  This is a general problematic for human thinking and acting. This general 
problematic finds expression and a special formulation in the reality that is political 
structures and institutions. In that domain the question of love and justice is awoken 
in a special way, related to, but yet different from, the general formulation. There are 
two main reasons the general problematic is awoken in a special manner in the 
political domain. 
                                                 




The first happens on the primary, doctrinal level of thinking through the 
implications of the Gospel-proclamation. On that level, we are, possibly, presented 
with a special way in which the central Gospel-concepts of promise and judgment 
relate to the realm of political authorities and political structures. If this is the case, it 
might have important results for our subsequent understanding of love and justice in 
political structures. This makes it important for us to ask the question concerning the 
relationship between love and justice in the political domain. 
Second, there is the level on which the ethical agent, standing under the 
Gospel-proclamation, engages with a fallen reality which threatens, compromises, or 
otherwise troubles the actualization of the truth received in the Gospel. Being shaped 
by the Gospel’s love and justice the ethical agent proceeds to create political 
structures and institutions to guard and assist the actualization of love and justice. 
However, in the process, the ethical agent is confronted with the neighbour who does 
not share his idea of love and justice and would therefore shape those structures 
differently. The strife, discord and conflict that arise in the subsequent interchange 
threaten the very peace and stability of the structures and institutions in question. The 
structures seem to replicate the very discord they are meant to overcome. 
Therefore, for these two primary reasons, our intention is to understand the 
relationship of love and justice in political structures. On our way there we will need 
to inquire generally and individually into the concept of love and the concept of 
justice, especially regarding whether the concepts of justice and love function 
differently in the political domain. It follows that our enquiry is bifocal in nature, 
concerning itself with i) the general relationship of love and justice and ii) the special 
relationship of love and justice as regards political structures.  
 
ii. The Subject’s Unfolding 
Before we engage with the central subjects of the thesis we need to understand the 
epistemological parameters within which subsequent theological ethics and political 
theology are to be conducted. Insofar as theological ethics and political theology 
concern themselves with many things external, the first chapter will be especially 
focused on the place of empirical and natural actualities regarding the procedures of 
theological ethics and political theology. Therefore, the thesis begins with the basic 
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determination regarding i) natural theology and ii) revealed theology, determining 
whether theology may or may not be guided by speculation based on empirical and 
natural actualities. The thesis will argue for upholding distinctions between the 
theological and natural speculative enterprises, thereby siding with understandings 
associated with revealed theology and ethics. This will be argued based on the 
decentring effects of the Gospel-revelation on human subjectivity as well as the way 
in which the proclamation of the Gospel re-centres human thought on itself. Having 
established these parameters we will confidently inquire into the central subject 
matters of this thesis, love and justice. First, we will look into the concept of love. 
As we seek to understand the concept of Christian love, the concept will 
already present itself together with its antithesis, non-Christian love. These two 
concepts of love will be treated under the headings of agape and eros, with agape 
being the concept we will use for the distinctly Christian ideal of love while eros is 
placed in the domain of religious love.  In order to understand the concept of love the 
thesis will seek to determine whether the concept of love, despite having this 
fundamental differentiation within itself, can be described as a unitary concept with a 
common point of reference. Importantly, it will be through understanding the unity 
or difference within the concept of love that we will come to understand its 
fundamental properties. 
In thought, these two fundamental concepts of eros and agape could be 
related in several ways. They could be i) placed in stark opposition, ii) synthesized or 
iii) they could form a unity. However, we will, instead, discover iv) their unity in 
opposition, based on an analysis of their unity and their difference. Eros and agape 
will, indeed, present themselves as different forms of love, eros being propelled by 
projection and agape by reception, the former being primarily self-appropriating, the 
latter primarily self-giving. Nonetheless, within the conceptual tension between these 
two concepts, eros being assigned to religions generally and agape to the Christian 
faith, we will find a unity and likeness which makes it possible for us to put them 
both under the same signifier of love. Their unity is found in that both are to be 
described as actualization processes aimed primarily towards a potentiality which is 
found either in the projections of religious eros or in the reception of the Christian 
Gospel. We will thereby have discovered the common reference that gives love its 
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unity as a signifier. Also, we will recognize this unity as something which helps us to 
include in our view the neighbour with whom we share political structures but who 
nonetheless holds other ideals of love. We will therefore be able to continue speaking 
comfortably of the relationship between love and justice in political structures 
without great hindrance caused by the dissimilarity within the broader concept of 
love. 
Having accomplished this understanding of the internal unity and opposition 
within the concept of love, we then need to understand love’s unity with or 
distinction from that for which it strives, potentiality. This will give a more particular 
understanding of the nature, work and, especially, the limitations of love. The 
question therefore becomes whether love should be seen as i) co-extensive with 
potentiality or as ii) distinct from it. The thesis will see the two in a relationship 
which emphasizes a distinction, discovering that, because of the disunity and non-
divine nature of human attributes, love and that which it seeks to accomplish cannot 
be directly correlated, which means that acts of love do not correspond to the direct 
actualization of potentiality. This will, furthermore, allow us to make a helpful 
distinction between the theological and more contextual forms of ethical judgments. 
The question that arises next is whether justice is distinct from love and, if it 
is, in what way? We will discover in the divine attributes of love and justice a unity 
that, subsequently, finds its correspondence in a human unity between the concepts, 
which as we will see is an imperfect unity. The unity of love and justice will be 
found to be primarily in reference to the same process, the actualization of 
potentiality, which will also be where we will discover the correspondingly distinct 
nature of justice. This will be explained by an analogy to and a distinction from 
God’s divine attributes. God can, in freedom, determine himself to be the one who 
loves and seeks humankind’s potentiality and, by justice, defeat and destroy 
opposition to his will. But humankind cannot directly accomplish the potentiality that 
it seeks and cannot perfectly defeat the oppositions to the actualization of 
potentiality. Rather, while God directly creates the new reality and accomplishes the 
defeat of his opposition, humankind will content itself, by love, with creatively 
seeking to actualize potentiality and, by justice, limiting and curbing, so as to guard 
that which is actual. This in effect reflects differences in emphasis between love and 
10 
 
justice regarding their unity and reference to the same process of the actualization of 
potentiality, whereby love refers primarily to that which is potentiality and justice to 
that which is actual and yet deemed to be in correspondence or in the service of 
actuality. Their unity is, therefore, primarily, in reference to the same coherent 
process of actualization of potentiality. The distinction between love and justice, 
then, refers primarily to distinct aspects of this process. We will have found the two 
concepts to be in i) a dual/complementary unity, not in ii) a subservient/derivate role 
to one or the other, or in an unqualified iii) interchangeable unity. 
These determinations will prepare us to engage with the core concern of love 
and justice in relation to political structures. The major extant understandings for 
construing this relationship posit either i) no relationship between love and temporal 
authorities, ii) hostility between love and temporal authorities or, finally, iii) a 
gradualist dynamic between love and temporal authorities. Of these alternatives, we 
will develop a position that is closest to the final understanding, but not without some 
qualifications. This is because, as we approach the question regarding love and 
justice in their relation with political structures, we will discover the peculiar nature 
of temporal authorities. This nature is peculiar because temporal authorities do not 
relate to potentiality and actualization or to promise and judgment as other realities 
do. What we find instead is a prescribed role for temporal authorities which refers to 
sin and disorder and other actualities that threaten the actualization of love. In the 
eschaton, as will be understood, there will be no such destructive manifestations and, 
therefore, no rationale for the legislations, enforcements, taxations, policing, and so 
on provided by temporal authorities. Indeed, this is why they are rightly called 
temporal authorities, in that they are meant only for the time being, to serve the 
actualization of love and justice, until the consummation of the eschaton. This means 
that it is possible for us to speak of a form of justice that is peculiar to temporal 
authorities and which receives its grounding and shape from the movements of love 
and justice as well as the actualities of sin and disorder. 
Therefore, temporal justice has a reactive relationship to love and justice and 
is shaped by interaction with love and justice. In fact, the metaphor we choose to 
describe the functioning of temporal justice is that it is the space created and upheld 
so that loving justice can actualize within it. In searching for more detailed criteria 
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for the interaction between temporal justice and love we will learn, however, to 
understand that their interrelationship is more than strictly mechanical. Although 
temporal justice is described as a space in which love actualizes and is said to react 
to its movements, it will be recognized that representatives of temporal authorities, as 
human beings, will necessarily make judgments concerning the truth content of the 
ideals of love in question. However, these evaluations of specific ideals of love, as 
we will find, cannot be the primary criteria of judgment without threatening the 
possibility of a mistaken political judgment, leading to the totalization of a false ideal 
of love. 
Therefore, the primary criterion of political judgment will be the general 
relationship of temporal authorities to love, with the specific judgment on the truth 
content of specific ideas of love functioning as a secondary criterion. Following this 
we will learn that this entails that sequences of judgments, according to this dual 
criterion, accrue to form i) suggestive spaces but not ii) negative spaces or iii) 
overdetermined spaces. We will thereby have described the relationship between 
love and the justice of political structures as well as deriving criteria to guide this 
form of justice. To come back to the twofold focus of the thesis we will have, first, 
provided an understanding of the general relationship between love and justice as 
unitary insofar as they refer to the same process of actualization while attributing 
their conceptual difference to their having a primary emphasis on distinct aspects of 
that process. Second, we will have provided an understanding of the relationship 
between love and justice in temporal political structures. Temporal justice will be 
described as a special type of justice, one that reacts to love, and is best explained as 
the space in which love can be actualized. This analysis will yield criteria for better 
guidance in political judgment and action. 
 
iii. An Argument Substantiated by Interlocutors 
In order to substantiate and complete the following arguments, we will also be 
interacting with a particular scholarly debate concerning political theology which has 
been taking place in the Anglophone world in recent decades. This extended 
conversation will be addressed in almost every chapter of the dissertation. There is 
good reason to engage with this well-known Anglophone debate: 1) The debate is 
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circumscribed by Reinhold Niebuhr’s opening position and a literature that arose in 
response to Niebuhr, giving it a distinct, limited framework of writings and 
interlocutors. 2) Reinhold Niebuhr and the conversation that he started strongly 
emphasized the notions of love and justice that are the focal concepts of the present 
thesis. 3) It could be argued that this on-going, lively debate poses certain 
fundamental dilemmas and questions on which Christians have disagreed over the 
centuries in a new light. This Anglophone debate with which we will be interacting 
with will be mapped out as falling broadly into three camps: i) realist political 
theologies, ii) radical political theologies, and iii) gradualist political theologies. 
Several parties to the conversation will be mentioned but three will receive a special 
attention: Reinhold Niebuhr, Stanley Hauerwas and Oliver O’Donovan. The 
conversation, as mentioned, arose largely in reaction to Niebuhr’s writing and 
influence and concerns itself largely, as does this thesis, with love and justice and the 
relationship of the Christian faith to temporal politics. 
Therefore, the applicability and strength of the argument advanced in this 
dissertation will be measured against the major contributors to this on-going 
Anglophone debate on matters of political theology. It will also provide a coherent 
critique of the various schools of thought and a concrete way forward out of any 
stalemate that may have developed in that debate. This will, most importantly, act as 
proof of the relevancy, strength and viability of the proposal made in the thesis 
concerning the relationship that ought to pertain between love and justice in political 
structures. Therefore, at this point, before we move on to the constructive arguments 
of the thesis, we will provide an overview of how our conversation partners figure 
into the question of the relationship between love and justice. This will not only help 
us understand our interactions with them over the course of the thesis but also 
provide a very helpful context for the thesis and its own constructive arguments. It 
will, furthermore, help us understand more fully the dilemmas and stalemates that 
political theology faces in addressing our subject. Given the bifocal nature of our 
enquiry—concerning itself with both i) the relationship between love and justice 
generally and ii) the relationship of love and justice to political structures—we will 
construct our overview with this in mind. Each of the three abovementioned schools 
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of political theology will be presented so as to show where they figure on that bifocal 
axis. 
 
B. The Interlocutors 
i. Realist Political Theologies 
The story of the extended conversation which we are entering begins with and is 
propelled by Reinhold Niebuhr and his sounding a note of what he called “Christian 
Realism.” The influence of this account of political theology was to extend widely 
and have direct implications for many subsequent conceptualizations of love and 
justice. Niebuhr claimed to have learned Christian Realism from church father Saint 
Augustine.2 In Niebuhr’s opinion Augustine had a deeply realistic view of human 
nature. Unlike the rationalists of the prior age or the social scientists of the modern 
age, Augustine presented human reason as corrupted by self-love which, in 
Niebuhr’s view, was an astute observation. Accepting this as a true axiom would, 
subsequently, impose a distinctive shape on Niebuhr’s own theology. The resulting 
inference from the axiom is that self-interest is infused in all the rational pursuits of 
humankind. Self-interest can, of course, often unify human community. It is also, 
however, deeply divisive and creates mistrust, suspicion, and a rift between peoples. 
As a result of this actuality of self-interest and self-love, Niebuhr saw the human 
condition as constantly involving an “uneasy armistice between contending forces.”3 
The important practical inference for Niebuhr is that, as a result, we must let go of 
naïve optimism and face the sobering reality concerning human nature and 
government. We cannot lose ourselves in thinking of the “ultimate possibilities of 
life, for which sacrificial and forgiving love is the norm, but must also come to terms 
with the problem of establishing tolerable harmonies of life on all levels of 
community.”4 The question is what this “sobering view” might entail for the 
Christian ideal of love, or for that matter any ideal of love. 
                                                 
2 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner´s Sons, 
1953), 120–21. 
3 Ibid., 127. 
4 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Problem of a Protestant Social Ethic,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 15 
(1959): 1–2. Quoted from: D. B. Robertson, “Introduction,” in Reinhold Niebuhr, Love and Justice: 
Selection from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. D. B. Robertson, Library of Theological 
Ethics (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1957), 9. 
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This in effect entails that, from the Christian realist perspective, politics 
cannot be a simple idealistic enterprise, concerning itself solely with ultimate values 
or pure expressions of love. First and foremost, Niebuhr thought, politics should 
focus on that which has actuality in the lives of all citizens—self-interest and the 
common human need for material goods.5 Such a thought will clearly have a strong 
effect on the perceived relationship between love and structures of justice. To many 
it might seem that this results in the drawing of a clear boundary between the two. 
The instinct behind that deduction is solid. But it is not the whole story of the 
Niebuhrian understanding of love and justice, which is slightly more nuanced than 
that. Let us first look at the general relationship between love and justice in 
Niebuhr’s work and then investigate their specific relation to political structures. 
 
a. The General Relationship between Love and Justice 
Within Niebuhr’s schema of thought, justice is associated primarily with concrete 
political institutions while love has an elevated place and cannot be directly 
actualised in political institutions without compromise. There is, however, another 
distinction concerning the concepts of love and justice to be found in Niebuhr’s work 
that is not accented to the extent it could be, which is the parallel distinction between, 
on the one hand, perfect/ideal love and perfect/ideal justice, and, on the other hand, 
love and justice as they are found in the strictly political sense. The concepts of 
perfect love and perfect justice are, nonetheless, spawned out of the primary attention 
Niebuhr gives to the ideal of love in its interaction with justice in politics, as our 
treatment below will show. 
The love that finds its way into the messy reality of politics is, in the process 
of entering this reality, changed. By entering into this imperfect reality, love is 
compromised and loses its character as ideal/perfect love. Niebuhr maintains that in 
our fallen reality “the social struggle involves a violation of a pure ethic of love, not 
                                                 
5 Niebuhr writes approvingly of Augustine that “Augustine’s realism prompts him to challenge 
Cicero’s conception of a commonwealth as rooted in ‘a compact of justice.’ Not so, declares 
Augustine. Commonwealths are bound together by a common love, or collective interest, rather than 
by a sense of justice: and they could not maintain themselves without the imposition of power.” See 
Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, 126. 
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only in the assertion of rights, but in the inevitable use of coercion.”6 This means 
that, according to Niebuhr, love is compromised in its entry into historical reality 
although, in making this entrance, it does not cease to be love. As Niebuhr states, 
“the social ideal of Jesus is as perfect and as impossible of attainment as is his 
personal ideal.” Niebuhr adds that, in “the ethical teachings of Jesus . . . we discover 
an unattainable ideal, but a very useful one.”7  
Based on this, our inference must be that there is a love which is the measure 
of the love which finds itself compromised in entering into the historical situation. 
That is, there is a perfect love which can be distinguished from love in its actual 
compromise with historical reality. And, as will be better explained later, this 
imperfect love is vital for the development of imperfect justice. What is important for 
us to note now is that there is a concept of imperfect justice to be found in Niebuhr’s 
work. We have already explained how love becomes imperfect in its compromise 
with fallen reality. But how can justice be said to be imperfect? According to 
Niebuhr, we know that justice is made better, more perfect, with the activity of love. 
The process of perfecting justice through love implies the imperfection of justice.  
Let us explain the rationale behind this statement. According to Niebuhr, the 
justice we have in history is tainted, like other historical realities, by the fact that this 
is a fallen reality, still plagued by selfishness and other human faults. Furthermore, 
this imperfect justice, standing by itself, quickly degenerates into something less than 
justice. It “always develops into injustice in actual life because every person views 
rights not from an absolute but from a biased perspective. The result is a society in 
which the perspective of the strong dictates the conception of justice.”8 Niebuhr 
continues: “Justice, in other words, that is only justice is less than justice. Only 
imaginative justice, that love that begins by espousing the rights of the other rather 
than self, can achieve a modicum of fairness.”9 That justice needs love so as not to 
degenerate into its opposite shows us how love is, without ceasing to be love, 
compromised and then translated into achievements of justice. As love enters 
historical reality, it is compromised, but still elevates justice, making it in its 
                                                 
6 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Ethic of Jesus and the Social Problem,” in Love and Justice, 35. 
7 Niebuhr, “The Ethic of Jesus and the Social Problem,” 32–33. 




dynamic with love more perfect. Justice is elevated in its dynamic with love so as to 
become more perfected. This entails that the achievements of justice are imperfect 
and yet, through love, they are in the process of being perfected. The inevitable 
question then is when and how easily justice reaches its perfection to become 
“perfect justice.” According to Niebuhr, in history, that is, before the eschaton, 
justice will most likely never become perfect justice. Simply put: Perfect justice will 
never actualize in any political systems, however advanced. Concerning this Niebuhr 
argues: “Such a system will not meet the requirements of perfect justice for decades 
to come. There is a sense in which it will probably never meet them.”10 Furthermore, 
Niebuhr states: “Whatever justice men achieve in the society in which they live is 
always imperfect justice.”11 
The important message for us to note here is that we have seen how, within 
Niebuhr’s writings, there is the necessary inference that there is such a thing as 
perfect justice to contrast with imperfect justice, just as there is perfect love to 
contrast with imperfect, compromised love. But what, then, is the relationship 
between perfect love and perfect justice? Niebuhr has a short but definitive response 
to that question: “anything short of love cannot be perfect justice.”12 What appears is 
that what Niebuhr calls “perfect justice” is just another word for the ideal of love. 
Therefore, in their general relationship, as perfect ideals, love and justice are closely 
related. However, when we investigate the difference between love and justice in 
political institutions, we discover a much greater differentiation between these 
concepts. 
 
b. The Relationship of Love and Justice in Political Structures 
We find greater differentiation in looking to the relationship between love and justice 
as they relate to political institutions because this is where the two concepts do the 
most work in Niebuhr’s writings. Interestingly, the more deeply we investigate 
Niebuhr’s writings the clearer it becomes that this justice of political institutions, in 
terms of the expression of the ideal, is different from perfect love/perfect justice not 
                                                 
10 Reinhold Niebuhr, “American Power and World Responsibility,” in Love and Justice, 205. 
11 Niebuhr, “The Ethic of Jesus and the Social Problem,” 32. 
12 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Christian Faith and Natural Law,” in Love and Justice, 49. 
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in type but in degree. It turns out that the imperfect, complex situations that abound 
in politics demand a compromise in the pure expression of love. Niebuhr claims that 
“even if perfect love were presupposed, complex relations, involving more than two 
persons, require the calculation of rights.”13 Justice (Niebuhr most always uses the 
term “justice” by itself when referring to the imperfect justice of political 
institutions) is, therefore, the virtue that is needed because perfect love cannot be 
realized in our sinful condition without, at the same time, supporting forms of sin and 
oppression.  
This may seem a somewhat strange claim but here Niebuhr argues simply 
that, by engaging in pure, self-sacrificial love on the level of nations, classes and 
other groups, we could be foregoing the claims, interests and needs of other people.14 
The more complex the moral situation, the more parties there are to an issue, the 
more important it becomes to compromise the demands of ideal love to achieve 
relative, imperfect justice. As Niebuhr writes: “This new life in Christ represents the 
perfection of complete and heedless self-giving which obscures the contrary impulse 
of self-regard. It is a moral ideal scarcely possible for the individual and certainly not 
relevant to the morality of self-regarding nations.”15 In the complex situations of 
politics love has to face the reality of interests and rights and power and seek the 
advancement of justice. This imperfect justice, which is the justice that should be 
practiced in our human condition, is well described as the “best possible harmony 
within the conditions created by human egoism.”16 Perfect justice and perfect love 
are both primarily ideals and can easily become destructive when they are acted out 
abstractly. Focusing on the realities of communal and individual interest will help us 
address conflicts more effectively and find a more fitting justice for, as Niebuhr 
makes clear, “any justice that the world has ever achieved rests upon some balance 
between the various interests.”17 
                                                 
13 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vol. 2 (Louisville, 
KY: John Knox, 1996), 252. 
14 Niebuhr writes: “For as soon as the life and interest of other than the agent are involved in an action 
or a policy, the sacrifice of those interests ceases to be ‘self-sacrifice.’ It may actually become an 
unjust betrayal of their interests.” Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 88. See also 
Karen Lebacqz, Six Theories of Justice: Perspectives from Philosophical and Theological Ethics 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1986), 84. 
15  Reinhold Niebuhr, Man’s Nature and His Communities (London: Bles, 1966), 30. 
16 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 252.  
17 Reinhold Niebuhr, “A Negotiated Peace,” in Love and Justice, 173. 
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But the emphasis on realism, interests and the calculation of rights in political 
institutions would seem to minimize to the greatest degree the interrelationship 
between love and justice. This raises a legitimate question. It could be said that 
Niebuhr limits the role of love, thereby risking the privatization of Christian love and 
causing it to become irrelevant to concrete political situations.  
However, such judgments of Niebuhr’s work are not entirely accurate. 
Niebuhr did visualize that self-sacrificial love could enter unexpectedly into political 
stalemates and thereby create new possibilities. Even so, however, this would, 
according to Niebuhr, always be strongly qualified by the realities of the human 
condition of self-interest, power, coercion and egoism:  
The spirit of love may preserve a certain degree of appreciation for the 
common weaknesses and common aspirations which bind men together 
above the areas of social conflict. But again it cannot prevent the conflict. It 
may avail itself of instruments of restraint and coercion, through which a 
measure of trust in the moral capacities of an opponent may be expressed 
and the expansion rather than contraction of those capacities is encouraged. 
But it cannot hide the moral distrust expressed by the very use of the 
instruments of coercion. To some degree the conflict between the purest 
individual morality and an adequate political policy must therefore remain.18 
 
Therefore, Niebuhr’s affirmation of a place for perfect love in the justice of political 
institutions might be too little, too late, as can be seen by the fact that Niebuhr was to 
become heavily criticized later in the century. But before this critique was levelled 
against him, Niebuhr nonetheless captivated the hearts and minds of many and set 
the tone for discussions in the twentieth century on the relationship between love and 
justice, becoming a favourite of scholars, activists and statesmen. The young 
philosopher John Rawls showed affinities for Niebuhr’s works,19 as did civil rights 
activist Martin Luther King, Jr.20 Niebuhr’s influence was, however, not tied to that 
period of history; the U.S. president, Barack Obama, has called Reinhold Niebuhr his 
                                                 
18 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner, 1934), 272–273. 
19 Robert Merrihew Adams, “The Theological Ethics of the Young Rawls and its Background,” in A 
Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, ed. Thomas Nagel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 74–78.  
20 King was both appreciative and critical of Niebuhr. See: Martin Luther King, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
Ethical Dualism,” in The Papers of Martin Luther King Jr, ed. Clayborne Carson et al., vol. 2  
(Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 141–151. 
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“favourite philosopher.”21 But Niebuhr’s spreading influence only amplified the 
criticism against him, particularly in the critique made by “radical theologians.” 
 
ii. Radical Political Theologies 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, critics who argued that Niebuhr’s realism 
was in fact dangerously “accommodationist” emerged.22 They charged that there was 
too little that was distinctively Christian in Niebuhr’s arguments. The English 
theologian John Milbank has even suggested that Niebuhr’s thought might be said to 
resemble Stoic philosophy more than it does Christian theology.23 Another radical 
theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, has argued that churches that would follow the realist 
theological agenda would wind up having “nothing distinctive to say as Christians 
about the challenges facing this society” [italics mine].24 This is seen, for example, in 
Niebuhr’s claim that “the law of love stands on the edge of history, not in history.”25 
Such a statement functions, in Stanley Hauerwas’s view, as a theological justification 
of the social “irrelevance of Christianity.”26 Placing the law of love outside the 
actualities of history results, according to Hauerwas, in sidelining the church (a 
community of love) in the affairs of the world. For, if love is placed at the edge of 
history, the church’s concrete social practices of love might as well be excluded from 
the realm of politics and placed “at the edge of history.” 
In the opinion of the radical theologians, it is Niebuhr’s idea of imperfect 
justice that reigns in history while love is pushed to the side. Hauerwas believes that 
this has terrible consequences: “as a result, ‘peace’ for Niebuhr can never mean an 
attempt to rid the world of war; rather, it is a word for ‘order’ that too often serves 
the interest of status quo powers. If you are for justice, therefore, you cannot exclude 
                                                 
21 In an interview with the New York Times, U.S. President Barack Obama was asked by the journalist 
David Brooks if he had ever read Reinhold Niebuhr, to which Obama remarked, “I love him. He is 
one of my favorite philosophers.” President Obama then expanded on the nature of his affinity with 
Niebuhr. “Obama, Gospel and Verse,” by David Brooks, The New York Times, April 26, 2007,  
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/opinion/26brooks.html?_r=1   
22 Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, Resident Aliens (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), 
32. 
23 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997),  
235–239. 
24 Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2000), 25. 
25 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vol. 1 (Louisville, 
KY: John Knox, 1996), 298. 
26 Stanley Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings (London: SCM Press, 2001), 54. 
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the use of violence and war. In effect, Niebuhr gave a theological justification for 
political realism.”27 The main thrust of the radical theological critique is, therefore, 
that the theories of realist political theology leave the church and Christian love 
without a concrete vocation in the world. All that is left for the church to do is 
bemoan the tragic necessity of the way things are—thereby legitimating the way 
things are. According to Hauerwas, “the sharp division between the realms of 
religion and politics intrinsic to [Christian] realism served to free liberal political 
institutions to follow their own interests, qualified only by the hope that they will 
recognize the ambiguity of what they do.” Echoing John Milbank’s earlier charge, 
Hauerwas continues: “[Niebuhr] proclaimed an essentialized view of the human 
condition and a parallel reification of the state that shut out any role in the world for 
the church. He, like the Stoics before him, left us without hope.”28  
The radical political theologies have espoused a vision very different from 
that of the realists. It is a vision wherein the Church embodies a special political 
vision or praxis, serving as a light to the world that the world could learn and follow. 
Hauerwas writes:  
The church does not let the world set its agenda about what constitutes a 
“social ethic,” but a church of peace and justice must set its own agenda. It 
does this first by having the patience amid the injustice and violence of this 
world to care for the widow, the poor, and the orphan. Such care, from the 
world’s perspective, may seem to contribute little to the cause of justice, yet 
it is our conviction that unless we take the time for such care neither we nor 
the world can know what justice looks like.29  
 
The law of love is supposed to reign in politics and the political domain should not 
be exempt from the demands of love as witnessed to by the church. Christian 
discipleship, the radical political theologies maintain, should be just as actual for a 
Christian in government as for a Christian in private life as they reject any 
                                                 
27 Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 142. 
28 Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 58 
29 Stanley Hauerwas, “The Servant Community: Christian Social Ethics,” in The Hauerwas Reader, 
ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 374–375. 
John Milbank strikes a somewhat similar note: “In the midst of history the judgment of God has 
already happened. And either the church enacts the vision of paradisal community which this 
judgment opens out, or else it promotes a hellish society beyond any terrors known to antiquity.” See 
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 442. 
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public/private distinctions.30 They claim that there can be no special ethic that applies 
to our personal lives and yet another that should apply to public offices or democratic 
discussions. It is standing on this ground that the radical theologians are able to 
describe Niebuhr and the realists as contributors to “the democratic policing of 
Christianity” and the divorce of Christian beliefs from concrete living.31 Having 
given this preliminary description of the radical political theologies, let us now 
consider how they figure onto our twofold foci, beginning with the general 
relationship between love and justice. 
 
a. The General Relationship between Love and Justice 
It is true that sometimes Hauerwas and Milbank might not always seem to be the 
greatest enthusiasts of justice.32 However, this does not mean that they are out to 
reject justice wholesale. Their reservations are held mostly in reaction to certain 
modern abstract usages of the concept of justice which they find to be uninformed by 
the Christian faith. This will be explained more extensively later when we examine 
the special relationship between love and justice in political institutions as seen by 
Hauerwas and Milbank. 
Importantly, Hauerwas and Milbank do have a place for justice as a general 
Christian concept. They mention it favourably, just as they treat equality and 
freedom and similar concepts favourably. For them, however, the important work to 
be done is reminding us that our notions of these concepts should be wholly 
informed by the Christian vision and Christian practices because, according to 
Hauerwas, every concept, such as justice, is tradition-bound and should therefore not 
be vague or abstract: concepts “are not self-interpreting, but require a tradition to 
give them specificity and content.”33 Hauerwas claims that when the traditional 
nature of such concepts is not emphasized, “love and justice become abstractions 
divorced from concrete practices necessary for Christians and non-Christians alike to 
                                                 
30 Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, “Ethics as Informed Prayer,” in The Blackwell Companion to 
Christian Ethics, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 6. 
31 Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front, 98–104. 
32 Servicing this view, Hauerwas includes a chapter titled “The Politics of Justice – Why Justice is a 
Bad Idea for Christians.” See Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom: How the Church is to Behave if 
Freedom, Justice and Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1999), 45–68. 
33 Stanley Hauerwas, “The Servant Community,” 389. 
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know what we mean when we say ‘justice.’”34 Milbank takes a similar stance, 
although differently conceptualized because of his emphasis on ontology combined 
with praxis. The resemblance is, nonetheless, strong: “Christian belief belongs to 
Christian practice, and it sustains its affirmations about God and creation only by 
repeating and enacting a metanarrative about how God speaks in the world in order 
to redeem it.”35 
This Christian metanarrative, according to Milbank, amounts to a “social 
ontology” wherein concepts such as justice receive their context and content. 
According to both Hauerwas and Milbank, the tradition that should guide our 
visualizations and practices should be the Christian tradition. So it is that for both 
Hauerwas and Milbank love and justice are bound together in a common wellspring 
of Christian tradition, narrative and ontology. Insofar as our concepts of love and 
justice should be grounded in the tapestry that is the Christian tradition, we may next 
ask what is central in the ethical tradition and ontology of Christianity, according to 
Hauerwas and Milbank. 
It is here that the question becomes more interesting. Not only are concepts 
such as love and justice in a unity of tradition, praxis and ontology, but we also 
discover that for both authors it is non-violence that plays a central role and it is non-
violence that we must see as the uniting principle of Christian love and Christian 
justice. According to Hauerwas, God in Jesus, in rejecting the dominion offered to 
him by the devil, “decisively rejects Israel’s temptation to an idolatry that necessarily 
results in violence between peoples and nations. For our violence is correlative to the 
falseness of the objects we worship and the more false they are, the greater our stake 
in maintaining loyalty to them and protecting them through coercion. Only the one 
true God can take the risk of ruling by relying entirely on the power of humility and 
love.”36 Love and justice are unitary in God’s non-violent overcoming of the 
opposition to his kingdom. For, as Hauerwas writes: “True justice never comes 
through violence, nor can it be based on violence. It can only be based on truth, 
                                                 
34 Stanley Hauerwas, Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 230. 
35 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 422. 
36 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 79. 
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which has no need to resort to violence to secure its own existence.”37 Milbank has a 
similar understanding, as he distinguishes sharply between ontologies of dominion 
and violence wherein justice is upheld by coercion and an ontology of peace wherein 
love and justice are harmonious in non-violence. Milbank, by way of Augustine, 
draws “a contrast between a certain kind of limited, apparent peace, consequent upon 
the victory of a dominant force over other forces, and a real peace, which is a state of 
harmonious agreement, based upon a common love, and a realization of justice for 
all.”38 
All this means that, for these two authors, love and justice have unity, first in 
their common grounding in the Christian tradition/narrative/ontology, and second in 
the specific, but central, aspect of that tradition, which is the peaceableness and non-
violence derived from the Christian proclamation of a God who, in Jesus, has 
overcome by non-violence.39 This highlighting of non-violence as a central aspect of 
Christianity creates a more tensely strained relationship between the Christian ideas 
of love and justice when applied to political structures and institutions. 
 
b. The Relationship of Love and Justice in Political Structures 
What we should recognize here is that both Hauerwas’s and Milbank’s projects reject 
the view that temporal politics are as important in human affairs as they are typically 
assumed to be. “Politics” for Hauerwas and Milbank refers primarily to a communal 
existence and its traditions. They do not view politics primarily as structural, but 
rather as communal, moral and visionary. They focus first and foremost on the 
church as politics in its own right. As Hauerwas writes: 
I am challenging the very idea that the primary goal of Christian social ethics 
should be an attempt to make the world more peaceable or just. Rather, the 
first social ethical task of the church is to be the church—the servant 
community. Such a claim may well sound self-serving until we remember 
that what makes the church the church is its faithful manifestation of the 
peaceable kingdom in the world. As such, the church does not have a social 
ethic; the church is a social ethic.
40
   
 
                                                 
37 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 114–115. 
38 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 393. 
39 Hauerwas, Peaceable Kingdom, 79. 
40 Hauerwas, “The Servant Community,” 374. Emphasis in the original. 
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Hauerwas and Milbank are, if anything, reluctant to answer questions as to how the 
church is to relate to temporal political social policy. They are primarily out to 
remind us that without a distinctive community of the church that deeply nurtures its 
own praxis and ontology of love, justice, freedom and equality, we have no hope of 
knowing what these concepts rightly mean. Hauerwas writes, concerning this point: 
“Put in terms that have now become familiar, freedom and equality are not self-
interpreting, but require a tradition to give them specificity and content.”41 If the 
church does not nurture its narratives, traditions, and ontology, these concepts will 
lack context and content to the extent that they will become general and abstract to 
the point of being useless. It is even possible that these concepts will become nothing 
more than dangerous allies of violence and coercion. That was, amongst other things, 
the accusation brought against Niebuhr by Hauerwas and Milbank. Love and justice 
cannot mean one thing in church and another thing in temporal politics.42 If the 
justice we speak of in temporal government is just another way to legitimate war, 
violence and coercion, how can it be justice? And how can Christians participate in 
such politics? 
This primary emphasis that Milbank and Hauerwas place on the utter 
distinctiveness of the church must result in an unstable relationship of Christian love 
to the justice found in temporal politics. If political institutions work according to 
criteria that do not perfectly harmonize with the non-violent understanding of love 
and justice that Milbank and Hauerwas espouse, then how are Christians to 
participate in it without, at the same time, compromising their praxis/ontology? This 
is a legitimate question given the structures of their respective theological projects. 
So, while love and justice are in general bound together in the Christian 
praxis, proclamation and ontology of non-violence, Hauerwas and Milbank seriously 
doubt whether the concept of justice often employed in political institutions is 
compatible with the Christian idea of justice.43 One could even go so far as to say 
that it is altogether uncertain whether such justice is rightly called justice. This could 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 389. 
42 Hauerwas calls the distinction between public and private a “yet another binary distinction that   
misrepresents the call of the gospel and the nature of the Christian life.” See Hauerwas and Wells, 
“Ethics as Informed Prayer,” 6.  
43 Hauerwas, After Christendom, 45–68. John Milbank describes the corruption of politics in history 
leading up to modern times as something brought about by a failure of the church, resulting in a 
secular state in the form of “a perverted church.” See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 440–442. 
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possibly breed an attitude of “overcoming or retreat” in the relationship between 
Christian love and the justice of political institutions: Either the Christian ethic 
becomes social policy, without compromise, or the Christian is forced to retreat to 
the only true politics of the church, so that, at least, the world might rightly know 
what love and justice truly are. The problem the radical theologians have with the 
former alternative is that they believe that the coercion and violence inherent in 
government structures are sinful (a betrayal of the demands of Christian love) and 
ought not to exist.44 One could then legitimately ask whether there is any hope for an 
amicable relationship between Christian love and the justice of political institutions. 
The relationship between love and justice, for the radical political theologies, 
obviously differs sharply from that of the realist theologians. While the realists 
would tend to maintain a more peaceful boundary between love and justice, the 
radical theologians can be said, without overstatement, to place the two in a less 
friendly relationship. Love has ruptured into the world and the negotiated terms of 
the realists are not an option. Given the radical theologians’ somewhat non-
compromising view of the church and Christian discipleship, it becomes obvious that 
if the state does not support the right telos it becomes an argument for Christian 
withdrawal from public affairs. 
Interestingly, both these prominent radical theologians have been very vocal 
critics of the common, Western, liberal–democratic order and are widely read. As a 
result of being widely read, the ideas and criticism of the radical theologians have 
created their own sphere of influence. Some even truly worry that, as time passes, the 
                                                 
44 Hauerwas has, to some extent, contested this. He has claimed that violence is not necessary or 
essential to the state and therefore the Christian need not withdraw altogether from the secular order. 
However, he does maintain that Christians cannot have any hand in governmental actions that can be 
considered violent: “but I do not believe it entails an indiscriminate rejection of the secular order. 
Rather, I maintain that Christians must withdraw their support from a ‘civic republicanism only’ when 
that form (as well as any other form) of government and society resorts to violence in order to 
maintain internal order and external security. At that point and that point alone Christians must 
withhold their involvement with the state. Such an admission, however, hardly commits me to a 
sectarian stance, unless one assumes, as some do, that every function of the state depends on its 
penchant for violence.” See Stanley Hauerwas, “Why the Sectarian Temptation is a Misrepresentation: 
A Response to James Gustafson,” in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael 
Cartwright (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 105. There are two obvious problems with 
this stance. First, we are still left with a problem of definition concerning what counts as violence. Do 
we employ wide or narrow definitions? Almost every law and regulation could be considered violent 
if it is defined widely enough. Second, one wonders what it is about non-violence alone that singles it 
out as the one non-negotiable demand of Christian discipleship and Christian love. Are there not a 
host of other distinctively Christian actions that should not be compromised? 
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influences of radical theologies might become problematic. Jeffrey Stout writes: “We 
are about to reap the social consequences of a traditionalist backlash against 
contractarian liberalism.45 The more thoroughly Rawlsian our law schools and ethics 
centers become, the more radically Hauerwasian the theological schools become.”46 
 Stout has also pointed out that the inflated rhetoric and extreme 
characterizations of Milbank and Hauerwas are not completely warranted, given their 
own respective frameworks of thought. He sincerely questions Hauerwas’s apparent 
view that there can be no dynamic between love and justice,47 and puts the question 
to Milbank whether God cannot be seen at work in any non-Christian, secular 
movements and individuals.48 These are indeed criticisms and questions that should 
be taken seriously. 
 
iii. Gradualist Theologies 
Some remain unsatisfied not only with the understandings of realist political 
theologies but also with the radical alternatives just described. Here they shall be 
called “gradualist” theologians and, for them, Oliver O’Donovan should be seen as 
the most important figure, although Eric Gregory will also be treated under that label. 
An investigation of O’Donovan’s writings reveals that he does share some of the 
thinking habits of the radical theologians such as John Milbank. This can be seen in 
his use of patristic, medieval and pre-modern political thought. Also, like radical 
theologians, he might be said to hold a high view of the church and its moral 
character while simultaneously being critically disposed towards worldly 
government. Nonetheless, there is a great difference between O’Donovan and the 
radical theologians. He does not share Hauerwas’s or Milbank’s hostility to the idea 
that there is a viable relationship between the Church and liberal–democratic states. 
Instead there is, in O’Donovan’s thought, a form of continuity between church and 
state as there is a “Yes” that needs to be spoken to the state together with the “No” 
                                                 
45 In his book Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey Stout labels Hauerwas and Milbank “new 
traditionalists.” See Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 118. 
46 Ibid., 76. 
47 In fact, Stout quotes early writings in which Hauerwas puts a similar question to John Howard 
Yoder. See ibid., 144–7. 
48 Ibid., 105.  
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that is due to it.49 The state, O’Donovan thinks, needs its own criterion of justice and 
this justice cannot be a free-floating concept. Rather, a specific historical identity 
should govern the state in its organization and actions and the church should preach 
to the state what it believes should be the content of this justice.50 The justice that the 
state practices and upholds needs to be informed by something, and this 
“something,” Christians are to hope, should be the Christian proclamation.51 
The question that then becomes urgent is what shape this influence should 
take. O’Donovan lays the answer out and suggests neither the “all or nothing” of the 
radical theologians nor the “almost nothing” of the realist theologians but rather 
argues that there should be an ongoing dynamic between love and structures of 
temporal justice.52 With this introduction to the gradualist approach let us examine 
the relationship between love and justice in the writings of the gradualist political 
theologies by applying the schema of the twin foci as we have done so far, beginning 
by portraying the general relationship between love and justice. 
 
a. The General Relationship between Love and Justice 
Oliver O’Donovan has a treatment of the general notions of love and justice which 
present the two concepts in a unity. More can, however, be said of this. The unity is 
upheld, shaped, and permeated by love because all the virtues have their unity, not in 
justice or the good, but in love. O’Donovan writes that “love is the unitary 
                                                 
49  O’Donovan writes: “Where God has said ‘Yes’ to mankind in Christ, he has said ‘No’ to all refusal 
of him, to the rebellious authorities, which as the psalmist has it, ‘the Lord laughs to scorn.’” See 
O´Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 255. Also, in The Desire of the Nations, O’Donovan 
writes: “the witness is vindicated when it is carried through in a positive mode, saying yes as well as 
saying no, encouraging the acts of repentance and change by which the powers offer homage to 
Christ.” Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 215. 
50 O’Donovan writes: “The key to the state’s fulfilling of its role, then, is the church’s proclamation to 
it, ‘reminding’ it.” O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations, 213. O’Donovan also writes: “The 
[church’s] penitential system could not, of course, replace the secular courts, but it could, and did, 
shape them.” Ibid., 259. 
51 O’Donovan writes: “The secular function in society was to witness to divine judgment by, as it 
were, holding the stage for it; the church, on the other hand, must witness to divine judgment by no 
judgment, avoiding litigation and swallowing conflict in forgiveness. Society, respecting the judicial 
function as the core of political authority, must shape its conception of justice in the light of God’s 
reconciling work.” Ibid., 250. 
52 O’Donovan writes: “The reshaping of justice by mercy cannot reach a final settlement, but will 
always be a dialectic in which the ongoing forgiveness of the wronged has a dynamic effect.” This is a 
thought that O’Donovan takes from reading William Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure and The 
Merchant of Venice. See  ibid., 261. 
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orientation that lies behind all uniquely varied responses to the generic variety of the 
created order.”53 O’Donovan further comments:  
True virtue is love for God, and the four cardinal virtues are manifestations 
of this love in certain typical relations into which human existence leads us. 
Temperance is the loving subject preserving himself unspoilt for God; 
fortitude is his glad endurance of all for God’s sake; justice is his stance of 
subordination before God and command over the non-human creation; and 
prudence is his discrimination between that which helps and that which 
hinders his pilgrimage towards God.54 
 
Importantly, within O’Donovan’s writings, this unity is seen as a human unity of 
human attributes in the temporal and are therefore not in the perfect and divine unity 
that belongs only to God: “The clemency of human judgment cannot be like divine 
mercy, making all things new; it can only be a response to it, founded in humility, 
gratitude and fellow-feeling with sinners. It can only point, it cannot reach, to the 
place where justice and mercy are entirely one.”55 It can therefore be said that, within 
O’Donovan’s scheme, love and justice have a unity, secured by love. In reference to 
God this is a perfect and divine unity while in the human reference it is an imperfect 
unity.  
Eric Gregory has a similar interpretation of the unity of love and justice, 
although it exhibits slightly less nuance in arguing for a more strongly accented 
“hypostatic union” between love and justice. Gregory writes, for example, that love 
and justice are “without confusion, without change, without division, without 
separation, the difference of the natures being by no means removed because of the 
union.”56 Despite claiming this equality of the concepts, the priority of love 
nonetheless emerges in Gregory’s writings, as it does for O’Donovan. Gregory 
claims that, despite this union, “nevertheless, love could be seen as the condition for 
the possibility of justice.”57 We therefore find, with the gradualist political 
theologies, a general notion of the relationship between love and justice which keeps 
them in a union within which love has a certain priority. With this in mind, let us 
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now consider the specific relationship of love to the justice of political institutions as 
it appears in the writings of the gradualists. 
 
b. The Relationship of Love and Justice in Political Structures 
The gradualist political theologies construe a relationship between love and the 
justice of political institutions that places the two in a dynamic. In this dynamic, 
political judgments and institutions can be said to take on the shape of the Gospel-
love (particularly mercy for O’Donovan but more generally love for Gregory.) Let us 
explain this in greater detail. As we follow O’Donovan’s treatment of the 
relationship between love and the justice of political institutions we see how it is 
most commonly construed by him as the relationship between mercy and justice. 
This is already apparent in our description of the general relationship between love 
and justice, for two reasons. First, the confrontation with God’s mercy not only gives 
us a desire to emulate it but creates humility in us as we learn that we are recipients 
of mercy.58 Second, the permeation of justice by love, as the guarantor of the unity of 
the virtues, means that justice takes a different direction from the direction it would 
take without it. Justice is, therefore, as O’Donovan likes to see it, better described as 
“merciful judgment.”59 Importantly, this merciful judgment “is a qualification, not a 
suspension of justice.”60 Awareness of God’s judgment changes how we engage in 
judgments, tempering them with love’s mercy and forgiveness. As O’Donovan 
writes: “The nearness of divine judgment demands humility in judging, showing 
mercy as we hope to receive it.”61 Importantly, though, this must occur without 
disbanding justice. According to O’Donovan we are “flesh and blood and full of 
infirmities, and society cannot endure if we judge with the rigor that an angel might 
use.”62 However, also importantly: “But that is not a reason to abandon justice, for 
justice must shake hands with mercy (cf. Ps. 85.10)”63  
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According to O’Donovan, justice and mercy meet on at least two levels. First, 
they meet in the self-knowing witness of the church. As O’Donovan writes: “the 
wisest of those who have thought about what might be implied in an evangelical 
politics have looked first to the social life of the church. There we may expect to see 
the Paschal victory take effect in judgments that immediately serve the creation of 
mutual love and the forgiveness of enemies.”64 Second, justice and mercy have a 
secondary meeting in temporal politics based on the first. This is due to the 
responsiveness of temporal political judgment to the merciful judgment that 
emanates from the knowledge of the Gospel as witnessed by the church. However, 
this responsiveness is indirect as it is responsiveness to the primary witness of the 
church. That is, temporal politics “are shaped by the presence of a society in which 
redemption is taking effect and assuming a social form; so they witness to the 
Paschal judgment, but indirectly.”65 Having said this, O’Donovan is careful also to 
state that, nonetheless: 
There is only one society which is incorporated into the Kingdom of God 
and which recapitulates the narrative of the Christ-event, and that is the 
church. Even in deep Christendom civil society was not identical with the 
church, but, at most, merged with it on the surface in a prosopic union. 
Society shaped by the presence of the church forms a kind of penumbra to 
the church, a radiation of it rather than a participation in it.66  
 
This entails a transformation of temporal politics through the leavening influence of 
the society of the Gospel, the church. Temporal politics are reactive and reactive 
even to the degree that they may and rightly should bow their knees and knowingly 
confess Jesus Christ as Lord and the limit of their own reign.67 However, as 
mentioned, O’Donovan discerns an important difference between the church and 
temporal politics insofar as, while one will be incorporated into the kingdom, the 
other will not. Temporal politics can therefore become “a penumbra” to the kingdom 
and the church, but not a form of participation in it. This still leaves us with the 
question of the degree to which gradualist political theology shapes temporal politics. 
The notion of penumbra might imply very extensive shaping while the emphasis 
upon love as mercy might circumscribe it somewhat. Let us examine Gregory’s 
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thought before we further evaluate the possible implications of gradualist political 
theologies. 
 Gregory, in his Politics and the Order of Love, is focused especially on the 
question of love’s role in politics and applies the abovementioned notion of the 
hypostatic union of love and justice to that problem. According to Gregory, love has 
a vocation in politics that has its root in a love for God, within which the neighbour 
is loved. That is, a Christian love of neighbours in God is what makes the 
constructive enterprise of politics possible for Christians.68 But how, exactly, 
according to Gregory, should this love of neighbours in God be translated into 
common political structures in which the language of justice reigns? Here again 
Gregory makes an interesting move, drawing an analogy between the problem of 
reconciling the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ with the need to hold together 
God’s love and God’s justice: “Learning how to say both claims at the same time 
without denying the other—God is just and God is  love—God is human and God is 
divine—is part of what Christian theology is all about.”69 
 In this way Gregory hopes to speak of the aforementioned “hypostatic 
union”70 of love and justice wherein both witness to Christ, with love being “the 
condition for the possibility of justice.”71 How are justice and love then different? As 
one reads Gregory’s book it becomes clear that he believes that they are not different. 
To Gregory, justice is simply love in a certain mode. Justice is love in public. This is 
confirmed when Gregory logically prioritizes the “hypostatic union” by saying that 
“love could be seen as the condition for the possibility of justice.”72 He maintains 
furthermore that justice is, in fact, love correcting itself in order to be more loving 
“by not overwhelming its object.”73 But if the church’s love translates into temporal 
justice does that not imply that temporal authorities will, eventually, become like the 
church? Gregory maintains that this is not the case and claims a position that avoids 
both such theocracy as well as status quo defeatism.74 He intends his position to go 
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74 Gregory writes: “I have tried to claim a space for a more dynamic Augustinian liberalism that 
avoids theocracy and status quo defeatism.” See ibid., 364. 
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neither the way of hostility between love and justice found in radical theological 
thought nor the way of peaceful, static border control between love and justice of 
which realist theologians are sometimes accused. Without further analysis of the 
concept of justice it is, however, unlikely that Gregory can accomplish his goal. 
 
iv. Responding to the Gradualist Theologies 
These short summaries of the three schools of modern political theology describe 
them in a way that allows them to criticize one another. But the gradualist theologies 
are more difficult to criticize in this mode. Today, gradualist theologies seem to be 
gaining headway and have faced little in the way of comprehensive critique. A more 
comprehensive evaluation of all three political theologies will follow in the thesis. 
For now, a short note on the general project of gradualist theologies will suffice to 
compensate for the lack of comprehensive contemporary responses. 
 If the relationship between love and justice, or church and political structures, 
is what the gradualist theologians will have us believe, it begets a simple question: 
Are democratic citizens then not supposed to shape the democratic state laws, 
regulations and structures according to what they love? It is arguable that 
O’Donovan, and certain that Gregory, must be understood to answer this question 
positively. The question that then quickly arises is that of the effect this has on the 
relationship of the modern Christian to the state. If our loves are determined to a 
great extent by the love we learn of in the Gospel, does a gradualist framework not 
allow us to foster a theocratic impulse? Does the Christian not want to shape the state 
into the complete image of the good, the true and the beautiful he comes to know in 
the Gospel of Christ? 
Gregory displays a more perfectionist optimism in this regard than 
O’Donovan does, which entails that “the theocratic charge” is more directly 
applicable to him. Gregory defends himself against such a charge and argues that the 
consciousness of the existence of sin in the world tempers how much love one spills 
into the public realm. This consciousness of sin does the work of determining that we 
cannot “aim too high”75 as we seek to mould the state to our concept of the good. 
Thereby, Gregory clearly states that his framework does not set it as the state’s telos 
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to become like the church. He clearly claims that his vision is not theocratic. But if 
that is the case, then the citizen who wants to lead his life in the context of modern 
Western democracies has little sense of how to go about it. What do Gregory’s 
suggestions mean for the Christian’s daily reality as a citizen interacting with the 
state? In other words: What does any distinction between love and political justice 
with increased emphasis on love in politics concretely mean? It might be suggested 
that gradualist theologians risk keeping the relationship and boundaries between love 
and the justice of political structures unclear, thereby sending Christians on an 
equally unclear mission which could land anywhere between a quietist retreat and a 
theocratic vision. This consequence would follow from a lack of criteria of 
engagement. It all sounds very good when Gregory describes the civil rights 
movement in America as having been an event in which love became justice (that is, 
love translated into concrete legislation) in order to illustrate that there is and must be 
a dynamic between love and temporal politics.76 But is this what truly happened in 
the civil rights movement? And if it is, where does love stop and by what criteria? 
 
v. The Debate: An Outline of the Issues and Problems 
We have surveyed three types of understandings of the relationship between love and 
justice in political structures. We discovered that the three understandings are built 
on problematic or incomplete understandings of the relationship between love and 
justice in political structures. The approach of the realist theologians cannot properly 
account for Christian engagement and influence on political government but instead 
risks creating a neat, peaceful, boundary between love and justice in temporal 
politics whereby each is, to a large extent, unaffected by the other. Although the 
realist understanding gives us an account of a temporal justice, it seems by nature 
simply that of a justice compromised. This is made more problematic by the cryptic 
role love plays with regards to political government in realist political theology, 
rendering the criteria for temporal justice unclear and without a clear vocation for 
love and thereby feeding directly into the critique later posed by the radical political 
theologies. 
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 The approach taken by radical political theologies also has its flaws. Instead 
of a peaceful boundary, they present a relationship between love and justice in 
political structures that easily slides into negative tension and animosity. There is no 
recognition of a special temporal sphere of justice. Rather, the ethical demand of the 
Gospel is the same in every sphere and every context. In the radical political 
theologies this is further exacerbated by the very strict ways in which they picture 
how love can find expression, radical non-violence being the pre-eminent trait. As a 
result they risk ending up in an unhappy binary which tends either to theocracy or a 
ghettoizing of the church. 
The gradualist political theologies try to escape these alternatives of quietism 
and hostility towards temporal political structures. To do this they attempt to posit a 
dynamic between church and political structures. Love becomes justice—the justice 
of the state gradually takes on the shape of Christian love. But this approach provides 
no criteria for engagement. When does love cease becoming justice? Does the 
transformation of political institutions stop before they become like the church? 
Before they effectively become a pseudo-church? The result of gradualist political 
theology is that political judgment and action becomes more difficult than it has to 
be, and without sufficient criteria to guide them.  
 
vi. Where We Must Now Head 
We have now given a description of our conversation partners that both prepares us 
for our coming interactions with them throughout the thesis and also helps us better 
understand the thesis’s own context and importance. After our survey of our 
interlocutors we can see more clearly what is needed. What is needed is a theological 
approach that rightly analyses the relationship between love and justice and, in turn, 
the relationship between love and temporal political structures. Furthermore, what 
should be sought are guiding criteria that can successfully guide acts of Christian 
political action and judgment. 
In order to do this we will later investigate the concept of Love (Chapter 3). 
After that we will seek to understand the Relationship of Love to Justice (Chapter 4). 
But especially, we will be investigating the relationship between Love and Justice in 
Reference to Political Structures (Chapter 5). Finally, to complete our picture we 
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will be looking to find Criteria of Interaction concerning love and justice (Chapter 
6). 
Yet to be properly able to do this we have to start at the beginning, by asking 
first how to inquire theologically into ethics and politics. This will allow the project 
to unfold naturally and provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the theological 
limitations and possibilities of other schools of political theology. Thus, the question 
of how to inquire theologically into ethics and politics will be the subject of the next 
chapter (Chapter 2). We must do this if we are to confidently address our central 
concerns, because we must first understand the terms on we will be thinking, as these 
terms will determine every moment in the subsequent argument. This is the first 
building block in saying something theologically concerning politics. In this next 
chapter we will learn what can and cannot be used as resources for thinking 
theologically about our subject matter. We will begin with a constructive argument 
concerning theological thought, moving from broad brush strokes toward ever-
greater concretizations. At the end of the chapter we will, as in every subsequent 
chapter, engage our conversation partners on the issue of theology and human 
thought, thereby providing a more definite account of the thesis’s contentions as well 
as what they entail. At this point we will, therefore, begin by inquiring into theology 





Chapter 2  
Theology in Ethics and Politics 
 
The main concern of this chapter is to understand the ground rules for theological 
rationality as it engages in ethics and political theology. The most basic objective 
here is to understand what can be brought into the process of theological thought 
concerning matters ethical and political. A range of understandings concerning this 
basic element of theological thinking have, traditionally, been categorized into two 
camps: natural theologies and theologies of revelation. This is found extended into 
ethics and politics in the form of what can be called “revealed ethics” and “natural 
ethics.” By the end of this chapter it will have become clear where, within that 
conceptual constellation, the argument of the present thesis is broadly to be located. 
In the following section, in the interaction with the thesis’s conversation partners, 
that broad placement will be better detailed and concretized. The present chapter will 
contend that a natural theology/ethics that would hope to bring natural, empirical 
realities into the theological thought procedure cannot be sustained without serious 
qualifications. This is not to say that speculation upon natural empirical realities 
cannot enter into any type of interaction with the theological thought procedure. 
However, the status of such speculation has to be delineated and circumscribed to the 
greatest extent, as will be better explained later. 
 
A. The De-centring and Re-ordering Event 
Investigating the effects of the event of the Gospel on human thought raises the 
question concerning the extent, impact and radicality of that event in relation to the 
thinking subject confronted with it. This means that we want to understand the extent 
to which, when assented to, the revelation of God in Christ, as confirmed in the 
resurrection of Christ, demands a complete reordering of human thought with respect 
to that event. The answer will have momentous consequences for subsequent 
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theological thinking concerning ethics and politics as it will determine what can and 
cannot be brought into the processes of theological thinking. 
It might seem that any idea of a “complete reordering of human thought” 
must come through a point of certainty around which every other thought must be 
ordered. A solid instinct guides that presupposition. Yet, when thinking theologically 
we must take care to avoid problematic understandings of certainty that assume that 
certainty must be achieved by the human subject operating its own independent 
processes based on “a point within.” 
We must, therefore, begin by shaking off understandings of certainty which 
do not hold in light of the Gospel event. One must begin by saying that the human 
subject presented with the Scripture’s proclamation of the cross and resurrection of 
Christ is put into an inverse relation to Scripture which threatens humankind’s own 
pretentions to certainty and knowledge. Humanity no longer can sit and judge the 
Scripture. In the Scripture’s Gospel-proclamation, it is humankind that is under 
judgment. It is humankind’s judgment that is played out on the cross of Christ and in 
his resurrection. Humankind is therefore thrust into a great crisis by the proclamation 
of the Scripture, one which does not occur when, for example, reading the daily 
newspaper. Humankind, not God, is placed in severe doubt by the cross of Christ, in 
the judgment which belonged to humanity. Bent Flemming Nielsen puts it well when 
he writes: “Der Mensch selbst, als erkennendes, deutendes, auslegendes Subjekt, 
wird—von der eigenen inneren ‚Sache‘ des Textes—in eine “Krisis” gestellt . . . die 
menschliche ‚Erkenntnis‘ selbst unter eine ‚Krisis‘ gestellt wird, bei der alle 
autonomen Prinzipien des Erkennens und der Vernunft  von der ‚Sache‘ des Texts 
selbst in Frage gestellt.”77  
Yet the greatest moment, the moment which makes the understanding of this 
great judgment possible, which reverses human subjectivity, is the de-centring of the 
subject confronted with the proclamation of Scripture. Humankind is summoned and 
allowed to identify itself with the man that is forgiven, the man without sin, the man 
who is revealed in the resurrected Christ. Humanity’s true identity is with the risen 
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Christ! The Christian subject is only rightly known in this proclaimed event. This is 
the result of the acceptance of the proclamation itself. The Christian subject, in faith, 
identifies itself with the subject of faith proclaimed. Therefore, the Christian 
proclamation entails a complete re-ordering of human thought when assented to. It is 
not a re-ordering around a Cartesian point within, but around a point outside the 
thinking subject.78 Certainty received in the position of faith initiates a re-ordering of 
human thought. The human subject, its knowledge of itself, is placed outside itself 
with the true man of the proclamation, Jesus Christ. The certainty received in the 
position of faith can have little to do with humankind’s pretence to self-acquired 
certainty. It plays out as a Copernican revolution of human subjectivity. To put it in 
dryer, less poetic language: Human subjectivity is decentred by the Christian 
proclamation entailing that human subjectivity must be re-centred around the centre 
of the proclamation. The results must be that the theological thought process is a 
thought process based on the proclamation and not on material accessed prior to or 
alongside that proclamation. This however creates its own crisis for human thought, 
a great tribulation in fact. Certainty in faith, unlike the Cartesian meditation which 
arrives at certainty through a method of doubt, makes the believer per se subject to 
doubt. This is the radicality of the event of the Gospel which entails a re-ordering of 
human thought with respect to itself. 
As has been stated, humanity is thrust into a moment of great crisis by the 
proclamation of the Gospel. That this crisis is included and necessitated by the 
proclamation is nothing new. But for some reason theologians do not agree on the 
severity of the crisis. What has already been said about the Gospel should show the 
all-consuming nature of this crisis. It should show how the subjectivity of the person 
confronted by this proclamation, in order to receive it, has to be completely re-
ordered around the event. This obviously means that the event is not only the great 
positive around which thinking must conform but a great critic of all the 
presuppositions of the thinking subject. It was systematic doubt which led Descartes 
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to certainty, but one could say that the certainty of faith in understanding leads the 
Christian subject to doubt.  
Therefore, it can be said that every theology that does not let itself succumb 
to something analogous to a “Cartesian” method of doubt in relation to the Gospel of 
the resurrection of Christ is not letting the event form theology to the extent that it 
demands.  Everything has to be doubted through the proclamation. One cannot even 
be confident enough to say that the Gospel includes God’s “Yes” to creation as it is 
empirically present to our senses in everyday experience and that creation therefore 
becomes an independent source of truths about human nature and human action. 
After the event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, creation can be said to be rightly 
known only through looking to the resurrected Jesus Christ. Creation has no 
independent reality apart from that. 
Let us stop briefly to explain this notion of the resurrection of Christ as a 
creation event. This is an understanding whose importance will become clearer as 
the chapter continues. It is a thought that emphasizes that creation is rightly 
understood only by looking to God’s revelation of himself in Christ. It agrees with 
what Barth maintains: “I believe in Jesus Christ, God’s Son our Lord in order to 
perceive and to understand that God the Almighty, the Father, is the Creator of 
heaven and earth. If I did not believe the former, I could not perceive and 
understand the latter. If I perceive and understand the latter, my perception and 
understanding are completely established, sustained and impelled by me believing 
the former.”79 This means that anything we say about creation theologically is 
made possible by the revelation which is itself fully understood only through the 
revelation of God in Christ, as Barth notes in discussing some past failures of 
theology that could have been avoided “if it had realized that it is primarily the 
creature and not the Creator of whom we are not certain, and that in order to be 
certain of him we need proof or revelation.”80 
Saying all this entails that “a creation ethic” is properly possible only 
through the self-proving divine act of revelation whereby creation is properly 
identified as the new creation in Christ. This is important for the present work. 
Creation must be identified by looking through the new creation in Christ. The 
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difficult question is whether the new creation in Christ (known through 
proclamation) can be theologically correlated with “everyday empirical reality.” 
But that is a question to which we will turn later. For now, it will be enough to 
know that the resurrection of Christ, the Gospel, is a creation event in which the 
invisible ground and end of creation is constituted and made visible and available 
to rational reflection. More importantly, this highlights our earlier contention that 
the Gospel revelation is the starting point for theology and the only starting point 
for theology, which also means that it is a checkpoint through which no 
assumptions can be brought. Or better yet: a point against which each and every 
one of our theological assumptions needs to be tested again and again. Natural 
theology—a theology that attempts to gain theological insight by beginning with 
created, empirical reality—has become suspect, to say the least. 
 
B. Thinking Theologically 
How does theology then proceed constructively? First, theological thinking has to be 
determined by the object of theology that makes the radical, re-ordering demand. 
Ultimately this object is the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. But 
theology does not have direct access to this object but only indirect through the 
witness and proclamation of it as it has revealed itself in Jesus Christ. This means 
that theology’s object is approached indirectly through its proclamation. In 
addressing itself to this proclamation which is found in the Scriptures, human 
thought engages in theology. Human thought confronts its object, the proclamation, 
and derives concepts from it. Often the concepts will bring with them what appear to 
be contradictions. Then theology has to think through the seeming contradictions 
introduced by these concepts of thought and seek, by thought, to transcend the 
tensions created by the concepts themselves. This is what we will attempt to do in 
our discussions of political theology, for example in our treatment of love and justice 
as mitigated by the concepts of promise and judgment. But what is our approach in 
doing this? How do we allow ourselves to bring into the thesis certain concepts from 
the Scriptures and not others? The most straightforward answer we can give to this, 
risking banality, is: by reading the Scriptures. This means that one must immerse 
oneself in the thought-world of the Scriptures and then proceed to speak about it. But 
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this answer can be qualified even more. One is helped by reading the Scriptures with 
the background of other readings, past and present—the tradition of reading. One’s 
reading is, furthermore, also helped by research in historical–critical scholarship and 
other fields of biblical study. But neither human traditions nor historical–critical 
scholarship can take control of the reading as the Bible must be free and not captive 
in its speaking to us. So it is that “simply reading” the Scriptures must be the primary 
practice with the tradition of reading as well as more technical biblical scholarship 
being secondary. 
Now in saying this we must be honest and admit that, although it is pure 
exegesis that we want, there will always be an element of both “reading in” and 
“reading out of” the text. But it is likewise certain that neither any tradition of 
reading, nor any historical–critical scholarship will ensure us against the ever-lurking 
threat that we read into the text. It is obvious that succumbing to traditions alone is a 
form of willing captivity to certain static points in the text in what is an ever-flowing 
conversation. And although historical–critical scholars might sometimes be made 
uneasy by the exegetical expansion or abbreviation of certain biblical texts, we must 
agree with Barth: “It is precisely a strict faithfulness which compels us to expand or 
to abbreviate the text, lest a too rigid attitude to the words should obscure that which 
is struggling to expression in them and which demands expression.”81 
Anselm of Canterbury’s naming of God as “that above which nothing greater 
can be conceived” can, in this way, be said to be highly scriptural, following the deep 
logic of the Scriptures, even though the formulation itself is nowhere to be found 
there. Furthermore, Anselm’s subsequent theological procedure is one we find 
ourselves looking to as it cogently describes what we mean when we claim that 
theology must think through tensions brought about by its concepts. Anselm engaged 
with the Scriptures, emerged with his concept of “that above which nothing greater 
can be conceived,” found its negation/opposition (i.e., its non-existence) within his 
mind, but found that its negation was impossible. The negation or opposition tested 
and fortified the Scriptural concept. It was not simply that the affirmation was 
unaffected by its opposition, but that it was strengthened by it. By presenting the 
affirmation from the Scriptures with its opposition the strength of the affirmation was 
                                                 




tested and proven. Examples of this type of thinking will be found in some of the 
conceptual thinking concerning political theology later in the thesis.82 
Here we must keep in mind that some readings are more commonplace than 
others and it is certain that all readings can be disputed. But we cannot allow 
ourselves the luxury of testing every concept used in the current thesis. We can, 
however, make a point of not using concepts which are too obviously debatable. We 
will instead focus on concepts and inferences which are such that the burden of proof 
is more obviously on those who would want to dispute them. As Barth writes: “That 
the assumptions are certainly justified is at the end only a relative certainty. They 
cannot be proven. In this uncertainty my fundamental assumption is, of course, 
included. For the present, however, I assume that in the Epistle to the Romans Paul 
did speak of Jesus Christ, and not of someone else.”83 This might of course, seem 
like a trivialization of a very complicated debate which turns on hermeneutics and a 
host of other topics. It is however meant not to be a trivialization but rather a 
reminder that we should keep our focus and follow the central thrust of our 
investigation. 
 
C. Inferences and Interaction with Conversation Partners 
But let us get back to the main line of reasoning we have followed in the current 
chapter. Let us recall that human subjectivity is decentred by the Christian 
proclamation, entailing that human subjectivity must be re-centred on the 
proclamation. This entails that the theological thought procedure is based on the 
proclamation and not upon material accessed prior to or alongside the proclamation. 
Proceeding from this understanding, human thought confronts its object, the 
proclamation, and derives concepts from it. Then theology has to think through the 
seeming contradictions introduced by these concepts of thought and seek, by thought, 
to transcend the tensions created by the concepts themselves. In all of this theology 
will be operating only with the relative certainty that theologians will be reading out 
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more than they will be reading into the text. This is the dry outline of what we have 
established. 
Having described the theological method in this way lays the groundwork for 
the investigation that follows. It also advances an argument pertaining to how the 
work of theology, particularly political theology, ought to proceed. Importantly, in 
light of this positive description of the theological thought process, other approaches 
must be judged incomplete or untenable. As a result, what is conventionally known 
as natural theology must fall under suspicion. Natural theology, which seeks to have 
theological reasoning determined by natural reality or “perceivable facts” of 
empirical reality, cannot be sustained without serious qualifications. This also holds 
true for theological ethics. There is no room left for any kind of natural theology 
which would want to correlate speculation upon natural actualities with theological 
thinking so as to create a theological ethic determined by non-theological realities. 
The radical claim of the Gospel-message over and against human subjectivity has 
been established with that effect. It will influence all subsequent thinking concerning 
the concepts of love and justice and their relations to political structures. 
However, this impossibility of natural theology for theological ethics should 
be explained a bit further. If human thought is constituted in the event of 
resurrection, then thinking based on the event is not determined by considerations 
external to itself. Everything needs to be accessed in light of the event itself. Much 
theology in the present, but still more so in the past, has tended to bring assumptions 
alien to the Gospel into the discussion and to see the Gospel as a consummation or an 
add-on to what was already an intelligible reality—creation. In this way, some 
Christian thinkers began to feel comfortable taking up Aristotelian considerations 
into their theological method of thought. They could claim through observation, for 
example, that human beings are by nature social animals and thereby also political 
animals. They could then, as a result, use this to infer that before the fall of Adam 
there was a political order and that, having a pre-lapsarian origin, political authority 
should be considered good. This is a helpful example that portrays a confusion of 
theological with natural speculation. This was a break with the Augustinian tradition 
which would not identify politics as originally good based on such reasoning.84 True 
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to the Christ-event, Augustine saw that true justice was only with and in Christ and 
that therefore “true justice has no existence save in that republic whose founder and 
ruler is Christ.”85 But with the aforementioned Christian Aristotelians, a pre-
theological determination of humankind entered the theological thought procedure 
and kept human thought from being fully shaped by the event which concerns 
theology. Such theological thought has, historically, been called “natural theology” 
insofar as “nature” acts as a source for theological reasoning. We have already parted 
ways with such theological traditions. Natural theology is off the table in its most 
typical forms. 
We should nevertheless try to be a bit more specific about what we mean 
when we use concepts such as natural theology and revealed theology. It has been 
said that natural theology threatens to bring non-theological reasoning into the 
theological thought procedure. Revealed theology, on the other hand, is the antithesis 
to natural theology in that it can be charged with irrationalism, making natural 
realities incomprehensible. The implicit danger, someone could say, is that in any 
determination based solely on revelation the human will imposes order on life, both 
individual and social, instead of recognizing the order which is already there in 
nature.86 But this short sketch is rather incomplete. So, let us inquire further into the 
meaning of the concepts of “a revealed ethic” and “a natural ethic.” Here we want 
highlight two elements which are, however, deeply interrelated. One of those 
elements is more distinctively epistemological, the other considers ethical 
implications. 
First, there is an epistemological element which relates to the relationship 
between faith and natural reason. The question is whether there is any theological 
knowledge beyond, outside of or prior to the proclamation of God’s revelation. In 
this aspect a theology of revelation is associated with a faith which has its ground 
solely in the revelation. Natural theology, on the other hand, would then understand 
faith to have sources of theological knowledge beyond, outside of or prior to 
knowledge of proclamation. Revealed theology in the epistemological aspect can, as 
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was said before, be charged with irrationalism and a disjunction between natural 
realities and theological knowledge. On the other hand, natural theology, regarding 
its epistemological aspect, could be accused of making faith in the revelation into a 
mere add-on to “natural knowledge of God.” 
Second, and following from this, there is the ethical implication of revealed 
theology and natural theology in regard to external realities. Regarding this aspect 
the concern is how the human being acts with regard to empirical and material 
realities. Revealed theology, regarding this aspect, means that human beings could 
possibly act on empirical reality with no regard for “the way things are.” Natural 
theology, on the other hand, sees how things are, the natural order of things, as 
legislative of human actions. The revealed ethic can be accused of seeing no order 
“out there” while the natural ethic could be charged with being too constrained by 
the natural orders it pretends to see. The revealed ethic can be said to tend to impose 
order while the natural ethic recognizes and acts in accordance with a pre-established 
order. 
This opposition of approaches has tempted many to take a stand with one 
thesis against the other, while yet other thinkers have wanted to have the best of both 
worlds and reach some kind of synthesis. Our primary conversation partners have 
addressed these issues in varying degrees but each one of them can be mined to find 
where they fall with respect to these very basic issues of theology: revealed theology 
and natural theology in light of their abovementioned epistemic and ethical aspects. 
 
i. Being Mindful of the Anthropological Trap 
As one looks to the work of Stanley Hauerwas one is struck by how idiosyncratic, 
yet strangely compelling, his view is of the relationship between revelation, theology 
and ethics. At first glance it might seem that Hauerwas’s frequent use of the concept 
of revelation and appreciation of Karl Barth suggests that he places a strong 
emphasis on revelation as the basis for Christian knowledge. This might be taken to 
imply that, concerning the epistemological aspect of the revealed theology/natural 
theology divide, Hauerwas would exhibit a decidedly strong emphasis on revelation. 
But there remains an issue that changes that initial assumption, which is how 
Hauerwas believes the revelation is mediated. Hauerwas maintains that human 
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witness, through church practices, is the way in which the revelation is mediated, 
explained and propagated.87 In this vein Hauerwas claims that “Christian identity is 
not primarily to be found in statements or debates or arguments, but in particular 
practices, commitments and habits.” The Gospel story “is not merely told but 
embodied in a people’s habits that form and are formed in worship, governance and 
morality. Therefore, the existence of Israel and the church is not accidentally related 
to the story but is necessary for our knowledge of God” [italics mine].88 This is not, 
of course, a one-sided emphasis in virtue of which orthopraxis rules alone without 
orthopistis entering the picture. But importantly, church practices seem to hold a 
position that is primary or equal to the Scripture proclamation within Hauerwas’s 
theology. This can be seen in Hauerwas’s insistence that the Scriptures are given 
their importance by the concrete, practicing community. Writing on the issue of 
tradition and Scripture, for example, Hauerwas claims: “Of course, Scripture stands 
over the community exerting a critical function but that it does so is an aspect of the 
community’s self-understanding.”89 Furthermore, Hauerwas has reminded his readers 
of how there was once a Christian community before it had written and collected its 
texts.90 By such statements, and combined with the highly charged rhetoric 
concerning the centrality of the church, Hauerwas could be regarded as giving 
logical, epistemological priority to the community of believers. 
Hauerwas indeed prefers looking towards the practices of the community as a 
source for doing theology. In fact, in the large companion to Christian ethics that 
Hauerwas has edited, several aspects of the church liturgy are used as the primary 
ground for theologizing. It therefore seems that, within the Hauerwasian scheme of 
things, God is known through the practices of a human community. This may well 
awaken the question as to whether this entails the possibility of engaging in the 
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anthropology of the church, consisting of investigations of empirical actualities, and 
calling it theology. It would certainly seem too harsh to describe Hauerwas’s method 
in this way without serious qualification. But the question encapsulates a certain 
uneasiness we might acknowledge regarding Hauerwas’s theological method. There 
can most certainly be a place for human witness in a theology of revelation. But the 
question is what exactly we mean by human witness and Hauerwas’s treatment of it, 
at times, gives pause. When Hauerwas ventures to write, for example, that “theology 
is primarily about the Church,” and that “this means that theological ethics is a 
discipline that reflects on the practices of the Church,”91 we cannot follow him. We 
should avoid using empirical actualities as the basis of theological affirmations. 
Hauerwas’s epistemic use of the empirical manifestations of the church might be in 
danger of doing just that. 
As we look to the natural/revealed theology divide as it regards external 
realities, a very similar problematic plays out in Hauerwas’s writings. First, 
Hauerwas does understand there to be such a thing as creation and that it is woven 
into the perceived natural order. As Hauerwas writes: “I certainly would not deny the 
natural order as a manifestation of God’s kingdom.”92 But he also claims that “The 
issue is not creation, but the kind of creation Jews and Christians continue to affirm 
as integral to God’s being.” That is to say, not everything perceived as part of the 
natural order is self-legitimating as God’s good creation. Already this underscores 
the importance of adopting a judicious approach with regard to external realities in 
determining the extent to which they are to be seen as “integral to God’s being.” And 
if they are not deemed “integral” in this way, there is considerable license to act 
towards the external realities so as to transform them, an attitude we have associated 
with the revealed ethic. Yet, where does Hauerwas find a measuring stick with which 
to engage in judicious reasoning of this kind? It should come as little surprise that 
Hauerwas points us in the direction of the church, as it is there that we find the “new 
unity of creation in Christ Jesus . . . most nearly embodied.”93 So we can, and ought 
to, engage with external realities based on the attempt to correlate them with the new 
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unity of creation in Christ, and Hauerwas believes this is possible by holding the 
church in view. Here it is, again, the centrality of the church which causes us unease. 
It makes the possibility of the correlation between empirical actualities seem too 
straightforward and gives the church an uncomfortable status in this regard. If one 
were to follow Hauerwas one would have to be very careful that one’s ecclesiology 
does not overshadow one’s Christology and that empirical actualities of the church 
do not overtake one’s theology. The clear danger, to speak in hyperbole, is that our 
theology might begin to look like the anthropology of the church. 
 
ii. Avoiding Over-Confident Correlations 
A very different set of possibilities and problems emerge with the theology of 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr does not make much use of the concepts of revealed and 
natural theology. Nonetheless, his attitude to the issues at stake can be adequately 
discerned from his writings. As one looks to Niebuhr’s theological method it might, 
at first, seem rather difficult to capture. Furthermore, once grasped, his method might 
appear somewhat unprincipled. But there is a definite method and this initial sense of 
unclarity is easily explained by what Niebuhr hopes to accomplish with his method. 
 Niebuhr has a binary loyalty to both revelation and human experience. As a 
champion of revelation, he criticizes the modern scientific mindset which pretends 
that it can approach its subjects without any kind of framework for meaning to make 
sense of empirical data. It is, according to Niebuhr, a great pretension. In fact, the 
presuppositions of scientists, time after time, determine the conclusions arrived at by 
the “empirical” method. Furthermore, such a mindset blinds the scientist by its bare 
reductionism. Niebuhr makes an example of the Christian insistence on humankind’s 
egocentricity. Niebuhr writes: “academic ‘empiricism’ insists that the Christian 
conviction rests upon a dogmatic assumption, rather than upon evidence. It, 
therefore, proceeds to uncover evidence that particular forms of egocentricity are the 
consequence of particular causes. This is indeed a fact. But preoccupation with this 
fact tempts a scientific culture to obscure the more general human phenomenon 
which underlies the particular social and psychic causes. . . . Thus an elaborate 
scientific enterprise may result in a totally unjustified nominalism, unable to 
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apprehend general and universal characteristics under an obviously unique 
phenomenon.”94 
 Niebuhr’s point is that some kind of framework is needed to read empirical 
data and, to the theologian, the Christian revelation provides a framework for 
meaning. Nevertheless, although the abovementioned quotes might make it sound 
differently, Niebuhr does not oppose the empirical, scientific mentality. He is a firm 
believer in the importance of human experience as a necessary corrective for our 
ideas and ideologies: “Any careful observation of any structure of reality, of 
sequences and causes, even if its frame of reference is inadequate, will yield some 
truth.”95 Niebuhr can therefore be said to have a twofold concern, one with the 
revelatory framework of interpretation and another with human experiences. This 
reveals much about Niebuhr’s theological method. Niebuhr’s own words capture this 
perfectly as he writes, concerning his own theological method, that it seeks a 
“circular relation between faith and experience.”96 This indicates an understanding of 
theology which seeks an ever-re-occurring correlation between the truths of faith and 
the truths of human experience. It is this clearly phrased attitude that can create the 
impression that Niebuhr’s method is somehow lax or unprincipled. As Robert Song 
points out: “Because of this correlation, it was possible for Niebuhr to reach 
conclusions argued either from a consideration of the facts or from the premises of 
theology.”97 
 This is further exacerbated by Niebuhr’s uncomfortable, but repeated, 
reference to the truths of the Christian faith as “myths.” There is a good defence to be 
made for his use of the concept “myth” in that it is employed to counter literalist and 
superficial readings of the revelation. According to Niebuhr, “it is the genius of true 
myth to suggest the dimension of depth in reality and to point to a realm of essence 
which transcends the surface of history.” But Niebuhr’s method, coupled with his 
understanding of the “myths” of Christianity as portraying “the dimension of depth 
in reality” creates its own problems. As Robert Song argues, “the potential danger of 
founding it on an understanding of religion as the dimension of depth in human 
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existence is that the symbols may gain existential or experiential purchase at the 
expense of referential content: The content may become subordinated to, e.g., social 
or political requirements, which may themselves be interpreted in a way that is 
insufficiently rooted theologically.”98 
 One might not, however, even have to go all the way to Niebuhr’s use of 
the language of myths to find problems with his method. This is because Niebuhr’s 
desire to maintain the circular relation of faith and human experience and call this a 
theological method still fails to make accurate distinctions. As will be argued later, 
empirical, experiential data is included in the ethical decision-making of the ethical 
agent. But these empirical, experiential actualities are not an aspect of the first tier of 
that procedure, the meta-analysis that takes place before concrete ethical decision 
and engagement. A more extensive treatment of what this concretely means will 
follow in the coming chapter on love. For now, it suffices to say that Niebuhr 
threatens to bring extra theological material into the theological thought process with 
his too-facile correlation of faith and experience. This again reminds us of the 
aforementioned Christian Aristotelians, who felt much too comfortable drawing 
theological truths from anthropological considerations. Much of what Niebuhr writes 
is compelling. But building on what this thesis has already established, Niebuhr’s 
attempt at a synthesis must be said to have too little hesitation and circumscription 
when it comes to meshing theology and natural speculation together and reaching 
“conclusions argued either from a consideration of the facts or from the premises of 
theology,”99 thus creating the illusion that they follow from the Gospel revelation in 
equal measure. 
 As regards the second external aspect of the revealed/natural theology 
divide, one could say that Niebuhr attempts a similar type of bridge-building. While 
it is true, according to Niebuhr, that humankind acts in accordance with natural 
reality, it is not determined by it to the fullest and the good life cannot be 
characterized simply by adherence to the perceived natural order: “The real situation 
is that man transcends his own reason, which is to say that he is not bound in his 
actions by reason’s coherences and systems. His freedom consists in a capacity for 
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self-transcendence in infinite regression.”100 So it is that natural reality and 
humankind’s perception of it should determine humankind’s action within it, but a 
possibility always remains for humankind to rethink the situation in terms of a 
transcendent, theological, possibility. As a result, there is always a slight possibility 
that the mechanisms of seeming natural necessities could be broken up. Once the will 
is given an equal or prior place to natural reason, humanity can will against perceived 
social and natural structures. 
 The question arises here as to which holds logical priority for Niebuhr, 
humankind’s perception of the world, nature and its rational structures or his 
transcendent freedom to act in disjunction to those structures? In the end, no direct 
answer is given and one might even say that Niebuhr would have liked to see himself 
as falling on neither side of that dispute. It has already been said that there is always 
a slight possibility for transcendent freedom to be exercised but one of the less clear 
aspects of Niebuhr’s though is the extent to which this is the case. While we must 
appreciate Niebuhr’s hope for a synthesis, the latter could never become a proper 
synthesis as it simply seeks to unite two elements to create something like a halfway 
house between what we have called revealed theology and natural theology. It is 
more of a balancing act than a synthesis. 
 
iii. Emphasizing the Speculative Nature of Correlation 
Oliver O’Donovan’s approach differs somewhat from those of other thinkers. Like 
Niebuhr, he regrets the polarization of revealed ethic and natural ethic and wants to 
bring the opposing sides together. He advises against the polarization of an ethic 
without ontological grounding and an ethic based on creation and so naturally 
known.101 But rather than simply stating this he articulates the manner in which these 
must be taken together. Out of our conversation partners, as will be shown, 
O’Donovan is the one, according to our measures, with the most compelling 
treatment of these issues. As a result, the substance of our discussion concerning the 
issue of revealed and natural theology will focus on O’Donovan’s writings. It will 
therefore be by moving through O’Donovan that we can best explain where the 
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current thesis stands with regards to revealed and natural knowledge in their 
epistemological and ethical dimensions. Saying that we move “through” 
O’Donovan’s treatment suggests that we will be following and yet elaborating on the 
sketch he has already provided. 
O’Donovan’s argument is of special interest here as it is upheld by an 
evangelical principle which is then used to re-introduce a place for theological 
thinking concerning itself with natural realities. O’Donovan’s argument, like that of 
the present thesis, is driven to focus on the resurrection of Christ as a special starting 
point for ethics because the resurrection “tells of the vindication of all creation.”102 
The Gospel of the resurrection of Christ, O’Donovan claims, pronounced not just a 
judgment over creation but also an affirmation of creation. In effect, there is a “Yes” 
spoken to creation. Thereby, O’Donovan argues, “the work of the Creator who made 
Adam, who brought into being an order of things in which humanity has a place, is 
affirmed once and for all by this conclusion.”103 Without the resurrection event, 
which acts as an affirmation of the perceived order of creation, there would, in 
O’Donovan’s opinion, be left only a world-transcending ethic of abnegation.104 This 
is why Christian ethics should begin with the resurrection. Otherwise an ethic which 
concerns itself with creation would be impossible: “God has given life on earth order 
and it should conform to the order given it.”105  
Having established all this, the results are interesting. It follows, for 
O’Donovan, that there can be no debate between an ethic of creation and an ethic of 
resurrection. The polarization of the choices is ill-advised within O’Donovan’s 
framework because the resurrection event is “the reaffirmation of creation” insofar as 
“in the resurrection of Christ creation is restored and the kingdom of God dawns.”106 
Using the language of restoration, O’Donovan argues that one cannot talk about any 
restoration of creation or human nature without recognizing a certain prior human 
nature which is being restored.107 O’Donovan therefore finds that he can boldly 
claim: “The order of things that God has made is there. It is objective, and 
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humankind has a place within it. Christian ethics, therefore, has an objective 
reference because it is concerned with man’s life in accordance with this order.”108 In 
this O’Donovan finds himself in agreement with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics in 
that he can say that “the way the universe is determines how man ought to behave 
himself in it.”109 Based on this O’Donovan can maintain:  
We are constantly presented with the unacceptably polarized choice between 
an ethic that is revealed and has no ontological grounding and an ethic that is 
based on creation and so is naturally known. This polarization deprives 
redemption and revelation of their proper theological meaning as the divine 
reaffirmation of created order. If, on the other hand, it is the gospel of the 
resurrection that assures us of the stability and permanence of the world 
which God has made, then neither of the polarized options is right. In the 
sphere of revelation, we will conclude, and only there, can we see the natural 
order as it really is and overcome the epistemological barriers to an ethic that 
conforms to nature. This nature includes all men, and indeed, as we shall see 
later, does not exclude a certain ‘natural knowledge’ which is also a part of 
man’s created endowment. And yet only in Christ do we apprehend that 
order in which we stand and that knowledge of it with which we have been 
endowed.”110  
 
What makes O’Donovan’s explanation rather tempting is the evangelical principle 
with which it begins and through which it seeks to establish other relations. We want 
however, to tread carefully, as to the status of subsequent theological thinking.  
In other words, natural reality is not all nonsensical. There is a 
correspondence between creation as revealed in Christ and natural, empirical 
realities. O’Donovan is right to say that we can have faith that our perceived, 
empirical reality will have a degree of ultimate correspondence to that which is 
promised of creation in Christ. But the fullness of creation exists only in Christ and 
the extent to which “the creation out there,” empirical reality, already partakes in this 
new life cannot be so easily correlated. Christ is the potentiality of creation but the 
degree to which this potentiality is actual in empirical reality is the greatest guessing 
game. Therefore, our contention is that we cannot correlate the two with any kind of 
certainty. We are therefore left to proceed very speculatively. It is inevitable that we 
will evaluate our external actualities and attempt to speculate on them with regard to 
the Gospel proclamation. But this exercise will be as uncertain as it is inevitable that 
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we engage in it. So, as we must find ourselves agreeing with O’Donovan concerning 
the affirmation of natural realities by the revelation of God in Christ, we must firmly 
emphasize the speculative, uncertain nature of any thoughts that proceed from this. 
This highlights a difference that must always be accentuated between theology and 
speculative engagements with natural realities as well as the priorities of and 
difference between a revealed theology and natural theology and the great guessing 
game that can easily result when we try to correlate the two. After all, we want to be 
mindful that we are engaged in a theological thought process, which means that we 
are engaged in thought based on God’s revelation in Christ. 
Even so, it is clear that theology cannot pretend to explain everything. One 
day we will see clearly, face to face, but now we see only through a glass darkly 
(1.Cor 13.12). Philosopher Alain Badiou, who has written astutely on the Apostle 
Paul as a subject of truth, explains very clearly, in his philosophy, the nature of the 
events of truth and the situation that they construct. He points out that in all truth 
processes the subjects of truth are faced with the challenge of naming all reality in 
light of the truth. But the subject of truth has to admit that “the production of a truth 
process does not have the power to name all the elements of the situation.”111 This 
needs to be kept in mind, especially since theologians, unlike most thinkers, tend to 
think that they have to be able to explain everything at all times. It is important to 
remember that, whatever we want to say about natural realities and their supposed 
relationships (as we will and must), this will, in all likelihood, be ontology and not 
statements of theology. These must not be confused. To speak in hyperbole: There is 
ontology and then there is theology. God reveals himself to be radically different 
from all other reality, as has already been established. He does not exist on the same 
level as anything else. When one discusses the proclamation of God who has 
revealed himself one engages in theology. When one speaks of natural, empirical 
realities one is likely to be engaging in metaphysics and ontology. 
Now, someone might want to object to what is being argued in this 
discussion. It could be claimed that it makes reality nonsensical if we take 
O’Donovan’s lead while accentuating and inflating the difference between revealed 
and natural theology. Included in that objection is the worry that this could forego 
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any way of transcending the opposition between revealed and natural ethics. 
Secondly, it could be charged that the type of theological thinking described in this 
chapter means that there can be no possible relationship between the theological 
thought process and our interactions with empirical, ontological actualities. It could 
be maintained, then, that such theological ethics contribute to a disregard of “the way 
things are.” 
The worry that we will not be able to achieve a synthesis between revealed 
theology and natural theology is a legitimate worry. After all, no one wants to hold 
on to an irrationalist position or endanger the integrity of theology. O’Donovan’s 
hope of bringing the two positions together concerning these matters is to be admired 
and emulated. Moreover, we are united with him in understanding that the 
affirmation (revealed theology) must somehow be strengthened and fortified by its 
opposition (the challenge of natural theology). Here we are referring to O’Donovan’s 
thinking through of the evangelical principle which then includes its opposition of 
natural theology within itself. We are, broadly, united with O’Donovan in this 
attempt. But the question is how exactly we should want to understand it. It is true 
that we must include the antithesis on the revelation’s terms. This is to say, revealed 
theology/ethics is the affirmation which is tested by its opposition by natural 
theology/ethics. But the understanding that must ensue from our prior arguments is 
that the opposition is defeated and included within the affirmation of revealed 
theology, as there is nothing “irrationalist” about it. When tested, we have found that 
a notion of an independent, self-legislating reality of creation is not necessary to 
make the theological method concerning ethics and politics more rational. In fact, we 
found the truth of the matter to be the other way around. As we said above: “‘a 
creation ethic’ is properly possible only through the self-proving divine act of 
revelation whereby creation is properly identified as the new creation in Christ.” 
Natural theology, a creation ethic, is defeated but yet included in the strengthening of 
what was affirmed, revealed theology.112 
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Regarding the second objection, it is, in reality, twofold. First, it has to do with the 
question as to how ethical concepts emerge from a heavy emphasis on the revelation  
as the main determinant of theological thinking. Second, the question regards how, 
proceeding from that understanding, the ethical actor will interact with empirical, 
historical reality. That is, will he be indifferent towards empirical, natural realities or 
accommodating of “the way things are”? 
 So, how do ethical concepts emerge from a heavy emphasis on the 
Revelation? The answer is twofold in that there we can discern two tiers of ethical 
concepts (this will be explained more clearly and concretized in the coming chapter 
on love). First, there is a “meta-ethical” level of analysis that can be said to be 
integral to the theological enterprise. Within this meta-analysis a general framework 
and trajectories are discerned by whoever is interacting with the Scriptures. As with 
all theological work, such analysis is provisional and based on the scriptural 
proclamation. Its provisional nature means that it is never certain but always under 
doubt to the extent that it involves human thought and discernment standing under 
divine love and judgment. Such theological–ethical thinking can take many shapes 
but it typically entails a progression that looks, for example, something like this: A. 
Human love descends in its service, mirroring the proclamation of the love of God. 
B. Human love does not have divine freedom in its actions. C. Therefore, human 
love is an activity characterized by hope in God’s consummation. 
A similar meta-analysis takes the following form: A. God has commanded 
certain acts in the Scriptures. B. God is free in every moment to speak anew. C. The 
commandments must be very important but cannot be said to be absolute or binding 
on God’s will. These two examples of basic thought processes are provisional and 
can be rethought and reshaped based on interaction with the Gospel-proclamation. 
The premises may be flawed and the inferences faulty. These examples illustrate 
form we are calling meta-ethical analysis 
 The second “tier” of ethical work involves a type of reasoning that adds and 
includes materials, concepts and thoughts that are not entirely scriptural but seem 
capable of being correlated with that which is discerned in the meta-analysis of 
theological ethics. It speculates not only on the revelation but also on empirical, 
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ontological realities and seeks to correlate these two in the inevitable attempt to 
discern a correct action or rule of conduct. This second tier of ethical thinking can 
also take many shapes but a typical progression might run something like this: A. 
God seeks to restore people to communion with himself. B. Capital punishment takes 
away the possibility of turning toward God. C. This entails that capital punishment is 
always wrong. Consider another example of such reasoning: A. God has ordained 
human rulers to be of service to his and our love until the eschaton. B. Violence 
disrupts the activities of love. C. The death penalty is an effective way for human 
rulers to counter violence D. Therefore the death penalty is an important statute for 
rulers to enact. 
 In both of these examples concerning the death penalty one can see that the 
reasoning includes assumptions that may or may not be scriptural but which originate 
in speculations or assumptions concerning natural, empirical realities. As has been 
stated, such thought processes will and must take place, but their reliability is even 
more subject to uncertainty than those undertaken in the first tier of theological 
ethical inquiry. These are the two ways in which ethical concepts and speculation can 
be said to emerge within the framework that has been given here. 
How this plays out will, as has been stated, be explained more fully in the 
coming chapter on love.  Nonetheless, we can answer the basic question regarding 
how an ethical actor will engage these “natural, empirical realities.” It will remain 
true that such a revealed ethic can, as O’Donovan writes, describe a reality in which 
man “imposes order on his life, both individually and socially.”113 While the present 
thesis will admit this to be the case, it will also emphasize that this is not the whole 
story. We will, as human beings, attempt to correlate and think through the relations 
between the Gospel-proclamation and perceived, natural realties. This has been 
established. Therefore, we will also, as human beings, be attentive to possible 
“unwitting disruption of benign interdependencies,”114 but such attention will be 
accompanied by an understanding of the speculative and uncertain nature of such 
thinking. 
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The more important part of the story here is that, at the end of history, the 
truth of creation lies with Christ, the Logos, and in every action the Christian subject 
strives to make this endpoint actual. This might entail engineering our individual and 
social circumstances, not necessarily, but only possibly. Most importantly, however, 
this kind of action could and should never pretend to be the actualization of God’s 
kingdom (although it might be) but purport to be only a faithful preparing the way of 
the Lord, to make his paths straight. This should, while acknowledging the 
possibility of “engineering,” present itself as an attitude rooted, first and foremost, in 
humility. By saying this we have already given a provisional answer to the 
question/objection about the interrelationship between our theological reasoning and 
Christian engagement with empirical, ontological realities. However, the answer can 
be given in full only within a discussion of Christian love and therefore will not be 
pursued further in this chapter. It will suffice to have argued that, as a result of our 
theological starting point, natural theology is suspect unless it is circumscribed as 
illustrated here. 
This chapter has been concerned with establishing the parameters for thinking 
theologically about ethics and politics. Insofar as theological ethics and political 
theology concern themselves to a great extent with external matters, it has been 
important to determine the extent to which empirical and natural actualities can be 
wellsprings of theological thinking. The thesis has argued for upholding distinctions 
between the theological and natural speculative enterprises, thereby aligning with 
understandings associated with revealed theology and ethics. This has been argued 
based on the decentring effects of the Gospel-revelation upon human subjectivity as 
well as the way in which the proclamation of the Gospel re-centres human thought 
on itself. We have also noted that, while empirical and natural actualities will 
necessarily enter the ethical and political deliberations of the theologian at some 
point, these belong to a second tier of ethical reasoning. This second tier seeks to 
correlate the strictly theological reasoning, which is provisional, with speculation on 
empirical and natural actualities which makes the judgments even less stable. 
As we have established the parameters for thinking theologically concerning 
ethics and politics, we can now inquire into the concept of love. As in this current 
chapter on theology and thought, our next chapter on theology and love will begin 
59 
 
with an expansive view, employing broad brushstrokes. It will move from that wide 
perspective towards more specific description, arguments and explanations. It is our 
way to first establish the frame, delineate the outlines, fill them out and, finally, 
produce a full picture. In the coming chapter on love we will, first, find love in its 
two forms as eros and agape and investigate their relationship to understand whether 
they can both be treated under the same concept of “love.” This will prepare us, first, 
for understanding the nature of love more clearly. Second, if we discover that the two 
concepts do form or fall under a unity, our discussion will be able to show how the 
relationship between love and justice in politics can better figure in non-Christian 
love. This is important because, as explained above, the problematic of political 
theology is partly born in confrontation with the non-Christian neighbour. Third, 
after this, we will be investigating the nature of love in its relationship to that for 
which it strives, freedom/potentiality. If we succeed in clarifying this relationship 
between love and that for which it strives, it will be of help later as we seek to relate 
love to the concept of justice in political structures. To put it concisely, in the coming 
chapter we will first investigate the internal distinctions in love (eros and agape) and 







-Love in Internal and External Distinctions- 
 
In this chapter we will seek to understand the nature, structure and work of love by 
investigating it in its two primary dimensions. First, we will be examining love in 
light of its internal distinction and unity to understand what is included and referred 
to under the concept of love. This entails investigating love in both its Christian and 
non-Christian manifestations (agape and eros) to see whether both manifestations can 
be included under the same signifier, that of “love.” This will help us better 
understand the nature and structure of love to the extent that it serves our purposes. 
Also, it will help us determine how wide its reference can be with regard to political 
structures. The present chapter will discover that love has a primary unity in that it is 
structured as a process of actualization that is set in motion by the perception of 
potentiality and striving toward potentiality. Second, the chapter will consider love in 
relation to that to which it points and works, potentiality, to see whether and in what 
way it should be viewed in distinction from potentiality. The chapter will find that 
love, while seeking actualization, does not directly accomplish actualization directly, 
but is always mediated by hope. Faith (the perception of potentiality), sets love in 
motion (works directed to actualizing potentiality), which works in hope (of 
actualization). Importantly, although their works are not to be directly correlated in 
this way, faith, hope and love are, in themselves, to be understood as instances of the 
actualization of potentiality. Having given this brief sketch of what is to come, let us 
begin by considering the basic internal structure and logic of love. 
 
A. Internal Distinction: Love as Eros and Love as Agape  
In what follows we will be employing the concepts of eros and agape as a basic 
internal distinction within the concept of love in its full and proper form. The 
concepts of eros and agape have been used for centuries in discussions on love. 
However, it is clear that in recent history it is the work of Anders Nygren that has 
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pushed the conceptual opposition between the two to the forefront. And the present 
thesis operates somewhat in indebtedness to Nygren and in response to his legacy.  
Nygren’s own concept of eros is derived mainly by mining a historical trajectory of a 
fundamental motif of love. This fundamental motif Nygren called “eros-love” and 
traced largely to Plato. However, Plato’s notion of love, according to Nygren, was 
not a discovery of the motif but a re-appropriation of a fundamentally religious motif 
operative in the cultural milieu of ancient Greece. Nygren therefore describes Plato’s 
hugely influential account of eros as a welding together of an ancient oriental mythos 
of love and the nascent Greek logos of the time.115 Nygren states that the Platonic 
outlook is so heavily influenced by this notion of love that “the myth of eros can, in 
fact, be described as the central Platonic myth.”116 This Platonic Eros-myth is, in 
Nygren’s mind, a salvific ideal,117 one wherein “eros is the mediator between Divine 
and human life.”118 Nygren’s eros-love has three chief characteristics: “(1) Eros is 
the ‘love of desire,’ or acquisitive love; (2) Eros is man’s way to the Divine; (3) Eros 
is egocentric love.”119  
Yet the eros-conception is not solely a Platonic phenomenon. This motif runs 
through Aristotle, whom Nygren interprets as granting to eros a greater physical 
focus because of his intent on explaining motion in the natural world.120 This 
secularizing tendency of the eros motif was, however, quickly lost in late antiquity 
with the development of Plotonius’s Neoplatonism and his flair for mystery-piety. 
This development, according to Nygren, “means that the Eros motif takes an even 
more central place than before.”121 Nonetheless, there is a fundamental difference 
between Plato and Plotinus. Plotinus and Neoplatonism were much more interested, 
according to Nygren, in also treating the downward vector of eros and not only the 
ascending one. And this means a type of trouble for Nygren because, while Nygren’s 
intent was to contrast eros’s ascent with agape’s descent, it would seem that 
Neoplatonism might escape that contrast. But Nygren insists that this is not the case, 
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that Neoplatonic love does not contain a properly descending attitude. Within 
Neoplatonism, Nygren affirms, there is no notion of God’s coming down to man. 
The downward vector is there only to explain how matter emanates from God, not to 
describe the process of salvation, which is an entirely ascending process within the 
Neoplatonic framework, as Nygren sees it.122  
Some commentators, as we will later learn, have disputed Nygren’s historical 
analyses as less than perfectly accurate. However, the main motifs or trajectories of 
eros and agape are helpful in organizing important distinctions within the concept of 
love. And so it is that the present thesis works with a notion of eros that is mostly 
consistent with the typology Nygren sketches out. However, there are two important 
differences. First, this thesis does not want to inflate the same type of militant 
opposition between the concepts of eros and agape, and this will be addressed at 
some length below. Second, the thesis assumes a less historical orientation than 
Nygren’s work, instead regarding the eros-type as an antithesis to the thesis of agape-
love as mediated by the Scriptures. 
If this is the case, though, then an important preliminary question emerges 
regarding our justification for using these concepts when exegetes dispute the 
presence of such a strong distinction in the Scriptures despite its being maintained by 
some in the tradition of Christian theology.123 Where do we, for example, find the 
notion of eros, a non-Christian form of love, stated clearly in the Scriptures, with any 
ideological force, as the opposite of agape-love? This is a good question. Our aim is 
nothing less than to speak in a way that is faithful to the Scriptures concerning such 
matters. In this effort we find great inspiration in looking to Anselm of Canterbury.  
When Anselm wrote out his proof for the existence of God, we can affirm 
that he was being deeply Scriptural. Through reading the Scriptures and engaging in 
prayer he emerged with the concept of “that above which nothing greater can be 
conceived” as the name of God.124 One must see that this name of God is indeed 
Scriptural, although one must simultaneously admit that the wording is nowhere to 
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be found in the very Scriptures that inspired it. As Anselm acknowledged, holding 
the concept of “that above which nothing greater can be conceived” in mind 
necessarily awoke its antithesis, its negation, that of “the non-existence” of “that 
above which nothing greater can be conceived.” It is well known that Anselm 
subsequently discovered this to be a self-contradictory concept. The affirmation of 
“that above which nothing greater can be conceived” was tested and strengthened by 
its opposition.125 Of course, it remains true that Anselm’s proof of God is a brilliant 
example of theological reasoning insofar as his thesis becomes logically necessary in 
a way that cannot be said of other subsequent theological statements. 
What is most important, for our purposes, however, is to notice, by way of 
Anselm, first, how a concept that cannot be found in the Scriptures can be thoroughly 
scriptural and, second, how it brings with it its own antithesis, which then is 
“defeated.” As we consider our present subject we can clearly see that as we 
encounter the Gospel we learn of the love of God who seeks communion with 
humankind. In this very proclamation we understand and learn about the 
corresponding liberty and demand for humankind to love. This human love is meant 
to correspond to the love of God in that it descends, gives, and reaches out. Christian 
love, the response to God’s initiative in love, is a love that moves towards God by 
moving towards the neighbour. In learning of this ex-centred love, its antithesis is 
awoken in the mind, that of a love which is self-centred, a self-love which moves not 
toward the neighbour but towards the self. As a Christian love it is inconceivable 
because it is the very negation of Christian love in that it is a love which is self-
seeking in its primary focus. This is the fundamental element of what we want to say: 
first, there is a Christian love we learn of in the Gospels and, second, this Christian 
love brings to mind and exposes its antithesis, a non-Christian love.126 Of course, one 
could very well continue discussing the matter of love by simply using the concepts 
of Christian and non-Christian love. But, in the theological literature, the concepts of 
eros and agape have become so firmly established that they are effective and rich as 
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references to love in the twofold distinction that we will be treating here. It is with 
this understanding that we continue to use the concepts of eros and agape as 
references to non-Christian and Christian love, respectively. We will further interact 
with possible objections to this later in the chapter. 
In what follows we will seek to explain the internal distinction and unity of 
love through conceptual work which will focus on the eros-love of projection and the 
agape-love that is found in reception. From the standpoint of human subjectivity we 
will move linearly, from eros to agape, from the projection to the reception of the 
object of love. This, obviously, can create a misunderstanding and might seem to go 
against the grain of what we have already said concerning theology and human 
thought. Importantly, this is being done without implying that, in any ultimate sense, 
eros is chronologically prior to agape. When Plato told the story of the cave of 
shadows and the movement of human subjectivity from shadows to the true Forms, 
he was in no way suggesting the priority of the cave of shadows but merely making a 
didactic move. Likewise, the movement between eros and agape can be said to begin 
(very humanly speaking) with a movement from eros to agape (wherein, in their 
confrontation, agape takes control of the dialectic in that the dialectic is not between 
two equal conceptions) and describing this movement can help one explain the unity 
of and distinction between eros and agape. This is how the following narrative-like 
structure should be understood. 
 
i. Love as Eros, Love as Agape 
Eros, the love which alone propelled and defined humankind before its confrontation 
with Christ, was a form of self-seeking. Erotic humankind sought gratification of 
something, to appropriate something for itself. Eros defined a constant movement in 
search of this gratification, as eros was a kind of appetite. Humankind’s every 
activity knew only this eros as its driving force. This form of love sought 
gratification but it sought it in beauty and truth, in more or less noble forms. It was 
humankind’s eros-love, its craving for beauty and truth, its desire to extend itself 
over the boundaries which it always finds everywhere, which drove man to become a 
religious being. This is because eros’s constant seeking moved humankind over each 
boundary up to the last boundary, to the ultimate boundary—up to the infinite divide 
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between time and eternity. Eros was behind humankind’s every action but, standing 
on this boundary of time and eternity, it consumed humanity. It sought to bridge that 
infinite divide, to reach supreme truth and sublime beauty. It hoped to see and to 
taste beyond this end-line of human thought and knowledge. Standing at this abyss 
eros could only reach out by human thought, by making projections into the gap, into 
the great divide. The projections eros made were religious projections. Religion in 
turn became and sustained the ultimate objects of eros. Erotic appropriation became 
erotic projection. 
By eros, by its arts, speculative thought, its lives well lived—the greatest 
feats of the human spirit were accomplished and sustained. Eros was no simple 
animal instinct which sought immediate gratification. Being confronted with the 
principles of reality, eros constantly sublated and transformed itself, postponing 
immediate gratification of its desire in order better to be able to reach its complete 
fulfilment. Therefore, erotic humankind had initially sought joy but found toil, 
sought receptiveness but found productiveness, sought absence of repression but 
found a security upheld by repression.127 Most of all it sought Truth but, faced with 
the reality of the great divide between time and eternity, found nothing but religion. 
Erotic, religious humankind was constantly thinking and acting on the brink of the 
possible, seeking for its erotic, religious needs to be met. 
Humankind has, therefore, erotically projected religious possibilities into the 
great gap which divides it from its origin and end. In these images and lyrical prose, 
Humankind has taken each of its own capacities and elevated them in the highest 
degree. The projections are the divinisation of the ultimate qualities human beings 
can imagine themselves possessing. Therefore, one can say that while the potentiality 
of an acorn is the oak tree, the potentiality of erotic humankind is religion. This is 
because it is in religion that humankind sets its own standard, determines its own 
possibility. The objects of religion are therefore the potentiality of humankind. 
Humankind loves its religious projections as they exhibit the ultimate objective of 
humankind’s own possibility. But this love for religious objects takes the form of 
desire, the form of eros-love. Eros has, therefore, projected its ultimate desire for 
truth and beauty and now strives for it, hungers after it. The objects of religion are 
                                                 




the potentiality of humankind and it is towards this potentiality that humankind seeks 
to actualize its own being. Erotic humankind projects truth and beauty and then loves 
its own projections because it wants to be erotically united with them. Religious 
humankind therefore heads for the long march where it, by the sweat of its palms, 
seeks to actualize its religious potentiality. But religion brings a heavy burden. The 
potentiality humankind perceives and strives for remains ever elusive. In the end it 
judges humankind because humanity cannot carry the weight of its own golden 
statue that it has erected under the name of religion. Religion is, in the end, self-
destructive. It becomes demonstrative in the negative, achieving only its own self-
exposure. We can, however, claim this only because the hidden object of the fantasy 
of religion, God, has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. While religion so typically 
tried to ascend, God descended. Anders Nygren rightly writes: “Man cannot by 
means of Eros attain to God.  Real fellowship with God is possible only if God in his 
Agape condescends to man.”128 Furthermore, as Barth has stated: “In God men 
possess—as slaves do—the possibility of rebellion.”129 
And as we are engaged in theology, we have to ask what happened in the 
encounter of eros-love and religion with the revelation of God. We should ask what 
happened when God revealed himself as a human being to the erotic, religious 
humankind. What was it that happened when humankind’s fantasy broke into its 
reality? How could humankind continue to think and act in such a situation? How 
could it continue living when all that it had built, its religion, civilization, art, all the 
feats of eros, were challenged by that which was its hidden object all along?  
 
ii. Love in the Confrontation: From Eros to Agape 
While humankind seeks to ascend to the divinities and potentialities it has projected, 
God descends. God, who is radically free, descends in a free act of love to bring 
humankind back into communion with himself. There is no necessity which drives 
God to this decision other than his own decision and act.130 God wills and acts to 
restore communion between himself and humankind. In making this decision to 
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restore communion between himself and created reality God implies his journey into 
created reality.131 Humankind cannot ascend to God. Instead God has revealed that 
he has made the decision to descend to humankind and to free it from the realities of 
sin, to its potentiality of freedom in communion. In the process, human reality is 
turned upside down. Importantly, as we will see, the movements of eros are inverted, 
as projection is transformed into reception and self-seeking is transformed into other-
seeking. 
 
        iii. Eros inverted: Great Giving Corresponding to a Great Reception 
It has been mentioned that erotic, religious, humankind projected potentialities for 
itself. Eros is a love which recognizes a worth in something and then seeks to acquire 
it for itself, to be erotically united with it. Eros was always a movement of ascension 
whereby humankind sought to move closer to that which it deemed worthy. This 
ascending movement of eros-love is met by the opposite movement, that of agape-
love. Before its confrontation with the Gospel, erotic love had many objects of 
desire. But in the multiplicity of eros-loves there is always a unifying factor, an 
ultimate object of eros-love, by which all of the other loves are subsumed. This 
ultimate subsuming object of love can be anything such as the gods of family, nation, 
wealth, health, honour, religions or other projections. In pursuit of the ultimate object 
of love, eros will suppress itself in many respects so that it may reach its true 
fulfilment in its ultimate concern. Augustine, in his City of God, provided a powerful 
description of this process. In inquiring how it was that the Roman Empire managed 
to grow to its greatness in size, power and glory, Augustine comments that this is not 
something to be traced to Roman virtue. Rather, the Romans only seemed virtuous 
and acquired their greatness because “they were greedy of praise, prodigal of wealth, 
desirous of great glory, and content with a moderate fortune. Glory they most 
ardently loved: for it they wished to live, for it they did not hesitate to die. Every 
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other desire was repressed by the strength of their passion for that one thing.”132 
Augustine argues that all that was considered virtuous by the Romans was nothing 
but vice disguised as virtue.133 The Romans had simply found out that by restraining 
their appetites they could better achieve human glory and further extend their rule 
and domination. The greatest love of the Romans was glory and praise. As a result 
their whole being was oriented towards moving them closer to this goal, to 
appropriate more glory for themselves. In the process, other erotic appetites were 
suppressed to achieve eros’ ultimate concern. 
But as erotic humankind confronts the God of the Gospels something very 
different happens. God reveals himself to be king in an act of servanthood. 
Humankind learns that it lives only in the reception of a faith, hope and love which is 
given and made possible by God. This great reception of faith is what lays a 
foundation for hope, as we have established. Importantly, it is hope because the 
actualization of that which is already real in Christ cannot be forced or implemented 
by humankind. It can only be hoped for. Like the initial act of liberation, the 
subsequent actualization of its freedom is a gift, something which is received by the 
human subject. God’s love is one that descends, which appears in giving and 
servanthood. Confronted with such love, the upward, ascending strivings of eros lose 
their appeal. Contrary to eros, the opposite movement is set forth. Humankind must 
become a servant of this God who reveals his majesty in the suffering and self-giving 
of Jesus Christ. The only possible response, the response proclaimed in the 
Scriptures, is one of a love which is “great self-giving which corresponds to the great 
reception.”134 This new love, agape, differs from eros-love because in this love 
humankind is turned away from itself to the realization of God’s future as promised 
in Christ. While eros recognizes the cultural worth and status of people (eros asks 
what a person is “due”), this agape-love does not ask primarily about such things 
before it acts. This is because agape-love is not concerned with the person as she is 
empirically visible but according to what she is promised in Christ, the person’s 
potentiality (agape asks about what the person is promised). The Christian is called 
to act primarily in accordance with another’s potentiality, not another’s actuality. 
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How else would self-giving correspond to its great reception? This is a strict demand, 
but it nonetheless must be seen as the substance of this new love which is named 
agape. The eros-type self-seeking of humankind and its own due is transformed in 
agape-love, which is the movement set forth in the encounter between God and 
humankind. 
 
iv. Potentiality and its Actualization 
The knowledge of this transformation is given through the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. By it, it becomes evident that the cross has not been the final word. Rather, 
God has exhibited his power over death and destruction in this event which turns out 
to have been an event of re-creation, of resurrection. In the event of resurrection it is 
known, not only, that the old humankind has been put to death but that it has been 
recreated. In the resurrected Jesus Christ humankind can now see its own true, 
resurrected self. The body of sin, still actual and visible, has received its judgment 
and been proclaimed to have no future. The future belongs to the humankind which 
is elected in Christ and free of sin. In the preaching of the resurrected Christ, 
humankind learns that it will not be left alone in its condition of sin but that God has 
intervened on its behalf presenting it with a new reality, that of Jesus Christ who is 
triumphant over evil. Jesus Christ, in his triumphant love, therefore establishes and 
represents the future of humanity and of creation. Jesus Christ is the potentiality of 
the world in that humanity and all of creation will be without sin. This potentiality, 
Jesus Christ, who is visible in the event of resurrection, begins an actualization 
process within the subjects confronted with the proclamation of this event. It is a 
movement of actualization of the potentiality revealed in Christ which means that it 
is a movement of freedom away from sin. As a movement, it is best described by the 
name of love—agape. In this movement of love humankind’s potentiality for 
freedom, which is real in Christ, becomes actual. God has acted in loving freedom 
and, in this act, freed humankind to loving service which corresponds with the 
freedom it already has in Christ. At the same time, this loving service is action, 
which is meant to bring humanity to this freedom in Christ. Love (agape) is a 
movement towards the actualization of the potentiality for freedom from sin which is 
already real in Christ. 
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To some this might be somewhat too concise, so let us try to clarify it further. 
First, the concept of potentiality, in the most important sense, is a very simple 
concept. Everyone has potential, a goal towards which all can grow. There can even 
be multiple potentials, such as the potential to be a violinist, to learn a new language, 
to become captain of the football team, and so on. In one person we can find a 
number of such potentialities. But when we use the word “potentiality” here, we are 
doing it in view of the fact that humankind subsumes each of its specific 
potentialities in a supreme understanding of a more general human potentiality which 
imposes its shape on the development of every other potential. When one potentiality 
achieves that status we are either in the realm of religion or being confronted with 
God who has revealed himself in Christ. In both cases, humankind believes itself to 
have found its true potentiality and by that we mean the goal towards which it is 
meant to grow. Development or growth towards a potentiality is a process which 
necessarily is set in motion by the knowledge of that very potentiality. Once 
humankind believes itself to have found its true potentiality it starts to move in that 
direction in a process that should be called actualization. Again, this term, 
“actualization,” speaks of a simple truth. It refers to the fact that knowledge of one’s 
potentiality imposes an overarching shape on one’s conscious and unconscious 
development. Such knowledge determines the movement of the actualization of the 
potentiality perceived. Now if we were talking only of the actualization of someone’s 
potentiality to speak a third language, it would not trouble us. So, neither should our 
use of potentiality and actuality within the current scheme trouble us. 
But why, someone might ask, is the actualization process described as one 
that leads us away from sin? As was just stated, “Christ is the potentiality of the 
world in that humanity and all of creation will be without sin.”135 Also, it was stated 
that “the future belongs to the humankind which is elected in Christ and free of sin.  
In the preaching of the resurrected Christ, humankind learns that it will not be left 
alone in its condition of sin but that God has intervened on its behalf presenting it 
with a new reality, that of Christ who is triumphant over evil.”136 It follows 
necessarily that the actualization of the potentiality revealed in Christ is a movement 
of freedom away from sin. But why, someone might further question, is this 
                                                 




movement said to be best described by the name of love—agape? That is a very good 
question. The reason, as will be better explained below, is that human wisdom and 
human freedom are imperfect and cannot, directly and by themselves, accomplish the 
future of freedom promised in the Gospel. Human activity must therefore be 
mediated by another concept which describes the movement towards that which the 
human being holds to be of value. Love is the perfect concept for that. This will be 
further treated in a later sub-chapter called: “External Distinction: Love and 
Freedom/Potentiality.” 
 
v. An Interlude on the Concepts of Potentiality and Actuality 
Let us pause briefly to give some context to the concepts of potentiality and actuality. 
These words form a vocabulary that can help us convey deep and important truths 
which are relevant to our project of political theology. And although the reader might 
already have received some idea of the concepts, a short note might draw a fuller 
picture. Originally Aristotle made a very deliberate use of the two concepts in his 
attempt to make sense of the notion of change. This question of change is immensely 
important to Aristotle as can be seen in the fact that one of his greatest criticisms of 
his teacher Plato is that Plato’s Forms contribute little to sensible things, “for they are 
not the cause of any motion or change in them.”137 Aristotle’s categories of 
potentiality and actuality are therefore constructed to help Aristotle resolve this 
fundamental problem of how change occurs.138 To explain, in simple terms, how 
Aristotle applies the concepts one can say that the seed of a plant has the potentiality 
of what the grown plant is in actuality. This means that one can say that the actuality 
of the plant exhibits the ultimate potentiality of the seed. At the same time, as the 
seed grows to become a plant, the actuality of the seed is one of being and of not 
being the plant.139  
The trouble for Aristotle is that of explaining the movement (as the seed 
changes from being a seed to being a plant) in which a thing both “is” and “is not” 
something. What is a thing that both is and is not something? What is the seed as it 
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sheds its actuality as a seed and actualizes its potentiality as a plant? The question, in 
the end, is: How can we explain change? This is a serious problem with which 
Aristotle grappled eloquently. The medieval scholastic philosophers, as Aristotle’s 
writings resurfaced in Europe, wrestled with this same problematic and felt 
themselves strictly bound by Aristotle’s arguments.140 However, the history of the 
concepts took a decisive turn with Martin Luther’s anti-Aristotelian and anti-
scholastic Reformation. But introducing Martin Luther as anti-Aristotelian should 
not give be taken to imply that there are no continuities between Luther and 
Aristotle. In fact, as Theodor Dieter has shown,141 Luther was, in many respects, in 
continuity with Aristotelian thinking. For example, in an important sense, Luther can 
be said to have accepted the Aristotelian problematic of change. But, more 
importantly than being a reader of Aristotle, Martin Luther was a firm believer in the 
Word and Promise of God in Scripture which proclaimed to him that humankind was 
both sinful and yet redeemed. Luther therefore confronted a problematic that was 
very similar to Aristotle’s. How can humankind be both sinful and perfectly 
righteous in Christ? How can one make sense of this scriptural truth about the status 
of humankind?  
It is here that Martin Luther took a very interesting turn. He said, in light of 
this, that change should be explained as a repeated dialectic wherein, at every 
moment, human beings are both sinners and redeemed. The famous phrasing that 
Martin Luther employed for this was simul iustus et peccator. In effect, Luther cut 
the Gordian knot of the Aristotelian problematic or, rather, caused it to implode. 
When faced with humankind as both sinful and redeemed, Luther placed each 
description of humankind on the opposite side of a two-sided flip-book and then set 
it in an ever-intense rotation. A two-sided flip-book in intense rotation can make two 
pictures seem to merge into one while the single picture is, in fact, comprised of two 
distinct pictures. Humankind’s potentiality of being “iustus,” like Christ, was already 
real; and humankind’s potentiality of being “peccator” was simultaneously real. The 
human being was thus understood to be fully sinful and fully righteous. 
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Now the obvious problem with Luther’s very important construal of the 
notion of change is the nature of this dialectic. It may seem as if it is a dialectic 
between two equals in that the change is not dominated by either side of the dialectic. 
For, how can the reality of humankind as “peccator” be just as real as its being 
“iustus”? Would that not suggest that the reality of the Gospel is on par with the 
reality of sin? Would it not risk presenting the two equals in a duel? Apart from the 
possibility of such problematics, Martin Luther had taken a very important step and 
accomplished a conceptual revolution. Later Protestant theologians would find ways 
of better securing the position of the Gospel, God’s sovereignty and humankind’s 
position as “iustus” (although it is debatable whether this was already achieved by 
Calvin or whether it is with Karl Barth that one first finds precisely such a construal). 
Importantly, in Barth’s theology, one can say that the Gospel holds and controls the 
dialectic. In the dialectic of change between “iustus” and “peccator” we discover the 
negation of “iustus” by “peccator” itself to have been negated and, ultimately, 
defeated. If it were not, it would not be the Gospel of the sovereign God who loves in 
perfect freedom.142 Thus although there is a dialectic between judgment and 
salvation it does not involve an unstable dialectic between equals but rather one in 
which the promise of “iustus” holds sway and, in fact, cedes no real terrain to the 
part of the human being that has not yet reached its potentiality in Christ. In fact, the 
parts of human beings which are still in opposition to salvation in Christ are denied 
any ultimate reality. The actuality of that which is not the potentiality of Christ, of 
“iustus,” is not true actuality in that it has no ultimate reality, in that it has already 
been defeated by God’s merciful action in Christ. 
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This discussion of these important concepts might seem, at first glance, 
problematic insofar as we have not provided a point of reference regarding the 
constant challenge posed by the non-Christian in political theology. But it so happens 
that this is one of the great assets of making use of the categories of potentiality and 
actuality, as they can be used to make sense of a very important human dimension 
which can be accessed both theologically and non-theologically. Or, perhaps better: 
the non-theological can be accessed theologically through these concepts. So it is that 
we can see how, in the Christian faith, human potentiality is found with the Risen 
Christ. The Risen Christ is an accomplishment and proclamation of a redeemed, 
recreated humanity without the brokenness and shackles of sin. At the same time 
erotic, religious humankind finds its potentiality in the objects of its desires as 
portrayed by the projections of religion. What we have therefore done is to access 
theologically a possibility of discussing, simultaneously, the nature of Christian and 
non-Christian humanity. In using the vocabulary of potentiality and actuality, we 
have a way of assessing, structurally, the nature of humankind’s relationship to its 
objects of worship. Human beings have a potentiality, signified by the supreme 
object of their worship and love. This applies as much to the faithful Christian as it 
does to erotic, religious humankind (whether in its basest or highest expressions). As 
human beings find or are confronted with this supreme object of love and worship, 
their entire being takes on the direction of that object. What ensues is the 
actualization of human potentiality. Christians know their true humanity in Christ 
and erotic, religious humankind finds its goals in the projections of religion. The 
movement which ensues, in both cases, is that of love. But as has been established 
there is an immense difference in the nature of the objects of worship. Christian love 
of God transforms love into agape, loving service, while eros remains the guiding 
force of religion. On that note, let us abandon this detour into the concepts of 
potentiality and actuality, and continue with our inquiry into love as eros and agape. 
We have still to explain their unity and their difference more clearly and fully. 
 
vi. Eros and Agape? Yes and No 
Throughout this chapter we have seen eros and agape presented as two types of love 
and yet our narrative has been filled with their seemingly conflicted juxtapositions. 
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The movements of eros have been represented as the opposite to that of agape as 
have its motives and its objects. However, what also emerges is the unity in 
distinction which makes it possible for us to treat the two under the same signifier of 
love. As we look at the two loves there is a clear similarity in the way they function 
structurally. Both eros-love and agape-love have love for a supreme object and both 
have a potentiality towards which they seek to actualize. In the multiplicity of eros-
loves there is always a unifying factor, the ultimate object of eros-love, by which 
every one of the other loves is subsumed. When we consider agape it is obvious that 
there is a supreme object of love to be found there as well, the God revealed in Jesus 
Christ. But in confrontation with this object of Christian love something very 
different happens from what occurs in the Roman love of glory or any other human 
religion. No matter how radically different the two loves are in this sense there is still 
obviously a structural connection between them. Human beings have a supreme 
object of love by which every other love is subsumed. This determines their 
perception of their potentiality, further determining the ensuing actualization process 
of Love, whether it be eros or agape. 
Our narrative also posits other connections, such as how eros can be seen as 
self-exposing and therefore pointing towards agape. As our narrative enfolded it 
showed how eros and religion try to ascend where they cannot ascend. The self-
righteous potentiality that erotic, religious humankind strives for remains ever 
elusive. As was said above, religion is demonstrative in the negative, insofar as it 
points to truth by its self-defeat. And this is where a link is established between eros-
love and agape-love. It is exactly in eros’s own self-defeat that it points beyond 
itself, when humankind exhausts its capacity for striving. And although this self-
negating moment of religion is not a positive revelation which points directly to 
agape, it nevertheless makes a strange reference to that which it is not. As Barth 
writes, “Whenever the Gentiles grow sceptical of the righteousness of men, there is 
exposed to them the righteousness of God.”143 He further states: “What is pleasing to 
God comes into being when all human righteousness is gone, irretrievably gone, 
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when men are uncertain and lost, when they have abandoned all ethical and religious 
illusions.”144 
This emphasizes another point, namely that God does wrest good out of evil 
and transforms negative to positive, a curse into a blessing. In the same way it can be 
understood that God can bring something good out of eros. Humankind is driven by 
this self-acquisitive desire of eros, looking for something to fulfil it. In its search it 
might move from object to object, from religion to religion, all the while driven by 
this strange thirst. Somewhere, along the way, it will be confronted by the God of the 
Gospels. In this confrontation, eros is transformed and the movement of agape is set 
in motion. Importantly, however, eros’s self-seeking can be used as a vehicle, and 
thereby agape can be brought out of eros. A movement of desire is confronted with 
that which was its hidden object all along.  We can therefore discern three main 
connections between eros and agape: i) Structural; ii) self-exposure of eros, pointing 
to agape; and iii) divine transformation of eros into agape. 
 
vii. On Bringing in Nygren: Problems and Reasons 
Someone might be surprised to find, in the present work, a positive appropriation of 
Nygren’s distinction between eros and agape, albeit a chastened one. Let us digress 
briefly to explain  why this route has been taken. After all, Nygren’s thesis, which 
has been greatly influential, has come under increasing fire from several directions. 
Nygren has been accused of not having a sufficient exegetical case to support his 
firm distinction between Eros and Agape. It has also been argued that love is, 
phenomenologically, too complex to be placed in such simple, stark categories as 
eros and agape. Furthermore, some argue that the word “agape” is ambiguous as it 
has been employed and that it therefore lacks the conceptual power ascribed to it by 
Nygren. These are, of course, only three grounds of attack against the Nygrenian 
thesis. But they represent very basic criticisms that might threaten the thesis at its 
core. They attack the exegetical, phenomenological, and semantic grounds of the 
agape/eros distinction. Let us briefly describe and respond to each of these critiques 
before continuing with the main argument of the thesis. 
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1. Many have wanted to challenge Nygren’s exegetical work, which attempts 
to find ways in which New Testament usage of the concepts depart from their typical 
interpretations. Such an approach is an attempt to break the Nygrenian thesis on 
exegetical grounds by finding exceptions to the New Testament usage of “agape.” If 
successful, such research is meant to reveal a lack of unity in the usage of the 
concept in the New Testament and thereby break down the general thesis about 
agape and eros. Such criticism can be found, for example, in James Barr’s “Words 
for Love in Biblical Greek”145 and in Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s “Fra Eros Och 
Agape.”146 Both are well argued and make an excellent case against the standard 
Nygrenian account. 
Yet despite the solid scholarship portrayed in such research, there is 
something incomplete in such an approach to the task of exegesis and theology. 
When confronted with such scholarly work one is reminded that there remains 
something very true about Niebuhr’s attitude towards this type of scientific practice, 
as quoted in chapter 1: “an elaborate scientific enterprise may result in a totally 
unjustified nominalism, unable to apprehend general and universal characteristics 
under an obviously unique phenomenon.” Niebuhr is right insofar as breaking 
everything to its extreme particularity does not necessarily help one see a 
phenomenon more clearly. Rather, it can also threaten to dissolve every 
phenomenon, to break every meaning of every concept in a “scientific” refusal to see 
general patterns or events for what they are. Pressing that point, as he discusses the 
Christian understanding of man’s sinful tendency to egocentricity, Niebuhr notes that 
some academics view this as a dogmatic assumption and therefore untenable. These 
academics then, instead, proceed to “uncover evidence that particular forms of 
egocentricity are the consequence of particular causes. This is indeed a fact,” writes 
Niebuhr. But then he continues: “But preoccupation with this fact tempts a scientific 
culture to obscure the more general human phenomenon which underlies the 
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particular social and psychic causes of particularly excessive or unique forms of 
egotism.”147  
Niebuhr’s observation remains true and it may also be applied to the type of 
New Testament exegesis under discussion here. When encountering such well-
argued objections as those proffered by Engberg-Pedersen and Barr we must 
remember Niebuhr’s warning and go back to the basics of agape as Christian love. 
When encountering seeming exceptions to the general observation, it seems that 
these exegetes are very quick to discard the most important point of Nygren’s 
argument. This method can lead them all the way to dismissing Nygren’s well-
argued thesis that there is such a thing as a specifically Christian love that can be 
discerned in the New Testament. It might be true, certainly, that Nygren made some 
hyperbolic statements with regards to Christian love, signified by his concept of 
agape. But even though the hyperbole is not tenable in its strictest sense, it may 
nevertheless contain truth as hyperbole. This is something Karl Barth realized when 
he accepted the Nygrenian thesis but also warned against its polemical juxtaposition 
of the concepts (eros and agape) as contrary to the inner logic of Scripture, an 
important point to which we will return.148 
Furthermore, as a general point, it seems impossible to conclude from reading 
the New Testament that there is no such thing as a specifically Christian love which 
can be distinguished from eros-love by virtue of the supreme object of Christian 
love, which is the God who reveals himself as descending to humankind in Jesus 
Christ. One wonders whether we find, in this form of criticism of Nygren, a type of 
exegesis that fails to see the forest for the trees. The importance of the exegetical or 
historical objections could, therefore, easily be overemphasized. It is obvious that the 
drive behind Nygren’s use of the concept of agape is strictly theological. There is a 
guiding realization that the Gospel of Christ points towards another shape of love, a 
different kind of love from the one described, for example, by ancient thinkers such 
as Plato. But to make a conceptual differentiation between these kinds of love 
requires actual concepts. And what concept was better suited to describe this 
specifically Christian form of love than agape? As Barr notes,149 the word “agape” is 
                                                 
147 Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, 17. 
148 See: Barth, CD IV/2:735. See also: Barth, CD IV/2:747. 
149 Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek”, 12. 
79 
 
used in deliberate ways by New Testament writers to convey something different 
from its conventional use, although he and Nygren might differ regarding the extent 
and nature of this use. Now, it might strictly be true that much of the argument for 
the radical linguistic purity of the New Testament usage of the word “agape” cannot 
be sustained. However, this would not make “agape” an improper signifier to be used 
to point to a specifically Christian love. And that is exactly what Nygren did. 
2. There are those who would say that love is simply phenomenologically 
more complex than Nygren’s harsh juxtaposition might suggest. Thomas Jay Oord is 
highly critical of Nygren and is more comfortable treating love as a heading for three 
types of love: eros, agape and filia (friendship-love). C. S. Lewis in his The Four 
Loves goes even further and identifies the four forms of love as affection, friendship, 
eros and charity.150 Such attempts at providing a “richer” interpretation of the 
concept of love might suggest that Nygren’s treatment is too simplistic and not in 
line with the general human experience of love. But such a contention misses 
something fundamental. Certainly a phenomenon such as love can be subdivided into 
various elemental forms (friendship, affection, etc.). But in the discussion of eros and 
agape one is looking at a much bigger picture, one that has to do with the fact that 
humankind always has a supreme object of love which subordinates every other love. 
The nature of this object determines every other form of love and it is here that the 
eros/agape distinction becomes a pivotal conceptual apparatus. Eros helpfully 
denotes the love of human religion, while agape points to the love of Christian faith. 
The two, within the conceptual domain of this thesis, help to make sense of 
fundamental theological truths which have to do with an important difference 
between the self-revealing, descending God of the suffering servant Jesus Christ and 
the objects of human religion. 
3. Finally, some maintain that there is a very basic semantic problem with the 
concept of agape. They would maintain that “agape” can be, and has been, used in 
such a variety of ways that it borders on the vacuous and lacks an obvious, distinct 
meaning. Both Gene Outka and Thomas Oord attribute the many descriptions of 
agape to a wide range of thinkers. Outka argues that “agape in particular is often 
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characterized by both variance and ambiguity.”151 Oord collects some modern 
descriptions of agape, (e.g., “unconditional willing of the good”—Timothy Jackson; 
“the simple yet profound recognition of the worthiness of and goodness in 
persons”—Bernard Brady; “understanding, redeeming good will for all men”—
Martin Luther King Jr.; “self-sacrifice”—Reinhold Niebuhr; “selfless altruism”—
Mike Martin; “Letting be”—John Macquarry; and so forth)152 There are two main 
questions that we must ask in response to this challenge. How very different are these 
descriptions of agape? And, secondly, what would a discovery of multifarious 
descriptions of agape really tell us? To begin with the second question, it seems that 
distinct descriptions of the concept of agape tell us very little by themselves. Why 
should anyone draw the conclusion that the theological concept is vacuous based on 
such an observation? Could one not simply investigate the various attempts at 
“capturing the essence” of agape and test them theologically? Can they not be tested 
for accuracy and substance? It seems that there is little warrant for assuming that, 
because there are diverse opinions about a matter, none of them can be accurate, 
allowing one arbitrarily to give “agape” whatever meaning one likes. And, 
concerning the first question, it still stands by itself as a rhetorical question serving as 
a counter-argument: As one reads through the various abovementioned descriptions 
of Agape, how very different are they really? 
 
viii. Bringing nuance to Nygren 
However justified Nygren may be in drawing his conceptual distinctions, his forceful 
juxtapositions of the concepts create the illusion that the boundaries between the two 
kinds of love are marked by a thick iron wall, rather than being intermingled within 
every human being, the Christian faith and human religion. The Nygrenian thesis is 
even in danger of placing the Old Testament concept of love in opposition to 
Christian love. 
It remains true that the Christ event helps to make available to our rational 
reflection a certain notion of love. The present thesis has told a story to that effect. 
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However, such didactic story-telling does not mean that, in actuality, God’s grace 
was not active prior to the Christ event. It cannot mean or entail that his grace was 
unable to manifest this truest form of love with the Hebrews or people of other 
religions and spiritual attitudes. The strength and the power of the Christ event in 
manifesting agape-love cannot entail such a limitation on the freedom and grace of 
God. Just as Abraham could be justified by faith before the Christ-event so the 
Hebrews must have been able to become agents of agape-love. 
Karl Barth has very important lessons to teach Nygren regarding the overly 
zealous oppositional juxtaposition of eros-love to agape-love. However open Barth is 
to Nygren’s conceptualizations, he finds that they are too rigid and militant in tone. 
Barth writes of this constant Nygrenian fascination with the antithesis: 
A presentation of Christian love cannot live by this antithesis, or be confined 
to a development of this problem. “Love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, 
is not puffed up” ( 1 Cor.134)—even in its relationship with erotic love. How 
it disavows itself if it regards it as its only greatness to be different from this 
love, not to be “as this publican,” to nourish itself constantly on this 
opposition! It is a strangely loveless love which is content with that. Above 
all, it does not need to insist rigidly on this antithesis.153 
 
Also, in this aggressive polarization, there is a failure of confidence in this love of 
which Nygren supposes himself to be an advocate. Barth continues: 
Christian love does not need to measure itself by eros-love, or to find 
strength and satisfaction in its difference from it. It lives its own life as the 
love which is true because it is grounded in God’s love for man and not in 
man’s self-love. It does so in antithesis to that other. But it does so as the 
love which is superior and triumphant in this antithesis. It is not, therefore, 
forced to insist on this antithesis.154 
 
Furthermore, there is, within the Nygrenian account, a lack of humility, compassion 
or appreciation of the gifts that we have received on account of eros-love. Barth 
adds: 
In the case of Christians, in a crude or subtle form (and perhaps both) they 
all love in this way too, according to the standards of this very different love. 
Thus they are all the first to be convicted by whatever may be said for the 
one love and against the other. And they have so much to do to wipe clean 
their own slate that it will be a long time before they can be too loud in their 
exaltation of Christian love and condemnation of the theoretical and practical 
forms of the other (whether Greek or otherwise). But above all reserve is 
                                                 
153 Barth, CD IV/2:746. 
154 Barth, CD IV/2:747. 
82 
 
enjoined by the fact that this other love can claim some of the greatest 
figures in the history of the human spirit, whom it would be a highly 
questionable enterprise to reject and repudiate in a curt and dogmatic 
Christianity, especially on the part of those who do not really know them and 
cannot therefore estimate them at their true worth. It has also to be taken into 
account that all of us (even we Christians) exist in a world which in its best 
and finest as well as its most basic phenomena is for the most part built upon 
this other rather than Christian love, and that we live by the works and fruits 
and achievements of this love, so that when the Christian calls it in question 
in the light of Christian love he always takes on a highly ambiguous 
appearance.155 
 
In this way, it turns out, Nygren’s account of love is, perhaps ironically, somewhat 
lacking in neighbourly love and compassion. Adding to this, the hyper-inflated result 
of Nygren’s overzealous attitude also leads to a confused estimation of self-love, a 
phenomenon towards which Nygren is sceptical. Oliver O’Donovan has traced 
Nygren’s scepticism towards self-love as having its “profoundest motivation” in 
Nygren’s negative attitude towards the eudaemonian framework of ethics. Such an 
anti-eudaemonian framework for Christian ethics “presents self-denial and the selfish 
pursuit of personal happiness . . . as sharply contrasted but not diametrically 
opposed.”156 Why is it so important for Nygren to make this case against a 
eudaemonian framework, and therefore self-love (even though it is implicitly 
included in Jesus’s command to love your neighbour as yourself)? The reason is that 
Nygren begins with a strong commitment to demonstrating the irreconcilable 
difference between eros, self-acquisitive love, and agape, self-giving love. Therefore, 
any framework that keeps human happiness in view is problematic in light of the 
Nygrenian mission in that it threatens to be self-acquisitive. But O’Donovan shows 
how this hyper-vigilance is unnecessary and, in the end, insubstantial. Self-denial can 
easily be translated into a eudaemonian framework in that the contention that every 
act aspires to some good can relate “as much to giving, loving, renouncing.” The 
Nygrenian is then left saying that a “eudaemonist formulation of Christ’s demand for 
self-denial robs it of its starkness.”157 O’Donovan thereby concludes that the critique 
is directed “less against the morality of eudaemonist concepts . . . than against their 
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epistemological efficiency as a linguistic vehicle for Christian ethics.”158 Therefore, 
in the end, the Nygrenian attitude of taking no prisoners ends up throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater and, in turn, risks others doing the same in regard to his own 
work on eros and agape. 
So, while we can appreciate Nygren’s work, we must be careful not to be too 
enamoured by the conceptual oppositions and the militant attitude which dominates 
his Eros and Agape. Conceptual distinctions have their place and are a condition of 
human thinking. But both our lives and the Scriptures have a great deal more nuance 
than conceptual distinctions would allow for. 
Having said this, the unity between eros and agape which the present thesis 
wants to emphasize most is that which we mentioned first: the structural unity, which 
emphasizes that both forms of love are processes of actualization directed towards a 
potentiality. This will prove helpful when we inquire into Christian love in the mode 
of political action as it then finds itself in cohabitation/confrontation with other forms 
of love.  
 
B. External Distinction: Love and Freedom/Potentiality  
The thesis has now investigated love by looking to its internal structure as 
actualization towards potentiality. At this point we should seek to understand love by 
looking into how it relates to that to which it points, potentiality. We want to know 
whether love and potentiality are co-extensive or distinct and in what way this might 
be true. What we will discover is that, while love is born out of recognition of 
potentiality, love’s own activity is not co-extensive with but distinct from 
potentiality. The Christian potentiality (which is freedom), we will therefore 
discover, is distinct from love and yet to serves as its ground and goal. After 
considering the implications of this construal of the relationship between the two 
concepts, we will arrive at a better understanding of love’s structure and work.  
 




i. Potentiality: The Ground and Goal of Love 
We claimed above that the perception of the potentiality of freedom in Christ sets in 
motion an actualization process whereby love initiates its movement.159 Here it is 
important to note that the movement towards actualization is not equated with that 
which is its ground and goal. That is to say: Freedom and love are not equated. To 
spell it out even further: The actualization of freedom is no simple translation from 
potentiality to actuality when viewed from the standpoint of the Christian subject as 
it seeks to act towards potentiality. This was anticipated above where it was 
maintained that freedom and love are distinct phenomena and that human action 
cannot directly, or by itself, accomplish the future of freedom promised in the 
Gospel. Let us clarify that statement: The human potentiality of freedom in Christ 
sets in motion a human movement toward the actualization of the potentiality 
perceived. This movement, made possible by the perception of the potentiality of 
freedom, has its goal in the potentiality of freedom. This entails that potentiality is 
both the ground and the goal of the process of actualization. Furthermore, this 
actualization process is a movement of love towards the potentiality of freedom. But, 
importantly, no single act of love can be undertaken in the human certainty that it 
directly accomplishes the potentiality for which it strives. This is because any such 
certainty or direct correspondence of action and actualization of potentiality is 
reserved for God, while human actions are undertaken only under the banner of hope. 
Faith (perception of the potentiality of freedom) sets in motion Love (actualization) 
and loving actions are accompanied by the Hope that potentiality may be 
accomplished. This is why, in reference to the human, we say that freedom and love 
are not equated and that potentiality and actualization are in an imperfect 
relationship, mediated by hope. 
We draw this boundary for two reasons. First, it would be insufficiently 
theological, given the parameters that have been set here, to describe humankind’s 
actions as equal or univocal to that of God’s. God is “that above which nothing 
greater can be conceived,” so such descriptions would misrepresent the God who 
reveals himself in Christ. God’s attributes of wisdom, freedom, love, justice, and so 
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on are not only divine and perfect, they also form a perfect unity.160 God does act and 
God’s actions influence and shape those confronted with his acts. So, God’s acts of 
self-giving love set in motion corresponding actions with human beings that see 
themselves as recipients of those acts. They, in correspondence, engage in actions of 
self-giving love. But there is an important difference between God’s action and 
corresponding human actions. Only God loves in perfect freedom. His loving will 
and determinations are in no way frustrated or hindered as his freedom is perfect 
freedom.161 There is therefore only an analogy and no equality between the acts of 
God and the actions of humankind. 
The second reason for drawing this boundary is necessarily connected to the 
first. It is the fact that humankind lives in the interim period between sin and 
salvation, “the already” and “not yet” of the consummation of God’s decision and act 
for humankind’s freedom in communion. The human existence in this “interim 
period” of the “already and not yet” causes the human virtues to be imperfect and 
this imperfection of the human virtues is, furthermore, found in their imperfect unity. 
The imperfection of human wisdom and human freedom breaks the unity between 
love and freedom. When humankind engages in acts for the cause of 
freedom/potentiality it is frustrated by its imperfect wisdom (faulty judgment) and 
imperfect freedom. This means not only that human freedom is not the divine 
freedom that directly accomplishes that for which it hopes, but also that it is in an 
imperfect relationship to love in that the two are not in perfect unity. 
                                                 
160 Karl Barth writes on this topic: “Therefore, explicitly or implicitly, when we speak of the love of 
God we shall have to speak also of His freedom, when we speak of His freedom we shall have to 
speak also of His love, and when we speak of one individual aspect we shall have to speak also of all 
the others. But if we do not wish to deviate from Scripture, the unity of God must be understood as 
this unity of His love and freedom which is dynamic and, to that extent, diverse. What we have here 
is, then, a complete reciprocity in the characterisation of the one Subject. Always in this reciprocity 
each of the opposing ideas not only augments but absolutely fulfils the other, yet it does not render it 
superfluous or supplant it. On the contrary, it is only in conjunction with the other–and together with it 
affirming the same thing—that each can describe the Subject, God.“ Barth CD II/1:344. 
161 Again, Barth writes concerning God’s attributes: “If we have interpreted the divinity of His act, or 
the divinity of God, as freedom, we could not and cannot mean by this notion of freedom anything 
different from Himself as the One who loves. We cannot mean a ‘universal’ in which He merely 
participates as the One who loves. We can mean and characterise only the manner, the utterly unique 
manner, of His love. His loving is, as we have seen, utterly free, grounded in itself, needing no other, 
and yet also not lacking in another, but in sovereign transcendence giving, communicating itself to the 
other. In this freedom it is the divine loving. But we must also say, conversely, that only in this divine 
loving is the freedom described by us divine freedom.” Ibid., 321. 
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Therefore, when the human being perceives the truth of its freedom in Christ 
this does indeed propel that human being to action. This was established in our 
descriptions of potentiality and actualization. However, such action is not the simple 
actualization of that which is already real in Christ. The sequence does not go from i) 
“freedom perceived” to ii) “freedom actualized.” This would be a human 
presumption and improperly theological in that it would refuse to recognize the 
difference between Creator and creature. It is very true that the Christian faith lives 
in the promise that freedom will be actualized. But this does not entail that every 
human action will be an action that directly accomplishes the actualization of God’s 
gift of freedom. Rather, the promise is that, in spite of the brokenness of human 
actions, they can be engaged with in the firm hope that in their brokenness they can 
and will be turned to good—bent under the glorious future of freedom. Human 
actions that hope to correlate themselves to the actions of the God who loves in 
freedom should therefore rightly be called loving actions. They are not to be 
described as actions of freedom although they do signify a new subjectivity that is 
accomplished by the knowledge of freedom. Rather, they are human actions which 
mirror God´s actions without ever being on par with God’s actions. While 
humankind loves, God loves in perfect freedom. The human schema should therefore 
be understood to be i) freedom perceived (Faith), ii) loving action (Love), and iii) the 
hope of the actualization of freedom (Hope). 
We explained above in the discussion of eros-love that the inherent danger for 
religion is that it will not recognize its own limitations. It is, therefore, in constant 
risk of beginning to understand its loving actions as contributing perfectly, without 
doubt, to the actualization of that for which it longs and hopes. In short, the 
temptation of the religious concept of love is that it can be seen as another step in the 
ladder of religious ascendancy. According to the erotic concept of love, humankind 
can make directly real that very freedom for which it hopes by the work of its own 
hands, attempting again to build a bridge between the (humanly) unbridgeable realms 
of time and eternity. The concept of love is in danger of being blotted out when 
freedom is, in that way, understood to be actualized directly by human actions.  
In one sense such a development would be understandable. For why retain a 
notion of loving action as a bridge between the perceiving and actualization of 
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freedom when freedom can be actualized directly and without hindrance? Why 
uphold a schema of i) “freedom perceived,” ii) “loving action,” and iii) “freedom 
actualized”? If there is understood to be no limitation or frustration for human 
judgments and human actions, why not just say: i) “freedom perceived” and ii) 
“freedom actualized”? Understandable as such developments may be, theologically 
they fail to integrate the imperfection of human judgment and human freedom, as 
will be better explained below. What we are saying here must not be misunderstood. 
It will be recognized that every action of the human being is accompanied with the 
hope that freedom may be actualized and that the world may become a better place in 
the long run.  However, the important word in that sentence is hope. 
Let us take an example. A person might decide to alleviate hunger in certain 
villages in the Third World with a twofold hope: That less hunger might bring 
comfort and then give the local inhabitants pause from their strivings to freely 
receive God into their lives. Next, a decision will have to be made about how to do 
this. A certain course of action will have to be taken and the person might decide to 
bring food by the truckloads and distribute it among the people of the particular 
region. But the question remains whether this action undertaken actually serves the 
purpose intended. And the answers are debated. There are those who would want to 
argue that hunger relief of this kind is detrimental to some regions. They would 
maintain that, in the long run, such gifting of supplies paralyzes local agricultural 
development and industries in the region, making it ever poorer and more dependent 
on aid. If this were true (which it might be or might not be) it seems that the action 
undertaken accomplishes the very opposite of that which was intended. Perhaps, in 
the long run, it might even prevent the actualization of freedom. 
This connects back to the previous chapter on theological rationality in ethics, 
where we found that there are two tiers of ethical deliberation, and that it is within 
the second tier where contextual, natural and empirical speculation enter, that our 
intellectual certainty grows dimmer. 
People engage in loving actions all the time in the hope that the world may 
become better through their strivings and in the hope that their actions correspond to 
the truth they perceive as ultimate. Human actions can be loving actions. But do they 
always actualize freedom? Are love and freedom to be equated? In the above 
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example, the person may be said to have engaged in loving action but the question 
remains whether the action accomplishes the freedom of a better world. Love and 
freedom cannot be equated in the knowledge and actions of human beings. We are 
not suggesting that people should not hope that their actions contribute to the 
actualization of freedom but rather precisely that they should firmly hope so. Having 
the humility not to pretend that one holds God’s view and to understand that every 
good we do is always subject to judgment is pivotal. Saying that certain human 
actions are the work of freedom is assuming a position of knowledge that human 
beings do not have. Rather, we must say that all the actions in which humankind 
engages (because it perceives itself to be free and hopes to partake in making 
freedom a reality) are works of love. Human beings should act, hope and pray, 
knowing always that whilst their actions are under judgment they can trust that God 
can transform misguided works of love into freedom. That is to say, our works of 
love may be transformed so that freedom is actualized. The human condition 
nevertheless remains one in which human actions, whilst driven by the understanding 
and hope for freedom, are rightly characterized as loving actions. And as has been 
stated, freedom can therefore be said to be love’s ground and goal. It is by the 
knowledge of freedom in faith (ground) and the promise of freedom in hope (goal) 
that love is made active. 
Interestingly, Reinhold Niebuhr would want to contradict this conclusion by 
arguing that “love is the only final structure of freedom.”162 This is because, within 
Niebuhr’s theoretical schema, human freedom is what makes it possible for love to 
enter into historical reality. This might appear surprising given that Niebuhr’s 
notions of freedom and love as a possibility have been criticized for being only 
nominally a possibility and not a reality.163 Indeed, Niebuhr’s writing concerning 
these matters can be somewhat elusive and the meaning he places on his concepts 
can be difficult to identify. But it is certain that Niebuhr wants to maintain that there 
is such a thing as human freedom which transcends any notions of either universal or 
traditioned reason. 
  As Niebuhr writes: “The real situation is that man transcends his own reason, 
which is to say that he is not bound in his actions by reason’s coherences and 
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systems. His concept of freedom consists in a capacity for self-transcendence in 
infinite regression.”164 There is, therefore, with Niebuhr, a notion of human freedom 
which can offset human equilibriums, systems and traditions. Interestingly, as is 
proven by the quote above, although this freedom is somewhat arbitrary and capable 
of anything (either sin or love), its true end lies in loving action. This means that love 
is made possible by human freedom, according to Niebuhr. But it also means that the 
ultimate end of freedom is that of love. Freedom becomes love as, in the end, 
freedom has love as its goal. Freedom may be the ground of love, but love, within 
this Niebuhrian schema, is the goal of freedom. 
We can therefore see that Niebuhr’s treatment of freedom and love differs 
somewhat from our own, as stated above. Whilst the present thesis has maintained 
that freedom is the ground and goal of love, Niebuhr seems to turn this equation 
around and assumes that love is the goal of freedom. Obviously, this reflects the 
distinct notions of freedom with which we are working. Niebuhr seems to understand 
freedom primarily as arbitrary will for either sin or love, meaning that freedom 
consists primarily in the act of human choice. However, the assumption of our thesis 
has been that human freedom is already found and determined in human potentiality. 
It follows that as long as one knows the potentiality of the human being, one can 
grasp an understanding of what constitutes its being free. This is how we could 
maintain that human freedom consists in humanity’s becoming what it is in Christ, a 
true humanity, free from the bondage of sin and free for the worship of God. We 
furthermore determined that the knowledge of this freedom (the knowledge of faith) 
was what created the ground for loving action which paved the way for the 
actualization of this freedom in Christ (what faith hopes for). This is not, of course, 
to deny the role of human choice of action. Human choice has, as we have explained, 
a determinate place within ethical action insofar as the human being needs to make 
concrete determinations within historical, material reality. But this aspect of human 
freedom cannot be understood to constitute the primary meaning of human 
freedom—because it is human freedom, it cannot be complete self-determination. 
Such complete self-determination belongs only to God.  
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But let us revisit Niebuhr’s idea of love as the goal of freedom. This 
understanding is problematic to a degree because saying that love is the goal of 
freedom might suggest that love has the primary eschatological reference, over and 
above freedom. It might suggest that there will forever be brokenness that needs 
mending by the strivings of love. This would be contrary to any type of 
eschatological hope. So, it is, theologically, very improbable that love, especially in 
its active form, is rightly described as the end of freedom. Much rather, as we have 
suggested in this thesis, freedom is more rightly described to be the end of love. 
Like Niebuhr, Oliver O’Donovan is concerned with showing that it is in 
determinations within historical, material reality that true freedom becomes actual. 
As O’Donovan writes: “Decision depends upon existing limits and imposes new 
ones. Limit is the very material with which freedom works.”165 Furthermore, 
O’Donovan’s notion of love is deeply connected with these movements of freedom: 
“we must complete our account of Christian freedom by saying that the Spirit forms 
and brings to expression the appropriate pattern of free response to objective reality. 
Saint Paul designates this response in general terms as ‘love’ (Gal 5.6).”166 Faith may 
be the perception of freedom and may hold priority as such but, as O’Donovan writes 
in Self, World, and Time, “the priority of faith is antecedent; it is not a primacy or 
pre-eminence.”167 O’Donovan then adds that “pre-eminence, if we follow Saint Paul, 
can be ascribed only to love. . . . Faith precedes love as its herald, and cannot be 
spoken of except in an orientation towards love, which binds us to objective 
reality.”168 Therefore, the freedom perceived in faith is materialized in the 
movements of love. This entails that, according to O’Donovan, freedom takes the 
shape of love. This may seem to rhyme somewhat with the theoretical elements of 
what we described to be Niebuhr’s position. However, O’Donovan’s treatment 
places greater emphasis on the aspect of love and, unlike Niebuhr, he will not be 
accused of downplaying its important role. 
 But if the relationship between love and freedom, within O’Donovan’s 
schema, is rightly described by saying that love is the shape of freedom’s self-
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limitations within history, then what is the end of freedom and love? O’Donovan´s 
writings present strong clues as to how he would answer this question. He talks about 
“the eschatological dimensions of love,”169 and tells his reader that “love is hopeful, 
carries with it a sense of incompleteness”170 and that “a community of loving 
agreement in the truth can have existence, though fleeting and imperfect, in our 
midst, and can show us something of the life of heaven.”171 What might be implied 
by all this? The answer is that it might suggest that O’Donovan sees the end of love 
to be the perfection of love. Love is broken and will, in the end, be made perfect, 
meaning that perfect love is the end of love. 
Yet, it is not quite that simple given that O’Donovan also very much 
highlights the importance of freedom in the moral life and even decisively writes that 
“Our supernatural end . . . is the perfect liberty of the kingdom of God.”172 Such 
decisive claims seem to suggest that O’Donovan holds that it is, in fact, freedom 
which is the end of love. This would agree well with the present work. But a final 
possibility, and not an unlikely one, for interpretation would be that O’Donovan sees 
freedom, eschatologically, to be coextensive with love to the degree that, while they 
can be conceptually pried apart, they will ultimately find a unity between themselves: 
that love, in the end, is freedom. As O’Donovan writes in Self, World and Time: “In 
the Kingdom of Heaven faith will not crown love and hope, but love will crown faith 
and hope.”173 Our hesitation in agreeing would be that, within O’Donovan’s scheme, 
this unity is not primarily eschatological but, equally, completely temporal. If that 
would be the right reading it might suggest that loving action within historical 
material reality should be understood to be the actualization of freedom. But if it is 
not the case, we find ourselves in broad agreement with O’Donovan in seeing the 
future of human freedom in an eschatological unity with human love. We would still 
have to affirm freedom to be primarily eschatological and the active form of love to 
be primarily temporal. Therefore we are quite comfortable with O’Donovan’s 
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statement when he writes that humankind’s end is in “the perfect liberty of the 
kingdom of God.”174 
Now, we must seek to understand the picture of Christian action that is 
emerging here. Christian action is loving action or, to be more precise, it is loving 
service—agape. It is a type of service and action which works so that freedom may 
become actualized. Christian hope is that which waits for the consummation of 
Christ’s work. Christian love is the appropriate action which correlates to the faith 
and the hope of the Christian. But this Christian action does not pretend to be on any 
level with the work of God in Christ. While agape-love strives so that God’s free 
future may be actualized it never pretends that there is any direct correlation between 
its actions and that actualization. Every agape-action is a hopeful action, acted out in 
the faith, trust and hope that God will bring good out of evil and take our broken 
works of love to make them whole. One could say that agape-action seeks to open up 
spaces where God can act to actualize the saving work of Christ. In fact, that would 
help us rightly describe the distinction that ought to be drawn between human and 
divine action. While humankind can try to open up spaces and pave ways so that 
God’s will might meet no hindrances or resistance, it is only God who holds the 
perfect freedom to really actualize his own will. Human love is, in fact, a faithful 
preparation of human spaces so that God’s will might find no obstructions or 
resistance to the actualization of his saving action in Christ. Love seeks to create and 
sustain spaces for humankind to freely receive God and have the communion with 
him that God has determined for it. In our example of the Third World aid worker, 
that person sincerely and lovingly engaged in loving action, in the hope that spaces 
might be opened up so that the people of the given region might become free for 
faith, hope and love. At no point should this point of humility be absent although it is 
to be accompanied by a certain degree of strength in hope, made possible by faith 
and working through love. Faith, hope and love are therefore all keywords. Faith 
recognizes potentiality, love is work toward actualization, engaged with in the hope 
that actualization of potentiality may take place. 
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ii. The Limits of Theological Ethics and the Risks of Love 
The picture that has now emerged of loving action must be correlated with what was 
established in the second chapter concerning the revealed ethic. In that chapter as a 
whole we were sceptical towards including any notions of natural or social orders as 
a part of the thought process of theological ethics. This has certain implications for 
the place and work of love. Towards the end of the second chapter it was noted that a 
distinction between theological and natural speculation should be maintained. This 
distinction also received expression in the possibility that this “might entail 
engineering of our individual and social circumstances” in that natural actualities are 
not to be seen as legislative of human action. However, in and of itself this could 
create some misunderstanding. This is not to say that individual, social or natural 
circumstances are not a part of the deliberation process which takes place before 
Christian love determines itself as a specific action. They are a part of that process! 
But it does mean two things: First, natural, social realities are not the source of 
theological ethics, of the meta-analysis that takes place concerning loving action 
before it is given concrete form by decision. Second, even in the concrete 
determination of loving action, empirical realities of nature and society have no 
legislative power but are always under question and can themselves be subject to 
change by Christian action. (This latter point is what is meant when it is said that 
loving action might entail “engineering of our individual and social circumstances.”) 
To try to make clearer the implications of what has been said concerning love 
(and the revealed ethic) it could be helpful to lay out a schema of Christian action as 
it looks broadly from this perspective. The human being sees the truth of what God 
has accomplished and promised in Christ and begins engaging in actions which she 
hopes will be consistent with it.  In faith, hope, love and humility she decides to work 
so that spaces may be opened up for the actualization of God’s promise in Christ. 
But, once this meta-analysis is clear, it is up to her to make determinations as to how 
to act concretely in any given context. In such determinations she will have to take 
into account empirical conditions in the natural and the social domains (although at 
no point do these have any ultimate legislative power over Christian action). She will 
eventually resolve to engage in a specific action but, in this concrete resolution, her 
thought is no longer theological in the strict sense. Furthermore, at this point, the 
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Christian cannot pretend to hold God’s view of the matter but rather bears the 
responsibility for the action undertaken. The Christian takes up this responsibility for 
self-determination with the ever-strong hope that ultimately each action, whether 
beautiful or broken, can be redeemed by God. Human self-determination is 
undertaken with the hopeful knowledge that ultimately everything will be 
overdetermined by the grace of God. This is how we can say that loving action 
“could never pretend to be the actualization of God’s kingdom (although it might be) 
but only a faithful preparing the way of the Lord, to make his paths straight.”175 
 
iii. Qualifying the Distinctions 
It should be emphasized following the strong distinctions already drawn between 
human love and freedom in temporal existence that they are exactly that: distinctions 
between human love and freedom in our temporal existence. That is to say, we have 
described the relationship between the concepts in human, temporal existence. We 
have wanted to accentuate the difference between love and freedom to make an 
important point concerning human ethical reality wherein love and freedom are 
imperfect and in an imperfect relationship. They are imperfect attributes in an 
imperfect condition and, therefore, in an imperfect unity. This is not meant to suggest 
that freedom cannot be tasted or found in our present, temporal existence. Yet it does 
mean that the unity between the two is broken and that love’s active dimension has a 
wider vocation in the “not yet” while freedom is, to a greater extent, an attribute 
describing the perfected future. Let us explain this statement further, starting with 
freedom in our temporal existence. 
First, bear in mind that “freedom” is used here to refer to the potentiality of 
humankind to be in worshipful communion with God. Second, let us further analyse 
this concept of freedom into cognitive and active forms. In its cognitive form, 
humankind lives in “the already” of the Gospel. But, in temporal reality, this is 
achieved through faith and, importantly, faith is a gift. This means that freedom’s 
cognitive dimension that we have in the temporal is active as faith, received as a gift, 
in that it is accomplished divinely. 
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But what then is to be said about freedom in its active form in the temporal? 
The answer is the same as it is for freedom in its cognitive form: It is a gift. But it is 
a gift that is given in love’s act of striving. Even though the future of freedom, in its 
active form, might be found in worshipful communion, temporal worship remains an 
act of love. This is because there is a distinction between the strivings of humankind 
and the gift it receives in its strivings. Human love and freedom are both imperfect 
and in imperfect unity and this means, as has already been argued, that love and 
freedom do not go together except when achieved divinely. Importantly, however, as 
with all of love’s works, through God’s grace, freedom can be had and experienced 
in temporal worship. However, in the future of freedom, human freedom in its 
cognitive form will be perfected in that it will no longer walk by faith but by sight 
and, in its active form, it will be worshipful communion without any type of 
hindrance. It is therefore clear that freedom, in both its active and cognitive forms, 
but especially in the active forms, is primarily eschatological. When it manifests in 
the temporal domain, it is received as a gift in the strivings of love and the 
anticipations of hope. 
 As regards love, the strong distinctions made earlier are not meant to suggest 
that love has no vocation in redeemed reality and only a temporal dimension. If we 
break love into forms, as we did freedom, we could say that love has an emotive and 
an active form (in the current chapter we have been focused primarily on love in its 
active form). Love’s emotive form attaches to faith in the temporal reality. It loves 
the truth that is held in faith. It survives in redeemed, eschatological reality as a love 
of that same truth which is had by sight. But what about love in its active forms? To 
answer that, it can be safely said that love’s active forms will have little for which to 
strive in a reality where God’s work has been fully consummated. Yet, there is one 
continuous work for love: the worshipful communion with God. This is because in 
the state of the reality of redemption, love and freedom will have a perfect, creaturely 
unity in the act of worship. Love strives for an ever-greater deepening of communion 
and is not hindered in doing so. This describes the perfect unity between acts of love 
and the accomplishment of freedom that has been divinely brought about. In the end, 
freedom, in its active form, indeed has a temporal dimension as love has an 
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eschatological dimension. But love’s active form is primarily temporal, found in 
striving, as freedom’s active form is primarily eschatological, received as a gift. 
 
C.  What Has Been Established Concerning Love 
Before we continue into the next chapter on love’s relation to justice, let us draw 
together a short summary of what we have established concerning love. First, despite 
their dissimilarities, the signifier “love” can be used for both agape and eros, the 
Christian and the non-Christian. This “love” is a movement set in motion by the 
perception of potentiality which, subsequently, works in the hope that potentiality 
may be actualized but, importantly, without any immediate guarantees. Therefore, 
love, given its provisional nature, can be said to freely and imaginatively create 
spaces in the hope that potentiality may actualize. 
With this in mind we can inquire into the nature of justice and its relation to 
love. While doing this we must remain mindful of our ultimate goal, which is to 
address the question of love’s relationship to justice in the context of common 
political structures. But one must take the necessary steps to get there. Therefore, the 
next chapter will begin by looking at the general relationship between love and 
justice in their divine and human references. We will first examine divine love and 
divine justice and their interrelationship to see what might be suggested about the 














Just as we have investigated the nature of love, so we now investigate the nature of 
justice in its relationship to love. This is a necessary prerequisite for us to be able 
eventually to investigate temporal justice in its relation to love. We will begin by 
considering the attributes of love and justice in reference to the divine, as God’s act 
always corresponds with a human response which will take its shape from God’s 
initiative. With the attributes of God we will find a perfect unity of love and justice 
in which love assumes logical priority. The thesis will, therefore, proceed on the 
instinct that love and justice will have a corresponding type of unity in reference to 
the human. This will be affirmed but with the important reservation that the unity of 
the concepts in the human realm is imperfect. Concerning justice we will find that it, 
like love, has a relationship to human potentiality although its way of action can be 
described differently to that of love, as being predominantly an act of limitation and 
curbing of that which threatens actualization of potentiality. 
 
A.  Divine Love and Divine Justice 
God is perfectly free. In his freedom he determines himself completely without any 
hindrance or frustration to his will and God has determined himself as the one who 
loves. He seeks fellowship with humankind, to lead humankind into communion with 
himself and this reveals his love. But as God seeks to bring humankind into freedom 
in communion with himself he also has determined and revealed himself as just. He 
is just, in that the communion between himself and humankind will be restored only 
by the destruction of that which is in opposition to His holiness. This can be seen in 
the cross of Christ. On the cross, humankind’s sin against God’s great majesty and 
holiness is defeated and destroyed. The cross assuredly represents to us the justice of 
God, which brings defeat and destruction to that which pretends to set itself in 
opposition to His will. At the same time, the decision of God in Christ to undergo, 
according to his human nature, the suffering of the cross, reveals his love. In this 
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way, one cannot fully treat the topic of God’s love in history without the treating of 
his justice as one cannot fully treat of his justice without his love. On the issue of the 
unity and distinction of divine attributes Karl Barth rightly writes: 
The multiplicity, individuality and diversity of the perfections of God are 
those of His simple being, which is not therefore divided and then put 
together again. In God multiplicity, individuality and diversity do not stand 
in any contradiction to unity. Rather the very unity of His being consists in 
the multiplicity, individuality and diversity of His perfections. . . . Our 
doctrine therefore means that every individual perfection in God is nothing 
but God Himself and therefore nothing but every other divine perfection. It 
means equally strictly on the other hand that God Himself is nothing other 
than each one of His perfections in its individuality, and that each individual 
perfection is identical with every other and with the fulness of them all.176 
 
Here it is important that love appears as an especially defining or spearheading 
attribute of God in Barth’s theology. This is the case because all of God’s other 
purposes are willed in his self-determination as the one who loves. As Barth writes: 
God’s loving is an end in itself. All the purposes that are willed and achieved 
in Him are contained and explained in this end, and therefore in this loving 
in itself and as such. For this loving is itself the blessing that it 
communicates to the loved, and it is its own ground as against the loved. 
Certainly in loving us God wills His own glory and our salvation. But He 
does not love us because He wills this. He wills it for the sake of His love. 
God loves in realising these purposes. But God loves because He loves; 
because this act is His being, His essence and His nature. He loves without 
and before realising these purposes. He loves to eternity. Even in realising 
them, He loves because He loves. And the point of this realisation is not 
grounded in itself, but in His love as such, in the love of the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit. And as we believe in God, and return His love, it is not 
to be understood from itself, but only from His loving as such.177 
 
In this way the conception of God as free and self-determining, as the one who loves 
in this self-determination, is the entry point through which Barth wants to access the 
other perfections of God. He does not do this to challenge the unity of the attributes 
in God but rather to access them in a way that is exegetically sound. Barth writes the 
following: 
The one perfection of God, His loving in freedom, is lived out by Him, and 
therefore identical with a multitude of various and distinct types of 
perfection. There is no possibility of knowing the perfect God without 
knowing His perfections. The converse is also true: knowledge of the divine 
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perfections is possible only in knowledge of the perfect God, of His loving in 
freedom. . . . The real God is the one God who loves in freedom, and as such 
is eternally rich. To know Him means to know Him again and again, in ever 
new ways—to know only Him, but to know Him as the perfect God, in the 
abundance, distinctness and variety of His perfections.178 
 
But there are other ways of construing the thesis of the unity of the divine attributes 
such as love and justice. Consider the Summa Contra Gentiles by Thomas Aquinas. 
The thesis put forward by Aquinas might at first appear in all major aspects to be like 
that now introduced by the present thesis, which aligns with Barth’s as well. This 
appears so because Aquinas argues for the unity of divine attributes in God’s self and 
employs the categories of potentiality and actuality. Nonetheless, Aquinas’s 
argument differs from ours. Furthermore, Aquinas’s argument also takes a slightly 
different shape because of the way in which he conceives of the relationship between 
Creator and creature. 
 Thomas Aquinas, while arguing for the unity of attributes, and employing the 
categories of potentiality and actuality, proceeds by way of negative theology. That 
is, Aquinas understands God as transcending the forms of our intellect in a way that 
makes it necessary to proceed by first establishing what God is not. As Aquinas 
writes, “For the divine substance, by its immensity, transcends every form that our 
intellect can realize; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we 
have some sort of knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.”179 In this spirit, 
Aquinas adds: “Everything that has in its substance an admixture of potentiality, to 
the extent that it has potentiality is liable not to be: because what can be, can also not 
be. But God in Himself cannot not be, seeing that He is everlasting; therefore there is 
in God no potentiality.”180 
 To some this might seem strange, insofar as potentiality is generally what a 
thing is before it is actuality. But Aquinas argues that this cannot be the case with 
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represents the goal of all creation transformed. 
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God, who is not a thing among things and therefore does not exist as other things 
exist. Rather, God is the great cause of all things. “Because potentiality does not 
bring itself into actuality, but is brought into actuality by something which is already 
in actuality. Everything therefore that is any way in potentiality has something else 
prior to it. But God is the First Being and the First Cause, and therefore has not in 
Himself any admixture of potentiality.”181 
 That God is, in this way, pure actuality entails, according to Aquinas’s 
argument, that God is one, and in that respect, unlike everything else that must be 
composite:  
In every compound there must be actuality and potentiality. For a plurality of 
things cannot become one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality. 
For things that are not one absolutely, are not actually united except by being 
in a manner tied up together or driven together: in which case the parts thus 
got together are in potentiality in respect of union; for they combine actually, 
after having been potentially combinable. But in God there is no potentiality: 
therefore there is not in Him any composition.182 
 
It can therefore be said that God is one, a perfect actuality and the cause of all things. 
The effects he has created and produced have a trace of himself in them, enough that 
Aquinas feels confident to say that human beings can arrive at God through the 
effects which he produces, “for as we cannot know Him naturally otherwise than by 
arriving at Him from the effects which He produces, the names whereby we denote 
His perfections must be several and diverse, answering to the diverse perfections that 
are found in things.”183 In this way God’s perfections are known by looking towards 
the perfections found in the things which are his creation and effect. Therefore, in a 
sense, one should go further than just applying the word “trace” when discussing 
how Aquinas sees God’s attributes reflected in his creation. Aquinas goes so far as to 
say of God’s effects that their attributes share in God’s attributes through a type of 
“imperfect participation.” Aquinas writes that “that which is found to perfection in 
God is found in other beings by some manner of imperfect participation, the said 
point of likeness belongs to God absolutely, but not so to the creature.”184 
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Therefore, according to Aquinas, as we proceed to speak of God with 
reference to his creation, we must proceed by way of analogy and by way of negative 
theology, which proceeds carefully to exclude those things which God is not so as to 
draw closer to describing him by his attributes. It remains true that in describing 
God’s attributes, according to Aquinas, we must move largely by observing the 
attributes of his creation and these attributes are diverse and as manifold as creation. 
However, because God is not a composite of actuality and potentiality but is pure 
actuality, of a single essence, the conclusion must be, according to Aquinas, that if 
we could see and understand his essence clearly we could see their perfect unity and 
be able to refer to them all by a single name:  
Thus also God by His one simple being possesses all manner of perfection, 
all that other beings compass by divers faculties—yea, much more. Hereby 
the need is clear of many names predicated of God: for as we cannot know 
Him naturally otherwise than by arriving at Him from the effects which He 
produces, the names whereby we denote His perfections must be several and 
diverse, answering to the diverse perfections that are found in things. But if 
we could understand His essence as it is in itself, and adapt to it a name 
proper to it, we should express it by one name only, as is promised to those 
who shall behold Him in essence: In that day there shall be one Lord, and 
his name shall be one (Zach. xiv, 9).185 
 
So, God is one and his attributes, if we could clearly see them and understand them, 
are one and undivided in his essence. The present thesis accepts such a 
pronouncement, for the most part. Nonetheless, it should simultaneously be clear that 
Aquinas’s thought does not place special emphasis on God’s love as the determining 
factor of the manifestation of this unity. There is, furthermore, an important 
difference in methods and assumptions used in Aquinas’s argumentation. We are 
somewhat hesitant to follow the view that humankind shares in the nature of God 
through some form of participation of the attributes of things in the created order. It 
is not we are reluctant to make the conceptual distinction between the attributes 
while yet affirming their unity. That is one practical implication of Aquinas’s 
understanding, allowing us to say that the attributes are so diverse in creation that it 
is possible for us to distinguish between them in reference to the divine essence, 
while affirming that, ultimately, they inhere in unity. Rather, the problem is that 
Aquinas’s pronouncements regarding these issues come pre-packaged with this 
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notion of divine emanation in nature and a type of theological argument based on 
that, both of which conflict with earlier commitments made in the present thesis.  
 
i. The Unity of Virtues and the Logical Priority of Love 
But with all this repeated affirmation of ultimate unity, whether it comes from Barth 
or from Aquinas, it could easily be forgotten that it could be most sensible to talk 
about either God’s justice or God’s love, depending on the event in salvation history 
to which one refers. In other words, God’s justice should perhaps be seen to be 
manifested in the crucifixion specifically and God’s love is seen to be manifested in 
the resurrection. Similarly, the Old Testament, with its emphasis on laws and 
commands, could be associated more directly with justice in contrast with the New 
Testament revelation which arguably imparts a message primarily of love. In such a 
way, could it not be argued that God’s love and justice are manifested separately and 
at different times in salvation history? So, even though, ultimately, they reach 
fulfilment in each other, should we not describe them to be manifested separately in 
history? 
It will be admitted that, if the cross appears to us to be primarily an act of 
justice because it is an act of destruction, we can understand that. Justice, while 
belonging in a unity with love, is conceptually distinguished in that it primarily 
destroys and limits opposition to God’s will, for example in restoring communion 
between himself and humankind. This remains true and is likely what tempts us to 
identify an event such as the cross solely with justice insofar as the destruction of sin 
is among its pronounced dimensions. However, it would be one-sided to leave it at 
that, because it also remains true that the cross, as has been stated, reveals God’s love 
as it does God’s justice. The justice of God cannot be treated without holding God’s 
love in view. They inhere together. When God in Christ seeks to restore communion 
between himself and humankind and undergoes the way of the cross to this end, this 
reveals his love. The limiting destructive aspect of the cross is, therefore, revealing 
of God’s love just as it is revealing of his justice. Similarly, although the resurrection 
might be viewed as a point of affirmation for humankind and, therefore, as pointing 
towards love, it also presents humankind with a promise that functions as a judgment 
on those realities which are “not yet” aligned with the resurrection. Therefore, justice 
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is always fully in view also in the resurrection. In making our distinctions and 
pronouncements with respect to God’s actions we gradually discover the way in 
which our pronouncement of God as just leads us to his love and pronouncements of 
his love leads us to his justice. 
 Having said this, that there is a unity in which God’s love always has his 
justice in view and vice versa, it also must remain true that love takes a certain 
priority in the relationship between the two. In an important way, while holding the 
unity of the concepts in view, it is a unity in which love should be seen to hold 
priority. After all, the story of the Scriptures is that of God who, in his freedom, 
seeks to bring humankind into communion with himself, and thereby, in his freedom, 
determine himself lovingly.186 God’s entire mission, as revealed in the Scriptures, is 
in loving and restoring humankind to communion with himself.  
To better illustrate this let us take the case of divine lawgiving as found in the 
Decalogue, a paradigmatic example of God, in his justice, commanding justice to his 
people. The commandments in the Decalogue can be said to consist of two tables. 
The first table of the Decalogue refers to humankind’s worship of and communion 
with God (humankind’s potentiality), and is found in the first four commandments 
(“You shall have no other gods before me,” “You shall not make for yourself an 
idol,” “Do not take the name of the Lord in vain,” “Remember the Sabbath and keep 
it holy” (Exod 20.3-8)). The first table has therefore to do with humankind with 
respect to an explicitly “vertical” dimension, as worshiping beings who belong in 
communion with their Creator. Therefore, the first table refers directly to that which 
God seeks, loving communion between God and humankind. The second table refers 
to human responsibilities, as it were on a “horizontal level,” referring especially to 
life together with other human beings in the “not-yet” (honor your father and 
mother,” “You shall not kill,” “You shall not commit adultery,” “You shall not steal,” 
“You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour” (Exod 20.9-17).  
How then does the second table of the Decalogue relate to God’s mission of 
love to restore humankind into loving communion with himself? As Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer writes: “The Decalogue indeed demands respect for the right to life, 
marriage, property, and human honor in the name of God. However, this does not 
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mean that these orders, codified into law, would have an absolute divine value as 
such, but merely that in them and above them God alone seeks to be honored and 
worshiped.”187 That is to say, God seeks loving communion with humankind and the 
law he lays down in the Decalogue circumscribes spheres within which worshipful 
communion with God can be cultivated. That is to say, even when God might appear 
to be manifesting his justice singularly, in setting down laws of conduct, love appears 
as its reference and inner logic. In this we discover that even the accentuated 
legalistic notion in the Old Testament Scriptures, so easily associated with justice, 
reveal themselves to be in unity with love and to have their centre in God’s loving 
mission to restore communion between himself and humankind. This is not said to 
nullify the differences that are to be found between the emphasis in the Old 
Testament scriptures and the scriptures of the New Testament. It is said to show how 
God’s love and justice always travel together, and that, in this unity, love takes a 
certain priority. 
Nonetheless, a fair argument could be made that, in the writings of the 
prophet Hosea, God in fact seems torn between the options of love and justice as he 
plans his interactions with his people. In Hosea we find many words describing the 
punishment God will distribute to Israel because of its waywardness. “Destruction to 
them because they have rebelled against me!” are the words attributed to God in 
Hosea 7.13. As God’s justice opposes, breaks down and destroys that which hinders 
his communion with his people, so it could seem that much of the writing in Hosea 
might suggest that God intends punishment or destruction for the Israelites for 
having turned away from loving communion with God. Yet, at the same time, we 
also find God saying in the book of Hosea: “I will heal their waywardness and love 
them freely, for my anger will turn away from them” (Hos 14.4). How can the two 
texts be understood in the same book of Hosea as utterances attributed to God? One 
way of understanding this could be found in an interpretation of the text which might 
call into question the contention we have already made concerning God’s love and 
justice as unitary. The interpretation would take Hosea as an example that God is, in 
fact, torn between love and justice and chooses one over the other in every given 
moment in salvation history. Sequentially, the two will eventually be brought into 
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perfect unity with the completion of salvation history in the eschaton. But until that 
time God is choosing to express either justice or love, as (it would be argued) is seen 
in the book of Hosea. 
 But is the book of Hosea rightly understood as manifesting an alternate idea 
of the relationship between God’s love and God’s justice? Does Hosea actually 
present God as being torn between love and justice and then choosing one over the 
other? Actually and primarily, the text must be seen to show the great fidelity and 
love of God, seeking the restoration of communion with his people.188 Furthermore, 
the text reveals God’s justice as instrumental in bringing about the repentance, 
forgiveness and restoration that re-establishes loving communion between God and 
his people. In other words, justice and love appear in a unity in Hosea. Hosea 
functions to remind the people of Israel and Judah that turning away has its 
consequences which are quite dire. In fact, the greater part of the text concerns itself 
with the results of the unfaithfulness of God’s people if they do not turn to him and 
repent for their idolatry. There is abundant description of the results of the 
waywardness of God’s people, of the punishment that they will reap. Nonetheless, 
the text also reveals the faithfulness of God’s love which will, in the end, be 
triumphant, bringing his people back to wholesomeness, into loving communion with 
God. 
 There is general agreement that the story of Hosea’s marriage to Gomer in the 
beginning of the book of Hosea functions as a metaphor for the prophetic message 
that follows.189 In that metaphor, Hosea married an unfaithful woman, Gomer. As it 
is written in Hosea: “Go, take yourself an adulterous wife and children of 
unfaithfulness, because the land is guilty of the vilest adultery in departing from the 
Lord” (Hosea 1.2). What follows in chapter 2 is a rebuke and chastisement of 
adultery which bears a strong resemblance to the idolatry and turning away of Israel. 
Nevertheless, in chapter 3, after the chastisement, God gives Hosea the following 
instructions: “Go, show your love to your wife again, though she is loved by another 
and is an adulteress.” The analogy is clear, just as Hosea is faithful to his unfaithful 
wife so God is faithful to Israel and whatever chastisement follows from the 
infidelity serves only to bring her/them back to a more wholesome communion. 
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Making the analogy ever more explicit, the text reads “Love her as the Lord loves the 
Israelites, though they turn to other gods and love the sacred raisin cakes” (Hos 3.1). 
 When God rebukes his people and gives them up to waywardness and 
punishes the unrepentant this only serves his loving purpose, which seeks a 
wholesome, free communion with his people. His justice never travels alone, without 
his love, and his love always ensures that his justice overcomes that which sets itself 
in opposition to his loving will. Again it is affirmed that love and justice coexist in a 
unity. Even when justice might appear to be moving without love and love without 
justice, they are shown to be in unity. Importantly, it is again affirmed that this unity 
is secured in the logical primacy of love. This is what results from our reading of 
Hosea. At every turn it becomes clear that God’s attributes are in a unity; his holiness 
and his justice, his freedom and his love, his love and his justice, and so forth. As 
Karl Barth writes: 
Every individual trait which is to be affirmed of God can signify only the 
one, but the one which is to be affirmed of Him must of necessity signify 
also every individual trait and the totality of all individual traits. Every 
distinction in God can be affirmed only in such a way as implies at the same 
time His unity and therefore the lack of essential discrepancy in what is 
distinguished.190 
 
However, as should have become clear, the emphasis on unity cannot be left to stand 
without further qualification. This is why Barth rightly reminds us that, primarily, 
“God’s being consists in the fact that He is the One who loves in freedom.”191 God’s 
free love appears as an access point to the other perfections, giving his love a certain 
priority in thought and discussion. Barth continues:  
The one perfection of God, His loving in freedom, is lived out by Him, and 
therefore identical with a multitude of various and distinct types of 
perfection. There is no possibility of knowing the perfect God without 
knowing His perfections. The converse is also true: knowledge of the divine 
perfections is possible only in knowledge of the perfect God, of His loving in 
freedom.192 
 
Therefore, any idea of God tempering his justice with mercy or of his mercy being 
limited by his justice is untenable. That would suggest that his attributes limit each 
other so that God is not allowed to express either fully in the context of the other. 
                                                 





God’s love and justice can be conceptually pulled apart for discussion, but, 
ultimately, God’s love and God’s justice are two sides of the same coin, which we 
can call God’s loving justice. 
 
B.  Human Love and Human Justice  
What has now been said about God’s love and justice might leave us with important 
clues as to how we should understand the nature of human love and human justice. If 
God’s love and God’s justice are to be thought of in unity as loving justice, this might 
bear in some way on how the relationship between human love and human justice is 
conceived. After all, humankind is called to correspond to God’s act. God loves and 
so humankind should respond in love. God acts justly and humankind responds. It 
must be acknowledged that there is an element of such “mirroring” or 
correspondence in action. But it should equally be clear that such mirroring, or 
response, is not made by an equal. It is a thoroughly creaturely response to a divine 
initiative. That much should be clear. The question is what that implies for the unity 
of love and justice in the realm of the human. 
 While it is true that there surely is a correspondence between the acts of God 
and the acts of humankind, there is, yet, one important difference: the perfect unity of 
the attributes of God. In his being he is perfectly free and perfectly wise; he is at the 
same time perfectly loving and perfectly just. This perfect unity does not belong to 
humankind. With humankind one discovers the imperfect unity of the attributes in 
imperfect, human, freedom and wisdom.193 Humankind does not, as has been 
discussed above, have the perfect freedom that directly accomplishes what it hopes 
for. What this entails, as we have seen in the chapter on love, is that love does not 
create or accomplish the new reality it strives for directly but, rather, acts in a 
creative hope that its actions will be made perfect by the divine act. Likewise, the 
justice that is human does not directly achieve destruction of that which is in 
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opposition to God’s will but is, rather, only an attempted limitation, curbing or 
restricting the manifestations of rebelling reality insofar it is (humanly) deemed to be 
destructive of love. So it is that human justice, like human love, has a reference to 
human potentiality/freedom of creaturely communion with God and the actualization 
of that potentiality. 
 Therefore, the unity between human love and justice is imperfect insofar as 
acts of love can, with incorrect judgment (imperfect human wisdom) or failed 
execution (imperfect human freedom) have disastrous effects on that which justice 
would want to shield. Furthermore, acts of justice, human attempts to curb rebelling 
realities, can possibly be to the detriment of love insofar as human judgment/wisdom 
suffers from an imperfection that can have catastrophic effects. Human love and 
human justice, therefore, coexist in an imperfect unity. They serve each other, and 
cannot be viewed in complete isolation, but yet are not in perfect harmony. This is 
true whether one looks to their cognitive, emotive or active forms. As we ask 
whether human love and human justice should not be said to correspond to or mirror 
the divine unity of love and justice, our answer must be a “Yes.” They are, as they 
both refer to the actualization of potentiality. They can be said to go together to the 
extent that they can be named together as loving justice. But this “Yes” must be 
combined with a “No” because they are, after all, still a human love and a human 
justice in an imperfect state and, therefore, in an imperfect unity wherein they can 
frustrate each other in both judgment and act. As Oliver O’Donovan rightly writes: 
“The clemency of human judgment cannot be like divine mercy, making all things 
new; it can only be a response to it, founded in humility, gratitude and fellow-feeling 
with sinners. It can only point, it cannot reach, to the place where justice and mercy 
are entirely one.”194  
Similarly, when Reinhold Niebuhr talks about perfect and imperfect 
expressions of justice his arguments strongly resemble what has been argued here. 
Within the Niebuhrian scheme of things, when love enters into historical realities, it 
is compromised by the reality that it enters.195 Therefore, love becomes imperfect 
love in historical realities and inspires customs and structures of justice that can be 
termed imperfect justice. This imperfect justice is then constantly being perfected by 
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the activities of love up to the point of becoming perfect justice.196 As Niebuhr 
writes: “. . . anything short of love cannot be perfect justice.”197 This eventual 
identity between love and justice is a testament to the ultimate unity of love and 
justice within the Niebuhrian conceptual frame. Nonetheless, it remains true for 
Niebuhr that, within temporal reality, love and justice are differentiated and love 
guides their movements. This stance works well as a general description of things 
and accords largely with what has been stated here: that justice and love can be 
differentiated in human activity although they ultimately coexist in a unity. However, 
for Niebuhr, the emphasis is always largely on the moral situation (corrupt 
institutions, the reality of differing interests, the fact of human egoism, etc.) rather 
than on the imperfection of human wisdom and freedom.  
Given that this is the case, Niebuhr is more confident that human judgment 
and freedom can find and achieve the best decision given any situation, although it 
may fall far from the highest ideal of love. However, it must remain true that, more 
fundamentally, the problem is that we do not necessarily know what entails a good 
compromise and even if we did our chosen route of action might be frustrated by 
events we cannot control. So, the question and problem revolves not primarily 
around reality and compromise, as it does for Niebuhr (although these will be 
important factors for subsequent human judgment and action), but prior to this there 
is a more basic uncertainty concerning human judgment and human action. 
Let us further explain this unity of and difference between human love and 
human justice. The unity between human love and human justice is found on two 
levels which are both intimately connected. First, their unity is found in their being a 
response to and in correspondence with God’s acts of love and justice, which coexist 
in a unity. Secondly, their unity is found in that they both refer to the actualization of 
potentiality. Their differentiation and complementarity should be described in the 
following way: Human love is a human response to God’s love, which seeks the 
actualization of the potentiality of humankind to be in free communion with God. It 
is, therefore, a creative enterprise that proactively ventures and risks, builds and 
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creates in the hope that the actions may correlate to God’s initiative and contribute to 
the actualization of potentiality. 
Human justice is a response to God’s act of judgment and destruction of all 
which pretends to set itself in opposition to his holiness and will. It, therefore, seeks 
to curb, hinder and limit that which threatens the accomplishments of love. Both 
refer to the actualization of potentiality. But, more than love, justice refers to that 
which is actual while love is more singularly oriented toward potentiality. This is not 
to say that love does not include justice’s concern for the actual or that justice does 
not have a strong focus upon potentiality. 
As human attributes, justice and love coexist in an imperfect unity with the 
effect that they can find themselves in opposition, or fall into a quandary. They can, 
because of the human condition of broken, imperfect unity, frustrate each other, in 
both human judgment and in action. In a single scenario of events, one act may be 
considered just and another loving. In that occurrence the agent will have to make 
one determination over the other, by way of judgment, and then follow through, in 
the freedom and the risk that come with it. A very clear illustrative case would be the 
medical treatment of people resisting necessary treatment. The treatment suggested 
may be resisted or rejected and, yet, the caregiver may nonetheless determine to 
force it upon the recipient as an act of love. Very possibly, our judgments, 
theological or non-theological, will tend to see the act of forcing someone to do 
something against her will to be an unjust act. Yet, we may undertake it. And it may 
be true the other way around. We may make a judgment and a determination to 
respect the autonomy and space of the individual that rejects our treatment, 
respecting our established thought trajectories concerning justice while going against 
what we perceive to be the loving act to undertake in that situation. 
We mention this to underline that, although love and justice go together and 
have the same reference in acting, we will often be uncertain as to when they go 
together. That is to say, people will find themselves in a perceived quandary between 
love and justice and yet proceed to act. Another excellent example would be a case 
with an even more conspicuous public dimension. A landlord who turned a deserving 
tenant out of his home in order to make it available to a son or daughter as an art 
studio might plausibly be thought to act both lovingly (to his son or daughter) and 
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unjustly (to the tenant). Again, it happens that there seems to be a tug of war between 
love and justice in our judgments. 
In this it must be emphasized that these divergences are only apparent. One 
may certainly feel and experience being torn in the situation of parenting between 
being a hard disciplinarian or a kind, supportive parent. But, in the end, there is a 
way for every situation in which our actions are simultaneously the best discipline 
and the kindest support. The problem is that we are without perfect knowledge and 
perfect freedom of execution.  
 Nevertheless, perhaps we have not, by stating this, fully excluded the 
possibility of real divergences that are more than apparent. Could there be, for 
example, a wider and more benign sense in which we must say that human beings 
experience the differentiation of the virtues? That is, is there a sense in which the 
virtues are self-standing and without conflict? When, for example, a man makes his 
living as a football manager during the working week and volunteers for a kids-with-
cancer-charity during the weekends is he not exhibiting two kinds of virtues, self-
standing and without conflict? Is he not demonstrating in the first instance the virtue 
of being a good manager and, in the second instance, the virtue of love? And if he, 
furthermore, is without excess in food or drink, does this not show him to have a 
third virtue, that of temperance, quite independent of the others? 
 The truth is that there is a love which has brought this particular man to 
become a football manager. Whether it is his love of his local community, his 
country, money, fame, or the game of football, love has brought him to this 
profession and shapes it. The virtue of being a good football manager is determined 
by the virtue of love. Every man has a supreme love which imposes its distinctive 
shape on everything that he does. The love which ascends to the object of love 
subsequently descends in its service and engages in actions that correspond and serve 
that object of love. In this descent, in this action on behalf of the beloved (the ego, 
the country, money, another person, God’s promise, etc.) justice is determined and 
defined as it appears in the face of opposition to love. In this way, what is considered 
just will receive a determination from our loves. This is how love appears in a unity 
with justice within which love holds logical primacy. Concerning the man’s 
volunteer work for a kids-with-cancer-charity, this can very well be in the service of 
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the same love which guides the man in his pursuits as a football manager: love of 
ego, local community, fame, God, and so on. It may also be a different love 
altogether. However that may be, a multitude of loves will, in the end, inhere 
together in a hierarchy of loves, where there is an ultimate love that determines and 
shapes all other loves. Concerning other virtues, such as temperance, they are never 
self-standing but always stand in reference to and the service of something else. 
There is no sense in which love and justice serve temperance or bravery or other such 
virtues. But there is more obviously a sense in which temperance and bravery are put 
to the service of love and justice. 
 Now there is yet another category of virtue that is somewhat different from 
the ones already mentioned. Being a good football manager requires a virtue, just as 
being a good driver is a virtue, at least in some sense. The same goes for piano 
playing, which requires the perfection of skill. But the sense in which they are virtues 
is quite different and they could almost be described more accurately as arts or 
functions. As such they are super-ordered by the higher virtues, first love and justice 
and second temperance and bravery and industry and so on. 
 Oliver O’Donovan also argues for a mutual inhering of the attributes through 
the concept of love. As he writes: “true virtue is love for God, and the four cardinal 
virtues are manifestations of this love in certain typical relations into which human 
existence leads us. Temperance is the loving subject preserving himself unspoilt for 
God; fortitude is his glad endurance of all for God’s sake; justice is his stance of 
subordination before God and command over the non-human creation; and prudence 
is his discrimination between that which helps and that which hinders his pilgrimage 
towards God.”198 This is largely in line with what is being argued here, although the 
present work has argued that the function of justice is more fundamentally in 
connection with love and has described its workings as differing somewhat from the 
description provided by O’Donovan. Human justice seeks to secure that which 
corresponds to the future love is seeking to achieve or realize. It thereby refers to the 
same process of the actualization of potentiality but is active in placing limits, 
hindering and curbing that which threatens the accomplishments of love. 
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 Therefore, we again affirm that the virtues are never completely differentiated 
or self-standing, although we do, for practical reasons, refer to this or that act as 
loving, the next act as just, the third act as brave and the fourth act as an example of 
good driving. We do the same when we read the Scriptures and attribute the concept 
of justice to the cross of Christ, when in fact the attribute of justice is not alone and 
self-standing in that event. The difference is that, in human action, wisdom and 
freedom are imperfect, making an actual disjunction between love and justice in 
thought and action possible. 
 
i. Platonic Unity and Conflict of Virtues 
The Platonic construal of the unity of virtues, like that proposed here, understands 
the conflict of virtue as arising only with defective virtue. In this regard, as will be 
explained, Plato emphasizes the failure of the attribute of human wisdom as the 
cause of this conflict. The Platonic construal of the virtues does affirm a unity 
between them, but it is a somewhat different unity from the one espoused here. 
Although it can be said that there is development to be found in Plato’s thought on 
the virtues over the course of his writing, it can be safely stated that Plato 
consistently presents the virtues as unitary in some way. In the early Socratic 
dialogues we find Socrates affirming the unity of virtues as, for example, in 
Protagoras where the eventual claim is that all virtues are united in wisdom. In this 
way, the conclusion in Protagoras is that even bravery is one with the other virtues 
as it ultimately depends on wisdom to be recognized as true bravery and not just 
foolhardiness.199 Based on this type of reasoning Socrates is able to conclude that 
men cannot be “altogether ignorant, but also very courageous.”200 The result must be 
that a conflict is possible only between defective virtues that have their root in 
defective or incomplete wisdom.  
In the Republic the angle is somewhat different but not necessarily opposed 
or in discontinuity with that of the unity of virtues in wisdom we find in Protagoras. 
Rather, it could be said to add a part to the picture that emerged in Protagoras. In the 
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Republic the virtues, like all other phenomena, have a further, ultimate unity in the 
Form of the Good. Plato’s Socrates, in conversation with Glaucon, draws an analogy 
between the Form of the Good and the sun. He describes the sun as that which grants 
the light by which our eyes are able to see. The analogy between the sun and the 
Form of the Good is that, as the sun grants the light which makes it possible for our 
eyes to see so the Form of the Good has a similar function for our intellects: 
Then what gives the objects of knowledge their truth and the mind the power 
of knowing is the Form of the Good. . . . And just as it was right to think of 
light and sight as being like the sun, but wrong to think of them as being the 
sun itself, so here again it is right to think of knowledge and truth as being 
like the Good, but wrong to think of either of them as being the Good, which 
must be given as still higher place of honour.201 
 
Afterwards a general discussion takes place between Socrates and Glaucon 
concerning how this Form of the Good may be better known and this discussion runs 
in the direction that the Form of the Good is to be known through the intellect. 
However, and importantly, no precise methods for achieving knowledge of the Form 
of the Good are presented. 
What can be safely said is that, in both Protagoras and the Republic, it is the 
virtue of reason/wisdom that receives a special place of prominence. Then, in the 
Republic, there appears a further unity, the Form of the Good, the unity of all good 
things. It is this good the intellect seeks so as to receive the kind of knowledge which 
might make humankind truly virtuous. All the virtues/attributes find their unity in the 
Form of the Good and this is what the human intellect seeks to know. But if we were 
to agree that this was in fact the nature of the unity of the virtues, whether of love, 
justice, bravery or chastity, these considerations still leave a looming question: What 
is this Form of the Good? Or better: What is the Form of the Good a form of? Terry 
Penner has maintained that the two major responses have been to describe the Good 
as either a moral good or some quasi-moral good. But Penner has a problem with the 
over-moralization of the notion of the Good, arguing that such moralistic 
interpretations do not describe the Form of the Good as “a Platonic Form of the kind 
of individual good we discover in Socrates (at least on some views), namely, the 
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happiness of the individual.”202 Penner maintains that this implausible view of the 
Form of the Good has been seen to be plausible because there is no proper alternative 
explanation. This is why Penner argues that the Form of the Good should be seen to 
be advantage or benefit. Chasing the central place of wisdom in Plato, Penner 
reminds us that: 
In the Republic, Plato tells us that Wisdom is the science the rational part has 
of advantage or benefit (tou sumpherontos) to each of the three parts of the 
soul and to the whole these parts constitute. So what is advantage or benefit? 
If we turn to the characterization of wisdom in the city, we find that the 
wisdom involved is: the science (epistêmê) . .  . by means of which one does 
not deliberate about some particular thing as the science of carpentry 
deliberates about how wooden things should be in the best state (echoi 
beltista); or the sciences of bronzesmithing and of farming about how 
bronzes or crops should do best; but about the whole—how the whole city 
gets along best (arista homiloi), with itself and with other cities.203 
 
Based on this, Penner states that “I take it to be clear that good and advantage are 
here taken to be the same thing.”204 Penner concludes: “And what could the Form of 
the Good clarify if not what that good, i.e., advantage is which it is Reason’s function 
(a) to have the science of and (b) to seek to realize in deliberating and in ruling the 
other two parts of the soul?” As we asked before what the Form of the Good was a 
form of, it seems that Penner has advanced a convincing argument that not only 
maintains a steady continuity between the earlier Socratic dialogues, such as 
Protagoras, and its emphasis on happiness, the unity of virtue and the part that 
knowledge or intellect plays in this unity. Furthermore, it also seems to accord well 
with the Republic.  
So, we have a unity of the virtues in the Form of the Good that is the benefit 
or advantage of the whole. This Good is then to be known by reason/wisdom. This 
being the case, the Protagoras argument is largely affirmed by the Republic insofar 
as the virtues do coexist in a unity that depends on human wisdom to be known and 
enacted. This entails that there is a conflict between virtues only if there is defect in 
the virtues which, again, is always traceable to a defect in human wisdom. It so 
                                                 
202 Terry Penner, “What is the Form of the Good a Form of? A Question about the Plot of the 
Republic,” in Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato’s Republic, ed. Douglas Cairns, 
Fritz-Gregor Hermann and Terry Penner (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 24. 
203 Ibid., 30. 
204 Ibid., 31. 
116 
 
happens that this line of reasoning largely aligns with a part of what we have argued, 
that is to say that imperfect human wisdom contributes to seeming contradictions 
between the attributes of love and justice. 
There is, however, a rather large problem that the Platonist, who would be 
pleased with the idea that the Form of the Good is the ultimate unity and depends on 
wisdom for actualization. The problem is that Plato never achieves knowledge of this 
Good, at least not in his written legacy. As Penner confirms: “But Plato does not 
claim to have knowledge of the Form of the Good, and therefore would not claim to 
have knowledge of the good—any more than Socrates claimed to have knowledge of 
the good.”205 But, if this is the case, then what is left for the Platonic subject but 
trying, by an effort of the logical rational mind, to derive statements that by 
themselves give us knowledge of the Form of the Good and consistently end up in 
aporia, in confusion and the inability to derive statements that grant us the kind of 
knowledge Plato was seeking? And, given the dependency of virtue on wisdom, 
where does this leave the possibility and viability of virtue? 
It must be said that we are able agree to some extent with the general 
structure of the Platonic description of the unity of the virtues, apprehended by 
intellect as it turns toward the Form of the Good. However, what we also see, 
perhaps not surprisingly given that this is a theological thesis, is that the intellectual 
seeing and knowing that Plato seeks is possible only from the position of faith. From 
the position of faith we can see that benefit or advantage is in communion with God. 
We can, therefore, in the position of faith, speak into Plato’s framework and say: If 
the form of the Good is taken on faith, then the form of the Good is communion with 
God, and love names the virtue of seeking this and all the virtues are united in this 
love and the justice that is unitary and yet subordinate to it. 
It is, however, at this point that the discussion turns to love and justice, and 
here we find another, important, point of disagreement with the Platonic framework 
of the unity of virtues. In looking to the accounts of love in Plato’s writings the chief 
feature that emerges is a yearning or desire, a primarily emotive quality. In the 
Phaedrus the wildness of the emotive qualities of love is highlighted prominently, 
making it imperative for it to be led, or shaped by, reason and self-control. Or, to use 
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the analogy of the Phaedrus, the charioteer, the love of wisdom, must rule the two 
horses, the white horse (love of honor and propriety) and the black horse (love of 
pleasures) so as to steer the right course. When the soul is rightly ordered in this way 
then “all love is directed, by its nature, toward the good.”206 
However, a more coherent idea of love emerges in the Symposium, which 
finds a true home with Plato’s constellation of the Form of the Good, wisdom and 
justice. In the Symposium Socrates argues (or, rather, relays the argument of 
Diotima) that love is that which seeks the attainment of absolute good.207 But love 
seeks that which it needs and, therefore, does not have. According to Socrates “Love 
is the love of something which he hasn’t got, and consequently lacks.” Furthermore, 
“if love is lacking in what is beautiful, and if the good and the beautiful are the same, 
he must also be lacking in what is good.”208 Love therefore appears as an ascending, 
largely emotive or appetitive trait, seeking the glimpse of the eternal goodness, truth 
and beauty. Love is, within the Platonic scheme, basically driven by the emptiness of 
that which it seeks. 
This is problematic for the present work in some ways. The love that is 
described in the Christian faith is brought out of the fullness of God, not poverty, and 
it descends rather than ascends. This is not to say that the erotic, ascending love is 
not to be acknowledged. It is and has been given its place here. But it is secondary 
and we know true love primarily in its ascending mode, travelling from a place of 
fullness to achieve wholeness. So, in the human dimension, it is from the wholeness 
perceived in faith that love travels and seeks to act. This difference between the 
theological view and the Platonic view is further emphasized in that the Platonic 
concept of justice is given the type of prominence that love, agape-love, has within 
the theological view and the view espoused in the present thesis. 
And why is that the case? The reason is that, while Platonic love ascends 
towards the realm of the Forms or the ideal of the Good, justice is said to be 
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descending. As Aryeh Kosman explains, “justice according to Plato is a matter of 
balance of harmony among the parts of the city.”209 This principle applies also to 
human beings as functionally differentiated beings.210 But what kind of harmony or 
balance then is justice? Kosman convincingly suggests that it is “the kind of harmony 
that is achieved when the differentiation of function is determined by what 
differentiated parts of the subject are best able to carry out the subject’s several 
specific functions.”211 So where do we learn of the right function of things and their 
best relations? Well, in the realm of Forms we learn of the perfect shape of things as 
well as their right harmony, justice: 
Think here, following the Republic’s spatial metaphors, of the divided line 
of Book 6 [The Republic] as having both a vertical and a horizontal 
dimension. The vertical dimension is made explicit in Socrates’ discussion, 
but the horizontal dimension is implied by the plurality of entities at any 
given level of the line. Justice may then be thought of as the ideal principle 
that governs the downward vector along this vertical dimension, a vector of 
imaging, but also of dispersion and exemplification, producing the diaspora 
of being whose upward direction is governed by eros, by the love that the 
phenomenal world has for its own true nature. As the horizontal dimension 
of the divided line is governed by principles of multiplicity and unification, 
so the vertical dimension evokes the twin themes of justice and love that 
properly divide and hold together the commonwealth of being.212  
 
Therefore, it can be said that love ascends to gain a glimpse of the world forms to 
learn of their nature and harmony, while justice descends, rightly ordering the world 
according to what reason/wisdom saw in its glimpse. 
That is to say, when love has moved the philosopher up to see the forms, their 
true nature, their unity and difference and right ordering, justice names the quality 
that brings the harmony of that “other world” into being to our visible world of 
senses. So, love is the trait that ascends to the realm of true knowledge, wisdom 
apprehends, and justice descends. Platonic love can, therefore, be described largely 
as “a search for the good.”213 Love is desire which promotes the seeking of wisdom 
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of the good, while justice is the harmony of the various goods and the virtues both 
within humanity and without. This means that love is desire, seeking the good, while 
justice is harmony, enacting the true nature and relationship amongst the forms. 
Again, it can be re-iterated that within the Platonic view love is the ascending trait, 
while justice is the descending one. But how can this be true within a theological 
paradigm in which God’s love descends to re-establish the right harmony, which is 
the freedom of communion and where justice is his operation of achieving this? It 
cannot. Our paradigms of love have been changed by faith in the revelation of God in 
a way that makes it: 
1. Untenable to discuss love primarily as a desire, ascending in the search for 
knowledge 
2. Untenable to describe the highest human virtue to be that of justice as the 
harmony of parts 
 
Rather, love is that trait that seeks to bring about God’s future of freedom while 
justice is the trait that serves love by restraining and breaking oppositions to its 
arrival. This, we have established what follows from attending to the revelation of 
God. This difference is attributable to our willingness to think on the terms of faith in 
the revelation. This is not meant to imply that Plato’s thought is, in any way, free of 
such conditions. As G. R. F. Ferrari points out in his discussion of Plato’s Phaedrus 
and Symposium, Plato’s discussion is determined by ideas of love that were handed 
down through his cultural milieu: “In both cases, Plato takes one of love’s clichés 
and turns it to his metaphysical advantage. In the Symposium, the cliché is ‘love 
promotes virtue.’ In the Phaedrus it is ‘love is wild.’ From this source flow the 
differences between the dialogues, their limitations and their achievements.”214 
 
ii. Wolterstorff on the Unity between Love and Justice 
Concerning the issue of the unity of or opposition between love and justice, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff has given an extensive treatment in his book Justice in Love. Helpfully, 
Wolterstorff focuses on the attributes of love and justice, making our interaction with 
him more pointed. In Wolterstorff’s book the main thesis is that love and justice exist 
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not in opposition but in unity. Wolterstorff advances his thesis as he finds some 
influential writers, especially Anders Nygren and Reinhold Niebuhr, to have set the 
two in opposition. Wolterstorff claims that Nygren tells us to side with love against 
justice while Niebuhr sides with justice: 
A fundamental assumption in both Nygren and Niebuhr is that love may 
conflict with justice and nonetheless be well-formed. Nygren instructs us to 
remain faithful to love in such situations of conflict at the risk of perpetrating 
injustice; Niebuhr instructs us to remain faithful to justice in situations of 
conflict at the cost of love. Both positions prove untenable.215  
 
Wolterstorff sees the binary between the two to be mistaken and argues that they 
actually coexist in a unity and that there is no opposition between them. According to 
Wolterstorff, loving action is acting in accordance with the requirements of justice. 
Otherwise it would not be love.216 The two coexist, in this way, in a necessary unity. 
What then is Wolterstorff’s understanding of justice, with which love is so strongly 
identified? In Justice in Love, Wolterstorff argues that justice consists in acting in a 
way that befits a person’s worth,217 something that we would describe as person’s 
“actuality.” Here we refer to worth as a person’s actuality just as “actuality” refers to 
the status of a thing or a person as it is found in each moment as contrasted with what 
it is determined to become, its potentiality. Therefore love, in Wolterorff’s argument, 
would not be love unless it accords with justice, which is to act in accordance with 
another person’s worth, another person’s actuality. This worth is, in Wolterstorff’s 
mind, rightly expressed as “a right.” Wolterstorff writes that “justice, as we saw, 
prevails in human relationships insofar as persons render to each other what they 
have a right to.” But what is Wolterstorff’s understanding of right, the concept 
central to justice as he likes to see it? Wolterstorff writes: 
I can now say what it is for a person to have a right to the life-good of being 
treated a certain way. One has a right against someone to the life-good of 
their treating one a certain way just in case, were they to deprive one of that 
life-good, they would be treating one with under-respect. They would be 
demeaning one. Someone’s rights are what respect for his or her worth 
requires. Or to put it from the shadow side: to wrong someone is to treat her 
with less respect than befits her worth—to treat her with under-respect, to 
treat her as would only befit someone of less worth.”218 So love acts in 
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accordance with worth which is equivocal with right, that is to say, if it is 
“well-formed love” and not “malformed love.219 
 
Love is shown, as Wolterstorff hoped, to coexist in unity with justice in this way. 
This is a difficult point for us to accept if it is not qualified. Because, although we 
want to recognize the unity and complementarity of love and justice, we also have 
shown how love acts with a primary view towards potentiality. Love acts not in 
accordance with worth primarily, but in accordance with potentiality insofar as it 
sees Christ in the neighbour. 
In some ways it seems that Wolterstorff may well stipulate that love and 
justice go together, especially when they are “well-formed.” But to say that love and 
justice easily go together in a Wolterstorffian manner is not a very accurate 
description of the way we perceive our dilemmas. Perhaps the notion belongs to the 
perfect state of the eschaton, where human wisdom is no longer imperfect and sees 
clearly, face to face. Perhaps it belongs to the perfect state wherein human 
potentiality simply is human actuality and the two are no longer separate, where love 
and justice coincide perfectly. But the stipulation does not amount to much in the 
moral experience of a fallen humanity in whom wisdom is broken and freedom 
imperfect and where our actuality exists in some kind of discontinuity to our 
potentiality. It still requires a greater sensitivity to “the already” and the “not yet” as 
well as the difference between potentiality and actuality as it regards the temporal, 
human realm. 
When Wolterstorff writes that “the commandment to love our fellows is, I 
believe, no more nor less than a call to the recognition of their deserts,”220 we cannot 
agree. Love is more than just recognition of desert.221 The understanding that love 
works only in accordance with the actuality of persons, in accordance with desert and 
rights, threatens to shrink love from being love, the attribute that works primarily 
towards potentiality. Likewise, if Wolterstorff were simultaneously arguing the 
opposite, that love is the content of justice, it would bring us to impossible 
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conclusions. It could lead us to deem it unjust when a person fails to engage in 
actions which hitherto have been understood to be loving and charitable. This is 
because, if Wolterstorff is equally saying that justice is encapsulated in the demands 
of love, it could entail that we would be acting unjustly in not giving alms, or 
declining to move to a Third World country to do charitable work when offered such 
an opportunity. 
 So, while we agree with Wolterstorff that love and justice are reconcilable, 
our construal of this reconciliation must be diverge from his as it avoids conflating 
the two concepts in the temporal domain. This difference between us and 
Wolterstorff is also evident in that we do not deny that the two concepts can and will 
come into opposition in both judgment and action. At the very least, we would not be 
keen to take the concept of unity and run with it so far as to deny that, on this side of 
the eschaton, love and justice are in an imperfect, broken unity and that they can, at 
times, frustrate each other in judgment and in act. After all, human attributes are not 
yet perfect human attributes in perfect human unity, and they most certainly are not 
divine attributes. 
 
C. Divine and Human Justice: The Connection 
To recapitulate what has been argued concerning the relationship of love to justice 
and the other virtues we can say the following. Love names the attribute that defines 
God’s action in seeking to bring humankind into communion with himself. Human 
love names the human disposition and activity that seeks to correspond with this 
knowledge and seeks to act so as to actualize God’s determined future. Justice 
appears as the attribute of God whereby God’s love meets an opposition and presents 
it with limits or destruction. Human justice names the attribute which seeks to 
correspond with this knowledge and seeks the curbing and limitation of that which 
sets itself up against the movements of love. In this way, justice appears unitary with 
love, serving to overcome all pretences to love’s opposition. However, it is love that 
retains the logical priority in this unity that can be called loving justice. As regards 
the other virtues, whether chastity, bravery, temperance, or industry, they are all 
united under loving justice and serve it and take their rationale from that unity. 
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Therefore, all the virtues, which have their own, distinct definitions, are united in a 
lived synthesis, that of loving justice or, better yet, that of love.  
We have now shown how love and justice are similarly connected in their 
human and divine manifestations. But the connection and continuity between God’s 
loving justice and humankind’s loving justice has yet to be made explicit. 
Nonetheless, we have established all the necessary prerequisites to easily drawing 
out that connection. God seeks, in his free love, to re-establish communion between 
himself and humankind. God accomplishes this, as we have said, through the 
destruction of sin on the cross of Christ, so that humankind is able to live in 
communion with God. Humankind is confronted with and recognizes its judgment 
through the presentation of The Promise, the resurrection. The human recognition of 
this truth results in humankind’s actively awaiting the consummation of its reality, its 
actualization. 
This active wait can arrive in two distinct yet unitary forms. First, humankind 
refrains from certain actions that might impinge on spaces in which the actualization 
of the divine–human communion can take place. This is the manifestation of human 
justice, well exemplified in the second table of the Decalogue. The active wait takes 
another form, that of loving action, which is more obviously active, creative and risk-
taking than human justice. Through human love, humankind pro-actively seeks to 
create spaces and remove hindrances so that the divine–human communion might 
actualize. The connection between divine justice and human justice (as well as 
between divine love and human love) is thereby made clear. In recognizing God’s 
will and action to restore communion between himself and humankind, humankind 
responds by actively waiting, characterized by justice and love, which are both meant 
to create and sustain spaces for God’s loving decision to actualize. God’s action 
therefore presents humankind with a truth about itself (that it is determined for 
communion with God) to which humankind then seeks to react (by creating and 
sustaining conditions which might facilitate the actualizations of the truth). 
Humankind’s actions respond to and mirror God’s actions, but are, as human actions, 
not on par with divine action. This is how it becomes clear that, while God’s justice 
destroys opposition to the actualization of the divine–human communion, human 
justice can seek only to limit the transgression of the sinful opposition. And while 
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God’s love accomplishes the future of freedom in the divine–human communion, 
human love can only creatively and faithfully prepare the way through which it 
might enter. 
 
D. Is It Justice That We Speak of?  
To some, the treatment of justice given here might seem to bypass or fail to address 
ideas many might entertain about the way justice functions. There is a reason for this. 
In the historical conversation about justice there is one tradition that is more 
influential and more substantial than any other and it has not yet been directly 
addressed. Nonetheless, it is precisely by moving through that very tradition that we 
are able to speak as we have spoken about justice. The tradition to which we are 
alluding is the tradition of justice that can, by broad strokes, be traced through 
Thomas Aquinas back to Aristotle. It was in describing justice that Aristotle 
distinguished between two special types. The first category he called corrective 
justice, which denotes an activity in which like is exchanged for like and a 
disproportion of loss and gain between exchanging parties is avoided. Of course, this 
is the type of justice found not only in economic transactions but also in punishment 
and retribution. As John Finnis rightly describes it, corrective justice is “the justice 
that rectifies or remedies inequalities that arise in dealings between individuals. 
These ‘dealings’ may either be voluntary, as in sale, hire and other business 
transactions, or involuntary, as where one man ‘deals’ with another by stealing from 
him, murdering him, or defaming him.”222  
Aristotle however saw, of course, that what justice can mean is not exhausted 
by such a notion of corrective justice. This is why he developed a second category of 
justice. Aristotle named this second kind of justice “distributive justice,” describing a 
process whereby “honour, or money or the other things. . . fall to be divided among 
those who have a share in the constitution, according to their desert.”223 Aristotle’s 
categories of justice, as has been said, became immensely influential and have been 
re-used throughout the history of ethics and politics. But however important and 
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Lesley Brown. Oxford World’s Classics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1130a–b. 
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resilient Aristotle’s distinction has been, it is not entirely satisfactory. The 
Aristotelian understanding of distributive justice is somewhat limited by being born 
out of a very particular experience of Greek culture and history, which was Greek 
colonization. 
Greek colonization consisted of groups from Greeks settling in new locales 
with new natural resources where they had to figure how to distribute newly found 
wealth. O’Donovan has pointed this out and explained the challenge of transplanting 
already existing hierarchies into new lands.224 But as Aristotle’s notion of justice was 
being rethought in the established political orders of Christendom in medieval 
Europe, it became clear that there was very slim use to be made of Aristotle’s 
category of distributive justice. In medieval Europe the political experience was very 
different from that of Greece. And even if one were to look away from such 
considerations it still seems inevitable, as O’Donovan points out, that both 
distributive and corrective justice could be explained by the Roman legal 
understanding “to each his own.”225 This seems to apply whether one distributes 
hitherto un-owned resources to an existent community (covered by Aristotle’s 
distributive justice) or one practices corrective justice. This explains, to some extent, 
how Aquinas could take Aristotle’s concept of corrective justice, rename it 
“commutative justice,” and thereby expand it so that it could easily apply to every 
type of transaction.226 While distributive justice was supposed to remain a formal 
category including all dealings between the whole and the individual, it can be 
argued that the reformulation made it insufficiently distinguishable from 
commutative justice.227  
But there is an even greater problem with Aristotle’s categories because a 
very important part of human experience cannot properly be placed within the 
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Aristotelian matrix of justice. It is exactly this particular limitedness that O’Donovan 
describes in his The Ways of Judgment. O’Donovan explains how Aristotle’s notion 
was perhaps too narrow and failed to account for a large part of the human 
experience of justice, which has nothing to do with distribution in Aristotle’s 
narrower understanding.228 The notion of something held in common, being 
distributed into the hands of private parties, is certainly a notion of something that 
can take place. However true that may be, it leaves one without any functional 
understanding of justice to answer such a wide array of ethical questions. O’Donovan 
helpfully makes this clear using the example of the practice of modern welfare states 
to provide child-allowances: 
Clearly, it is not a form of compensation, as though to make good the losses 
of child-rearing. Child-rearing is not a loss (though there are losses incurred 
within it), but a form of worthwhile human living. It is no part of the work of 
justice to equalize differences between parents and childless persons, nor any 
other differences arising from the pursuit of different forms of living. Is its 
point distributive then? Does it place spare resources of the community at the 
disposal of those who have something worthwhile to do with them? No, for 
if that were the case, we would need to measure the worthwhileness of child-
rearing against the worthwhileness of other projects laying claim to public 
money. The child-allowance would be determined in a proportionate 
relation, say, to Arts Council grants and money for hospitals, conceiving the 
whole distribution of public money as competition of merit. The justice in 
setting the allowance at a certain level would depend on answering the 
question: Who deserves the resources more? But this account would be as 
mistaken as the compensatory one. The point of a child-allowance is that the 
community should assist a crucial function in which it has a strong interest. 
Its justice depends not on comparative judgments between the merits of 
child-rearing and other enterprises, but on judgments about the extent to 
which the parents’ role needs assistance.229 
  
O’Donovan has, furthermore, pointed out Hugo Grotius’s ingenious way of 
approaching and evaluating the Thomistic–Aristotelian tradition of justice in a way 
that can help one better account for all the issues included in discussions about 
justice. In O’Donovan’s reading of Grotius, Grotius precisely “takes issue with the 
place assigned by Aristotle to distribution.”230 O’Donovan observes that:  
The real difference between the two kinds of justice, Grotius argues, is that 
the first has to do with reciprocity and the principle of suum cuique, while 
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the second concerns ‘the prudent allocation of resources in adding to what 
individuals and collectives own.’ That is to say, it emphasizes the 
prospective, forward-looking aspect of judgment. This, too, is justice—but 
not ‘strict’ justice. Grotius re-names it ‘attributive justice,’ and proposes his 
revision in a simple formula: ‘To a faculty corresponds expletive justice, 
justice in the technical or strict sense of the term. . . . To a fitness 
corresponds attributive justice.’231 
 
Hugo Grotius has, therefore, taken Aristotle’s concepts of corrective justice and 
distributive justice, as well as the Thomistic concepts of commutative and 
distributive justice, and pushed them in a new direction whereby he calls them 
expletive justice and attributive justice. Expletive justice has to do with a faculty a 
person may have that makes that person a claimant to some “right in the technical or 
strict sense.” Attributive justice has to do with the fitness someone might have for 
something, of some treatment. It does not, however, constitute a right, in the strict 
sense. To explain this, an example can be made of some professional post where 
there might be only one fully qualified candidate or many. Either way it wouldn’t 
matter insofar as no candidate could have a right to the position although some 
candidate may be fit for it and it would be more just for a fully qualified candidate to 
occupy the post. But, as O’Donovan points out, Grotius does not stop there; he 
makes the startling, yet necessary, inference that both types of justice, expletive and 
attributive, must be intertwined and coordinated in every judgment: “Grotius resists 
Aristotle’s assignment of the different types of justice to different spheres of action: 
The one exercised in voluntary exchanges and punishments, the other in distribution 
of common goods. In almost any context, he believes, the two types of justice must 
be coordinated.”232 There is something very true about this observation and it will 
have an important effect upon subsequent thoughts of justice. 
But before we reach those subsequent thoughts, let us briefly attempt to 
figure the notions of expletive justice and attributive justice into the matrix of the 
current thesis. This should not prove too difficult as we have very explicit help from 
Grotius in doing so. Grotius himself states that the concepts of expletive justice and 
attributive justice correspond to the criteria of potentiality of actuality, concepts 
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which we have already used heavily.233 Grotius argues that expletive justice refers to 
a faculty which is perfect and that expletive justice thereby corresponds to the 
concept of actuality. It is a faculty which the human subject holds in actuality.  At the 
same time attributive justice refers to a “less than perfect” faculty and thereby to the 
person or group as a potentiality. This “less than perfect” faculty nevertheless 
belongs to the human subject in potentiality and is taken into account in attributive 
justice. And there is something very true about O’Donovan’s interpretation of 
Grotius that, in justice, both actuality and potentiality must be taken into account. 
Few judgments can be completely backward-looking without considering a future 
aspect for subjects, that is to say their potentiality. Punishment and betterment must 
go hand in hand in criminal justice and likewise the “the need of populations for 
peace and welfare” must be part of every decision in the terrible acts demanded in 
war.234 
This is an understandable step to take and Grotius and O’Donovan are right in 
taking it. However, it does put us in a very strange position with regard to justice. 
When attributive and expletive justice are put into this dynamic/dialectic it is 
difficult not to see how muddied the waters become and how unstable our judgments 
become, without criteria of judgment. This goes directly back to our earlier 
discussion of potentiality and actuality and the instability and danger of conceiving 
the two as equals in a dialectic. It leaves one in the dangerous position of lacking any 
proper criteria of judgment.  
This is how Luther’s construal of the relationship between potentiality and 
actuality had to be restated with a clearer logical primacy for potentiality. Otherwise 
it would have left the impression that the actuality of sin and the potentiality of the 
Gospel could be considered equals in a duel. The same holds here for expletive and 
attributive justice, as they correspond to potentiality and actuality. Either part must 
enter the dialectic and assume logical primacy and our instinct must be to grant 
potentiality logical primacy, meaning that attributive justice should be conceived as 
taking charge of the dynamic/dialectic. But this might be problematic, or so it seems 
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at first. O’Donovan has pointed out that “expletive justice may not simply be 
overridden.” So it is that, although “considerations of rights must be supplemented 
with considerations of prudence, the need of populations for peace and welfare,” it 
remains true that “prudence which simply ignored the demands of exchange justice 
[O’Donovan’s term for ‘corrective justice’] could not be attributive justice, for it 
would not be justice at all.”235 O’Donovan can thereby say that “expletive justice 
may not simply be overridden: It is not sufficient but it is necessary, and attributive 
justice is secondary to the satisfaction of its demands.”236 So, there we see attributive 
justice placed in a logically subordinate relationship to expletive justice. This, in the 
end, is what makes it justice, and not love; that its primary reference is to actuality 
and its secondary reference to potentiality. In short, this explains how our discussions 
of justice may seem so unlike traditional discussions of justice, although they are 
derived from a rethinking of that very tradition. 
But why are we using the concepts of potentiality and actuality here and what 
is their significance? What prompts the usage of these concepts in a discourse on 
love and justice? We can easily account for this. These concepts have deep roots in 
Western philosophy and theology, starting with Aristotle, and provide an excellent 
schema with which to address and describe change. And it so happens that we need 
to account for change on two important levels: first, on the subjective level, whereby 
everyone is presented with the goal or standard of her humanity and then, second, on 
the communal level whereby the subjective commitment to truth and love is played 
out collectively in interaction with other realities. We have already made clear how 
the concepts function in relation to the subjective transformation. However, we have 
yet to clearly draw out the change that occurs on a more collective level between 
institutional realities and we will do this in the next chapter, chapter 5.  
Yet even though we are using the same concepts other thinkers have in the 
past, it is still the case that our specific use of them will be coloured by the 
framework within which they are being used. This means that, while we are able to 
stay in conversation with past thinkers concerning potentiality and actuality, any 
comparison will always escape perfect parallelism in the way the concepts are used. 
Our usage of these concepts both mirrors and differs from their usage by other 





thinkers. So, while we have placed ourselves in a tradition initiated by Aristotle, the 
way in which we apply the terms would have been quite alien to him. This is 
because, while he was seeking primarily to describe physical change, we are trying 
primarily to describe a change which is rather more mental, religious or spiritual. In 
this we found a helpful ally in Martin Luther, who was able to make use of these 
concepts of change for strictly theological purposes, to make sense of the Christian 
life. However, our usage seeks a broader reference than Martin Luther’s and so it 
covers the general dynamic that occurs between the subject of a truth and the 
development that occurs following the recognition of the truth. Furthermore, we have 
more distinctly applied the categories in relationship to the concepts of love and 
justice which, while it might not have been outrageous to Luther, is not a connection 
directly made in his work. In contrast, this connection is somewhat active in the work 
of Hugo Grotius, who does use potentiality and actuality to make distinctions within 
the concept of justice. But, even so, there is, in Grotius’s work, no direct link 
established between the concepts of potentiality and actuality and the concept of 
love, a connection that we have made. As it relates to love and justice, Wolterstorff 
indeed uses those concepts heavily, but without direct reference to potentiality and 
actuality. What we have therefore done in the present thesis is to read Wolterstorff 
through the conceptual grid of potentiality and actuality. This has helped us in 
interacting with Wolterstorff´s work in a way that is meaningful within the 
conceptual landscape of the present thesis. 
This chapter has addressed many issues, but the uniting theme has been the 
question whether and how justice differs from love. We discovered, in the divine 
attributes of love and justice, a unity that has its correspondence in a human unity 
between the concepts, albeit an imperfect human unity. The unity of love and justice 
was explained primarily in reference to the same process, the actualization of 
potentiality. This was affirmed but with the important reservation that the unity of 
the concepts in the human realm is imperfect. Also, it was explained how love and 
justice have primary reference to distinct aspects of the process of actualization. 
Love refers primarily to that which is potentiality and justice to that which is actual 
and yet deemed to be in correspondence with or in the service of potentiality. 
However, despite the complementary unity of the concepts, love was shown to hold a 
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certain logical priority in the relationship. And while our discussion of justice may 
have been unlike much traditional discussion, we were able to show how our 
treatment is consistent with important developments within the tradition of justice 
that stretches back to Aristotle. Having completed this general account of justice, we 
are able to move toward the core concern of the thesis, which is temporal justice in 









The main goal of this thesis is to inquire into the relationship between love and 
justice, especially as it pertains to shared political structures or, as we will now be 
calling them, temporal authorities. The concept of temporal authorities applies to a 
phenomenon that has, in history, been called by various names such as “kings,” 
“states,” “authorities,” “secular authorities,”237 “political institutions,” and so on. 
These concepts are taken from separate traditions of thought about what we have 
often referred to as “political structures.” Our own term that we will now 
increasingly use, temporal authorities, is deeply theological in nature and yet is 
meant to encompass the phenomena to which the various signifiers in history have 
been referring. The temporal nature of political structures (“kings,” “the authorities,” 
“states,” etc.) will be better explained later in this chapter. However, a short 
preliminary sketch can be given at this point to explain this temporal nature: The 
temporal nature of political structures will be derived from their particular functions 
without which they have no rationale. This will then be combined with the Christian 
hope of the consummation of God’s work which, when consummated, entails that the 
functions of political structures will no longer be needed. It is in this sense that 
political structures are temporal and without an eternal function or extension unlike, 
for example, the human being, which has a promise extending to the eschaton. 
 En route to this understanding we will first look through the primary scriptural 
witness concerning the subject and will find that it can be distinguished into the 
witness of judgment and the witness of affirmation of temporal authorities. We will 
then seek to think through this strange and seeming paradox and emerge with an 
answer concerning the nature of judgment and affirmation as they relate to temporal 
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authorities. The notion of space will be a pivotal metaphor in making sense of 
temporal authorities, the justice they wield and the ever-present activity of love. This 
will be helpfully clarified by an architectural metaphor. Following that we will 
survey a trajectory within the history of theology, wherein a pattern of similar 
understanding can be found, struggling to emerge. 
 
A. Temporal Authorities 
So far, we have investigated the general concepts of love and justice. This has been a 
necessary, clarifying endeavour. Now we have been brought to the point at which we 
can inquire more directly concerning temporal authorities. Hitherto, we have spoken 
generally of the judgment and promise of multiple distinct realities. In doing so we 
were able to establish that the extent and content of humankind’s judgment is known 
by the promise given to it in the Gospel. It is based upon such thinking that we have 
derived a notion of justice that is unitary with love in its basic aspects. However, 
importantly for our purposes, the language of justice is also often used specifically in 
relation to structures of temporal authority and we must therefore seek to understand 
whether the concept of justice should be wielded differently in that setting. Such an 
investigation will begin by revisiting the concepts of promise and judgment, this time 
in relation to temporal authorities. Our findings will move us closer to answering the 
question we are now seeking to answer: whether the same, unitary notion of justice 
and love should be applied in the realm of temporal authorities.  
To put it simply: It must be asked whether there is a form of justice which 
applies specifically to temporal authorities. It would be possible to address this 
question by what has already been established in the thesis and think through its 
implications for structures of temporal authority. We have already developed the 
conceptual arsenal to do so. But, for good didactic reasons, let us first visit the New 
Testament texts relating to temporal authorities to better crystallize the function of 




i. The New Testament on Temporal Authority 
We will address the texts of the New Testament as they appear, meaning that we will 
begin with the Gospels, move to Acts and the Epistles and finally end with the 
Revelation of John. Now, there is always a question as to which texts should be 
considered relevant to our endeavour. Many would want to employ a wide lens, 
meaning that every text wherein Jesus addresses poverty, nonviolence or humility 
should be understood to be political and relevant to the present thesis. But this will 
depend on how the word “political” is meant. It may be said that much, even most, of 
human speech and action has a political dimension of some sort when interpreted 
through a wide definition of the concept. However, as we are directing our attention 
to the question of politics more structurally, focussing on political structures and 
institutions and their relationship to love and justice, we will allow ourselves to 
employ a narrower lens and this will entail not taking note of many texts which 
might address the good life but have no direct reference or strict connection to 
political structures. 
At the beginning of the Gospels one is immediately struck by the story of the 
birth of Jesus and its political dimension. The infancy story in the Gospel of 
Matthew, in particular, presents a very interesting dynamic between Jesus and 
political authorities (Matt 1.18-2.18). It is clear from the start that political authorities 
are prone to see his coming as a threat to their own power. Yet, there are exegetes 
who want to look past that dynamic. Instead they tend to see the general thrust of the 
narrative to lie in making connections between Jesus and key figures of the Judaic 
religion.238 Such exegesis emphasizes the fact that Jesus is born in Bethlehem with a 
particular genealogy, using it as a vehicle to prove the Davidic kingship of Jesus. 
Furthermore, the story of the flight from a murderous ruler is commonly understood 
as drawing a parallel between Jesus and Moses.239 As a result, it seems that the 
independent motif of the reactions of a political ruler to Jesus’s birth tends to be 
downplayed. But it cannot be overlooked that there is an important narrative 
connection made in the Gospel of Matthew between Jesus and the political structures 
at the time of his birth. Richard Horsley, in his book The Liberation of Christmas, 
agrees with this assessment, finding that much biblical scholarship “illustrates a 
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general lack of attention to the socio-political dimensions of the nativity 
narratives.”240 Horsley argues that “the most fundamental theme of the story of 
Matthew 2, the irreducible basis of the story, has to be the opposition of the 
threatened King Herod, to the child Jesus.”241 Horsley continues to state that “the 
birth of a new ‘king of the Jews’ would obviously pose a threat to the reigning 
monarch.”242 Finding agreement with that, we would want to hold firmly in view 
how the political ruler is shown ready to hinder the historical manifestation and 
actualization of the Gospel, motivated by the desire to secure his own dominion and 
privilege. 
Later, it will be Jesus’s own potential desire for dominion and privilege that is 
put to the test. Following the silent years, before the beginning of Jesus’s mission, his 
own desire for dominion and privilege is put to the test. When Jesus is led out into 
the desert to be tempted he faces three temptations. However, it should be clear that, 
for our purposes, it is the temptation of power over the world’s kingdoms that is of 
special interest. There is a difference in opinion among exegetes as to how much 
political relevance we find in this part of the temptation story. There are those who 
would downplay its political connections and say that “the narrative . . . is much 
more concerned with the personal relation of obedience between Jesus and his 
Father”243 or that the problem is not worldly rule but that “the condition is the 
worship of evil.”244 We can also find it clearly stated by another exegete that “the 
temptation is not to entertain a false ambition, but to seek a desirable end by unholy 
means.”245 While it is true that Jesus’s response in both cases points to the service 
and worship of God, it seems strange to discount the possibility that Jesus is 
distancing himself from worldly rule. After all, in Luke’s version the devil is shown 
saying “for this has been delivered to me” (Luke 4.6), referring to all the kingdoms 
of the world. Also, one must ask why Jesus would at all be tempted if the temptation 
consisted in reaching his desired end by worshiping evil. Must not the temptation of 
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rule over worldly kingdoms be a temptation in itself? How would Jesus have been 
tempted if the temptations consisted in using “unholy means”? Would it not be a 
likelier interpretation that, while Jesus Christ will have sovereign rule over the world, 
his calling is not for human palaces of earthly pretentions to power and glory, as 
tempting as they might be? As Walter Pilgrim writes, this temptation “to rule over all 
the kingdoms of the world, represents the lure to earthly power and influence.”246 
John Kloppenborg agrees when he writes that “the third temptation, with its apparent 
rejection of political power . . . amounts to a de facto rejection of Zealot ideology.”247 
We must, therefore, entertain the strong likelihood that Jesus is, in the story, being 
distanced from the temptation of worldly power and glory. 
A similar distancing from political authority is found again in Jesus’s 
response regarding the payment of a tax to Caesar (Mark 12.13-17 / Matt. 22.15-22 / 
Luke 20.20-26). We can list two main trends in the interpretation of this interesting 
story. One reading sees Jesus as first and foremost legitimizing the state in that his 
reply “represents a positive and general appreciation of the role of the State.”248 The 
other trend finds cause to interpret the text as actually downplaying the importance of 
Caesar. Douglas Hare questions any emphasis on positive appreciation of the state on 
the part of Jesus. He argues that Caesar’s role is “so vastly inferior to God’s . . . that 
is, Jesus is not saying ‘there is a secular realm and there is a religious realm, and 
equal respect must be paid to each.’ The second half practically annuls the first by 
pre-empting it.”249 That is, everyone listening to Jesus must surely have understood 
that everything, ultimately, belongs to God. The Lukan account seems to recognize 
as much when it speaks of how people started making the false accusation against 
Jesus that he was forbidding the paying of tax to the emperor (Luke 23.2). Of course, 
Jesus did not forbid the paying of tax. But his accusers did, most likely, rightly 
understand that everything, ultimately, belongs to God, giving them cause for the 
accusation. So, we can see that the story can be interpreted in two main ways, one 
that understands it as legitimizing political authority, the other as annulling it. 
However, the two interpretations of the story need not be considered mutually 
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exclusive. Rather, although Jesus is, within the story, relativizing worldly political 
authority to a high degree he is also legitimizing it in some degree, giving it some 
sphere of influence or operation, however small it may be. 
Another story on Jesus’s response to taxation regards the temple tax but yet 
has Jesus describing worldly rulers as “the kings of this world” (Matt 17.24-27). 
Jesus asks Peter, “What do you think, Simon? From whom do kings of the earth take 
toll or tribute? From their children or from others?” When Peter said, “From others,” 
Jesus said to him, “Then the children are free. However, so that we do not give 
offense to them, go to the sea and cast a hook; take the first fish that comes up; and 
when you open its mouth, you will find a coin; take that and give it to them for you 
and me.” This is a powerful statement: “Then the children are free.” Interestingly, 
there are exegetes who argue that the text revolves around Jesus’s divine sonship and 
those who argue that, as it was his Father’s temple, he was “not obligated to pay for 
the upkeep of his Father’s house.”250 The suggestion in such interpretations is that 
the text is intended only to exalt Jesus as the son of God and yet have him pay the 
temple tax. Thereby, it is argued that the early readers of the Gospel were first and 
foremost being excused to retain their Jewish identities while also worshiping Jesus 
as the Son of God.251 
One must, however, deem it strange not to pay primary attention to the fact 
that Jesus states that there is freedom in being exempt from the structures of taxation, 
whether political or religious. This cannot be overlooked. As Pilgrim writes: “No 
other text in the Gospels declares the sovereign freedom of the people of God over 
against all human authority with such force and clarity.”252 We see the same dynamic 
at play here as in the story of Jesus’s remarks about Caesar’s coin. Worldly political 
authorities are being relativized to the highest degree, but yet allowed to remain in 
place. It must further be noted that there is probably also some importance in the 
wording “so as not to give offense,” which might link to coming texts in Matthew 18, 
where “a strong warning is issued against giving offense to any of  ‘these little ones 
who believe in me’” (18.6).253 It might suggest that this is a part of a larger tendency 
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on Jesus’s part “not to give unnecessary offence on secondary issues where principle 
is not involved and compromise is possible.”254 Again, this would suggest that 
political authorities could be considered “a secondary issue” and are thereby being 
relativized in the story. 
But as the Gospels end with the death of Jesus within the political structure 
and authority of the Roman Empire, this might be seen as an open-and-shut case for 
the argument that Jesus Christ and political authorities ought to be viewed as facing 
one another in opposition. After all, Jesus was tried and convicted as a political rebel 
and executed on the cross, as a rebel would have been in the days of the Roman 
Empire. But there are a number of things that must be said concerning this. First, at 
no point in the Gospels does Jesus demonstrate any pretentions to make rebellion 
against political authority his focus.255 Furthermore, it could be argued that, 
according to the Gospel accounts, Jesus was tried and found guilty primarily by the 
Sanhedrin, the Jewish religious court, who then lobbied to have him executed by 
political authorities. As Raymond E. Brown writes: “For all four [Gospel] writers the 
Sanhedrin session ended with a decision that Jesus had to be put to death.”256 
Following that decision the Sanhedrin began appealing to Roman authorities to have 
him executed. However, the main charges put against Jesus in the Sanhedrin were 
not political. According to the Gospels of Matthew and Mark the charges are that “he 
threatened to destroy the Jerusalem temple, and he claimed to be the Messiah.”257 
Furthermore, similar accusations are made of Jesus in claiming to be the Son of God 
and the Son of Man (Luke 22.69-71, Mark 14.61-62). In Matthew and Mark it is 
clearly stated that the Jewish authorities wanted to make the case that he is a 
blasphemer (Matt 26.65 Mark 14.64). These are, therefore, primarily charges with 
religious associations. 
Of course, the title of “Messiah” is more ambiguous. It most often carried 
political overtones in the cultural context.258 But, as Daniel Harrington writes, “while 
the claim that he was the Messiah was true, it was true in a sense different from the 
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meaning assumed by his opponents. Therefore from Matthew’s perspective the 
Jewish “trial” and condemnation of Jesus were a sham based upon “false witness” 
(Matt 26.59).259 There is, therefore, a strong case that the Gospel writers did not view 
Jesus’s Messiah-ship in the earthly political sense.  However, once the leaders of the 
Sanhedrin pushed the case to Pilate, their charges were dressed in a way that might 
better place them under the latter’s jurisdiction. In Luke it reads: “Then the assembly 
rose as a body and brought Jesus before Pilate. They began to accuse him, saying, 
‘We found this man perverting our nation, forbidding us to pay taxes to the emperor, 
and saying that he himself is the Messiah, a king.’” (Luke 23.1-2). Here the focus is 
on opposition to tax-paying and pretention of kingship, while in the Sanhedrin itself 
the focus was on issues of blasphemy. All of this is to say that the primary motive 
behind Jesus’s crucifixion was most likely not that he was considered a threat to the 
Roman political system. Adding to this, Pilate, the representative of Roman political 
authority, is portrayed as being reluctant in convicting Jesus, while the Chief priests 
are presented as pushing for crucifixion together with the crowds that they had stirred 
up (Mark 15.6-15, Luke 23.21, John 19.15). It is also important to focus on Jesus as 
he goes through the trial, passion and crucifixion. 
In the trial and passion of Jesus it is certain that the evangelists see him as 
being sovereign and able, if willing, to appeal to his Father who would “at once send 
me more than twelve legions of angels” (Matt 26.53). That is to say, in the 
understanding of the evangelists, Jesus willingly submits to the political processes, 
although not actively so. 
Furthermore, throughout the entire ordeal, Jesus does not resist and is largely 
silent unless it is to accept or suggest his divinity or sovereignty. This is strongly 
illustrated in Jesus’s interaction with Pilate according to the Gospel of John. There 
Jesus remains silent to the degree that Pilate is made uncomfortable and asks: “Do 
you refuse to speak to me? Do you not know that I have power to release you, and 
power to crucify you?” To which Jesus responds, “You would have no power over 
me unless it had been given you from above” (John 19.10-11). In these words there 
even seems to be a simultaneous relativization and legitimization of political 
authority. 
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The question that then emerges after the crucifixion, resurrection and 
ascension of Jesus is how the emerging community of followers would navigate its 
relationship to political structures. In the Acts of the Apostles the reader of the New 
Testament gets a sense of the community that is forming following the events of 
Jesus’s life, death and resurrection. Yet, there has been some dispute as to what the 
overall interpretive lens of Acts should be when it comes to political authorities. 
Some would want to read Acts (most often together with the Gospel of Luke) as 
presenting a peaceable coexistence between the Christian faith and the Roman 
Empire.260 However, in recent decades some scholars have begun to see the 
relationship presented between the two in Act as less amicable.261 What emerges is 
what many find to be a greater contrast between the early Christians and their 
surrounding culture than has often been assumed. As Richard Cassidy writes, “the 
apostles and Paul were highly dedicated disciples of Jesus who were not easily 
dissuaded from preaching in his name even though controversy and turbulence might 
result. As a consequence they were far from congenial figures in terms of the 
principal objectives of Roman rule.”262 Kavin Rowe argues that the religious critique 
presented in the Acts of the apostles should not be read as distinguished from culture, 
politics and economics. Rowe argues that “to call into question pagan religion is to 
critique pagan culture: tear out the threads of pagan religiousness and the cultural 
fabric itself comes unraveled.”263  
Such readings could create the sense that the Christian community described 
in Acts is a political community in its own right and thereby a direct challenge to the 
politics of the Roman Empire. This may well be, but it should be noted that this 
entails employing the concept of “politics” with a wide understanding wherein 
worship, morality and politics are all intertwined. And that understanding is perfectly 
legitimate. However, here we are focussing on the question of political structures 
more narrowly, not on a clash of cultures. And, in fact, these re-readings of Acts are 
presenting primarily the image of a first-century A.D. cultural clash. There is not the 
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accompanying suggestion that the writer of Acts intended to present Christian faith 
as a direct threat to the Roman political structure, but rather that they had a 
subversive effect on the larger cultural, religious and moral assumptions. Rowe 
writes that Acts “is a highly charged and theologically sophisticated political 
document that aims at nothing less than the construction of an alternative total way 
of life—a comprehensive pattern of being—one that runs counter to the life-patterns 
of the GraecoRoman world.”264 Rowe advances excellent arguments for this reading. 
But we are more interested in the important distinction that he makes when he then 
adds that according to Acts “the Christian mission is not a bid for political liberation 
or a movement that stands in direct opposition to the Roman government.” 
Furthermore, “the Christians are not out to establish Christendom, as it were (chapter 
3). New culture, yes—coup, no.”265 To make this even clearer, Rowe states that “the 
Christian mission as narrated by Luke is not a counter-state.” This means that, while 
there is no doubt that the Christian community that was coming into being in Acts 
could be described as political when seen through the wide lens, Acts is not to be 
interpreted as political in the narrower sense. 
We run into similar questions with Paul’s letters in the New Testament. There 
are scholars who have argued that Paul places Jesus and the early Christians in an 
important role in opposition to the Roman Empire. A particularly notable example of 
this is found in the book In Search of Paul – How Jesus’ Apostle Opposed Rome’s 
Empire with God’s Kingdom by John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed. In the 
book they argue that Paul’s Christology was marked by the fact that Jesus’s 
crucifixion was an “execution by Rome.” Therefore, according to Crossan and Reed, 
Jesus’s resurrection was, in Paul’s mind, a “resurrection against Rome.” 266 However, 
their thesis is not as stark as it may sound. They argue that this opposition against 
Rome was only secondary to a more constructive way of being: “He [Paul], like 
Jesus before him, had a divinely mandated program that secondarily and negatively 
resisted imperial Rome, but that primarily and positively incarnated global justice on 
the local, ordinary, and everyday level.”267 To Crossan and Reed, it is important that 
                                                 
264 Ibid., 4. 
265 Ibid., 5. 
266 John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan Reed, In Search of Paul, (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 
2004), 384. 
267 Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 412. 
142 
 
Paul’s message and view was not particular to the Roman Empire. Rather, they want 
to paint it as a general rejection of the ways of empires: “We are, at the start of the 
twenty-first century, what the Roman Empire was at the start of the first century.”268 
To contrast Pauline Christianity with imperial civilization they say that, whereas 
imperial civilization of all ages tends to have as its chant—“First victory, then peace, 
or Peace by victory”—the Pauline alternative should be understood to be the contrary 
chant of “First justice, then peace or Peace by justice.”269  
One would have little trouble agreeing that it is most likely that Paul regarded 
himself as representing, along with the Christian community, a moral alternative to 
the prevailing culture in Rome. Whether Crossan and Reed are right in saying that 
this alternative is crystallized by the chant “first justice, then peace” will most likely 
remain in dispute. But it might matter little to our current endeavour. Even if Paul 
understood himself to be in opposition to or disagreement with the greater Roman 
culture, that would not entail that he rejected the value of courts, rulers, policing and 
other facets of political authority. That is to say, even if we would accept the thesis 
of Crossan and Reed, we would still be left without an understanding of how Paul 
understood the nature and purpose of political authority. They surely argue that 
Paul’s cause was one of justice, but the question remains to what extent, if any, this 
touched upon the realities of political authorities. 
However, Crossan and Reed do attempt to read Romans 13.1–7, a text that 
concerns itself directly with the place of political authorities, through their own lens. 
Understandably, given their framework of interpretation, they are highly sceptical of 
the text and draw an analogy between Paul’s writings in Paul 13.1–7 and a remark 
made by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Nazi Germany as he performed the Nazi salute while 
saying, “We shall have to run risks for very different things now, but not for that 
salute!”270 Crossan and Reed thereby attempt to suggest that, while Paul abhorred 
Roman authorities, just as Bonhoeffer abhorred the Nazis, in Romans 13.1–7 he is 
performing the equivalent of the Nazi salute to so that he can focus on more 
important matters. That is a strangely forced reading of a text which Paul could very 
well have written differently had he intended to convey the type of sentiment 
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Bonhoeffer did. It is closer to reality to say that in Paul’s letters, as in other letters of 
the New Testament, we find a few passages that could be said to argue for a 
peaceful, someone could say submissive, relationship between Christians and 
political authorities. In Romans 13.1–7 Paul writes: 
Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no 
authority except from God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by 
God. Therefore whoever resists the authority resists the ordinance of God, 
and those who resist will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers are not a 
terror to good works, but to evil. Do you want to be unafraid of the 
authority? Do what is good, and you will have praise from the same. For he 
is God’s minister to you for good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does 
not bear the sword in vain; for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute 
wrath on him who practices evil. Therefore you must be subject, not only 
because of wrath but also for conscience’ sake. For because of this you also 
pay taxes, for they are God’s ministers attending continually to this very 
thing. Render therefore to all their due: taxes to whom taxes are due, 
customs to whom customs, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour.” 
 
To most readers this passage probably does appear at first to be a rather 
forceful request for submission to political authorities. However, this would require 
some nuanced reasoning. First it must be remembered that this chapter is part of an 
argument and not a self-standing declaration. As a text it is part of a longer 
encouragement and exhortation to exercise love in various settings. Emil Brunner 
reminds the reader of Romans 13.1–7 that it is “interposed between two instructions 
regarding Christian love!” Brunner adds: “Obviously there exists for Paul a hidden 
relationship after all.” Brunner thinks that the connection between these instructions 
and the admonition to love is “not too difficult to find.” This is because “to confront 
the representatives of political power with the intention of giving them their due is an 
outworking of love.”271 That is, love is the ground and motive of the instructions in 
Romans 13:1–7. Another thing must be kept in mind. As Brendan Byrne claims, 
there is an important sense in which the authority of the state is placed under God in 
this text, with regard to both its legitimization and its judgment. Byrne writes that 
“the text does . . . preserve the valid reminder that no government is a law entirely 
unto itself. At least in the perspective of the believer, all rule, all exercise of 
authority, is accountable to the supreme authority, God.”272 This means that there is 
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no unquestioning acceptance of the activity of political authority in all and every 
action as noble and good. As N. T. Wright argues, the text “does not validate 
particular actions of particular governments. It is merely to say that some government 
is always necessary, in a world where evil flourishes when unchecked.”273 
But regarding this text we are most interested in the condition given for the 
divine legitimization of political authorities as stated by Paul. When Paul writes, 
“For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil” and that they are ministers 
authorized to “execute wrath on him who practices evil,” and then reaffirms all this 
by saying that rulers are “God’s ministers attending continually to this very thing,” 
he is describing the condition of, or rationale for, the special status of political 
authorities. And this is an important point: These are conditions of, or a rationale for, 
the existence and the service rendered by political authorities, in the course of which 
they restrain evil. But this raises an important question: What if there were no evil, 
no sin, no violence in need of restraint? We will return to this question later, at the 
point where we will seek a more coherent view of the New Testament attitude 
towards political authority. 
A similar attitude towards political authorities found in Romans 13 is 
reaffirmed in 1 Timothy 2:1–2. There the writer focusses on the role of political 
authorities in creating a peaceable life: “Therefore I exhort first of all that 
supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men, for 
kings and all who are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all 
godliness and reverence.” 
The desire of the writer is that Christians may pray for kings and everyone in 
authority so they may lead a quiet, peaceable life.  Of course, one could ask whether 
the author of these words saw the authorities as a potential threat to the peaceable life 
and wanted, therefore, to buy their peace in this way. In the estimation of William D. 
Mounce, the intention or thought behind the text is that if the community prays for 
“all people . . . and do not become sectarian in their approach, then they will not 
alienate those outside the church and will not bring the church into disrepute. Rather 
they will be able to follow lifestyles characterized by peace and tranquility.”274 If this 
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is right then the letter focuses more directly on seeking practical ways to lead a 
peaceable life than on giving a particular status or mandate to political authorities, as 
Paul does in Romans 13.1–7. And yet, it is clear that the author of Timothy does not 
see political authorities as a troublesome entity but rather is aware of their positive 
contribution. 
In 1 Peter the reader is similarly told to submit to kings and governors and, 
further, to honour the king: “Therefore submit yourselves to every ordinance of man 
for the Lord’s sake, whether to the king as supreme, or to governors, as to those who 
are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those who do 
good. For this is the will of God, that by doing good you may put to silence the 
ignorance of foolish men—as free, yet not using liberty as a cloak for vice, but as 
bondservants of God. Honour all people. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour 
the king.” (1 Peter 2.13–17) 
It is worth noting here a certain harmony with Romans 13.1–7 in that political 
authorities are seen as restraining evil. This is what justifies their commission or 
“sending.” But Peter adds an interesting dimension, which is that political authorities 
should also encourage those who do good. The space and encouragement that 
political authorities give for good conduct Peter intends the Christian community to 
use so that they may “put to silence” their detractors.  
The focus in the text, according to Donald P. Senior, builds on the previous 
verses which urge blameless conduct before the gentiles. There is, therefore, 
according to Senior, a largely missionary component to the good conduct of 
Christians, as suggested by Peter.275 Senior therefore emphasizes that the type of 
subjection being advised is not one of sectarian withdrawal but rather one of 
participation in the structures of political authorities. J. Ramsey Michaels adds 
another dimension by saying that the emphasis in this text is on “cooperation and 
compliance not because the state requires it, but ‘for the sake of the Lord.’”276 That 
is, the text sees it as part of their service as Christians to establish and maintain 
amiable relations with political authorities. 
A very different note is sounded in the Revelation of John from that of the 
other writings of the New Testament, especially that of the letters. There is no idea of 
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peaceful coexistence, but one of resistance against and strong judgment of political 
authorities. “Here as nowhere else in the New Testament, the kingdom of God and 
the kingdom of the world stand opposed to one another.”277 However, such a 
statement on the Revelation is no matter of simple, straightforward interpretations 
given that the writer of Revelation employs metaphors, symbols and loaded imagery 
to convey his message. The symbols most often associated with political authority in 
the book of Revelation are the “two beasts,” and “the whore,” but also: “Babylon the 
great.” Interestingly, the two beasts are empowered by another entity, symbolized by 
the dragon (Rev 13.2). The dragon is typically understood to be primordial evil, 
associated with the serpent in Genesis and thereby the devil.278 The great whore of 
Babylon is commonly understood to be a symbol of the Roman Empire “because of 
her idolatrous religion and excessive wealth.”279  
It must be kept in mind that the interpretation of such imagery must be 
subject to much speculation and one must be careful not to expect it to bear too much 
weight. There is, for example, a fundamental division between scholars regarding 
whether the imagery of the book should be interpreted as referring to universal 
realities or particular, historical entities.280 Exacerbating that debate are the divided 
opinions regarding the situation in which the book of Revelation is written so as to 
contribute to its militant symbolism. There is some evidence that it was written 
during a campaign of persecution conducted by Roman officials against Christians at 
the time.281 Nonetheless, there are exegetes who dispute that and argue that there is 
insufficient evidence of any widespread persecutions at the time of writing.282 
However that may be, it is clear that the writer understands himself to be in a crisis 
situation together with his fellow believers. And this is what determines much of the 
tone and imagery of the book of Revelation. This, together with the imagery, could 
be argued as supporting the condemnation of political authority, as symbolized by 
the beasts and the whore. The suggestion is that the Revelation of John represents a 
judgment of political authorities to the extent that they align themselves in opposition 
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to Christ and at the service of violent evil. This would help the reader better 
understand what seem to be the specific complaints made against political authorities 
in Revelation, such as objecting to the requirements for emperor worship (Rev 13.4) 
and warfare or persecution (Rev 13.7). These specific accusations might suggest that 
there is no blanket rejection of political authorities as such but that there is a more 
wholesome mode of being that exists for them. In its basic outline such a reading 
would be aligned with Oscar Cullman’s reading of Revelation wherein he argues that 
“the totalitarian state is precisely the classic form of the devil’s manifestation on 
earth.”283 
As we have now surveyed the main texts that can be deemed directly relevant 
to our endeavour we must now identify the fundamental motifs that emerge. What is 
it that characterizes the New Testament attitude to political authorities? Let us try to 
make sense of the picture that is emerging and obtain a coherent view of the main 
motifs. 
 
ii. Judgment and Political Authority 
As one looks to gain a wider view of Jesus’s interaction with temporal authorities, it 
is soon noticed how they are made to shrink in comparison to his presence and 
teaching. Temporal authority is clearly displayed as just that: temporal authority. It 
does not compare to the rule brought by God in Jesus. All human authority amounts 
to little when confronted with the only true authority and power. This is perhaps 
nowhere as clearly exemplified as in Jesus’s words to Pontius Pilate. As Pilate claims 
to have power over Jesus, to crucify him or let him go, Jesus responds: “You would 
have no power over me unless it had been given you from above” (John 19.11). 
These words make clear that Pilate’s authority is a gift, something very provisional, 
and not something he holds by his own might. It shrinks from and pales in the 
presence of the giver “from above.” Pilate’s understanding of his authority, strength, 
and power is put to shame by the fact that all these things are, ultimately, despite 
what he may think, not his. 
Exactly this theme of putting temporal authorities in their place is found 
throughout Jesus’s life and teaching. As we saw before, when Jesus was asked 
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whether one should pay tax to the emperor, Jesus replies by asking whose picture it 
is on the coin and receives the obvious answer that it is the emperor’s. Jesus’s 
response, “Give to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to God the 
things that are God’s” (Mark 12.17) has rightly been interpreted as a very disarming 
answer, making it difficult for anyone to accuse him of outright revolt against the 
emperor. However, there is more that should be said here. One must ask what, in the 
end, ultimately belongs to the emperor. The question is one that can tell us the 
vocation and extent of the power of the emperor. The answer must be: Nothing. 
Everything, ultimately, belongs to God, as one learns from Jesus’s words to Pilate. 
Asking the question of what ultimately belongs to the emperor relativizes his 
authority and role, placing it completely within history. In the Lukan gospel the 
Jewish authorities are shown to be in full understanding of this and bring the charge 
against Jesus that he spoke against their paying tax to the emperor. They were, of 
course, making false accusations. Jesus did not forbid the paying of tax to the 
emperor. But he did relativize the act to a great degree, and this his hearers likely 
understood. They would have known that, ultimately, all belongs to God and not to 
the emperor, making it easy to bring forth the accusation that Jesus was forbidding 
the paying of tax to the emperor. 
We saw the same pattern of relativization without abolishment when Jesus 
states that the emperor’s tax collecting does not belong to the future of freedom. Yet 
the tax was paid, but with a clear understanding that, although such authority is given 
“from above,” it is not a human authority structure that can belong to God’s future of 
freedom. 
By Jesus’s presence and Jesus’s words, every human authority is relativized 
and subverted. Not immediately supplanted, but its true ground is made clear and its 
ultimate destruction heralded. These authorities are placed under ultimate judgment. 
It is, therefore, for good reason that the Gospel of Matthew has recorded the political 
authorities as envious and fearful of the power and authority of Jesus, which seems to 
threaten and trivialize their own. Immediately following the birth of Jesus one finds 
the rulers trembling before the potentiality of the realization of Israel’s prophecies 
and engaging in atrocious acts to prevent them from taking form. It goes to show that 
when temporal authorities do not recognize their limitations but rather seek to extend 
149 
 
and exercise their dominion over and against their subjects they can become 
destructive in a way that sets them in clear opposition to the Gospel. 
Interestingly, in the Revelation of John one finds the servant community of 
the church in deeply hostile relations with oppressive temporal authorities. Therefore, 
judgment over these authorities is extremely strong in the Revelation of John. The 
book is written by someone who believes the Christian community is undergoing a 
difficult time and facing hostilities. Great metaphors are drawn up to symbolize 
authorities that demand worship of emperors and blaspheme against the only one that 
should rightly be worshipped. The New Testament therefore can be said to harbour a 
deeply critical attitude towards governmental authorities. The first motif we have 
found emerging is, therefore, judgment. 
In his book Uneasy Neighbors, Walter E. Pilgrim, in making an exegetical 
exploration into the church and state in the New Testament, describes the moment 
we are here calling “judgment” of political authorities as two distinct moments. The 
first he calls “an ethic of critical distancing” from the state, the nature of which is 
found primarily in the relativization of the state. The second moment he terms “an 
ethic of resistance,” which is found when the temporal authorities put themselves in 
competition or opposition to the church. One can well understand how this 
distinction is made. But here we choose, rather, to include them both under the 
heading of judgment. It is our understanding that the judgment that relativizes the 
state is the judgment that, subsequently, sets the boundary for the state and 
determines the nature of the resistance that may or may not be due to it at any given 
time. Furthermore, the concept of judgment is very faithful to the basic structure of 
the Scriptures as it portrays the ever relevant dialectic between judgment and 
promise/affirmation. Where Pilgrim likes to see three distinct moments in the New 
Testament attitude to temporal authorities—“critical distancing, resistance and 
subordination”—we see two: “judgment and affirmation.” This difference is due 
largely to Pilgrim’s seeking to tease out the early Christian response to temporal 
authorities as portrayed in the New Testament. In contrast, the present thesis pursues 
a more strictly theological inquiry into temporal authorities vis-a-vis God’s judgment 
and affirmation. The notion of critical distancing figures well into the concept of 
judgment. We see critical distancing as the subsequent relativization of temporal 
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authorities that follows from the knowledge of judgment. This is why the basic 
moments are said to be two: judgment and affirmation. 
Still, to further investigate the notion of judgment, there is more to be found 
in the New Testament than the promise of ultimate judgment to temporal authorities. 
Apart from this ultimate judgment, there are, in the Revelation of John, very direct, 
specific accusations against temporal authorities and rulers. These regard various 
matters ranging from the rulers’ demands of emperor worship to their persecution of 
Christians to their incessant warfare against other peoples. One could legitimately 
ask how such specific accusations can be made without there being positive 
affirmations of temporal authorities which legitimate such charges and criticism. 
How could there be criticism of something if it does not include the possibility of 
correction, and an ideal state of being for the object being criticized? In theory, one 
could say that there need not be a positive affirmation to legitimate the specific 
accusations and critique. It would be possible to imagine complete judgment of, and 
rejection of, any authority with no room for positive affirmation of such realities. 
This would be included in an immediate call for the complete abolishment of the 
objects of critique. However, when it comes to temporal authority structures, this is 
not the New Testament witness. Next to the great judgments, warnings and 
accusations, there are, in fact, to be found positive affirmations of temporal 
authorities. 
 
iii. Affirming Political Authority in the New Testament 
We have described the encounter between Jesus and Pilate from the Gospel of John 
as exemplifying the ultimate relativization of temporal authorities. However, the very 
words spoken between Jesus and Pilate, while certainly relativizing temporal 
authorities, also clearly appear as the affirmation of the same temporal authorities. 
When Jesus says “You would have no power over me unless it had been given you 
from above” these words make it clear that, while Pilate’s authority is provisional, it 
is nonetheless a gift. It is something that Pilate has on account of divine providence 
and grace. As Karl Barth writes: “As power given by God, it could be used either 
way towards Jesus without losing its divine character. . . . Now Pilate did not release 
Jesus. He used his power to crucify Jesus. Yet Jesus expressly acknowledged that 
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even so his power was given him by God.”284 
The New Testament text that most directly addresses and develops similar 
thoughts of the affirmation of temporal authorities must be said to be Romans 13.1–
7. In the text Paul advises the Roman Christians on their proper relationship to rulers 
and authorities. 
The way in which governmental authorities are positively affirmed in that 
text is compelling and might seem like a strange contrast to the more critical attitudes 
also found in the New Testament. The authorities that exist are here said to have 
been established by God to be servants and this thought is continued in other epistles 
of the New Testament. In 1 Peter Christians are encouraged “for the Lord’s sake [to] 
accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as supreme, 
or of governors, as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those 
who do right” (1 Pet 2.14). In 1 Timothy 2.1–2 Christians are urged to pray for 
everyone. Especially mentioned are “kings and all who are in high positions, so that 
we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and dignity.” It may trouble 
someone that these texts say nothing about whether the authorities are always in the 
right or whether Christian submission to authorities should be qualified in some way. 
Are authorities never in the wrong? Are they to be accepted and submitted to no 
matter what injustice they demand or enforce? Furthermore, are not the epistles in 
direct conflict with the judgment heralded over temporal authorities in the Gospels 
and the hostility found in Revelation? How can we think through the seeming 
opposition between judgment and affirmation found in the New Testament? It is at 
this point that thinking theologically becomes imperative so we can understand how 
judgment and affirmation can coexist in thinking about political authorities. 
 
iv. The Justice of Political Authorities. 
When we spoke generally about judgment and affirmation there was an 
understanding that judgment was made possible only through affirmation. God’s 
promise is what gives meaning and substance to his judgment. This entails that 
realities placed under judgment typically receive a promise of a reality without sin, a 
                                                 
284 Karl Barth, “Church and State,” in Community, State, and Church: Three Essays by Karl Barth, 
introduction by David Haddorff (Oregon, USA, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2004), 110. 
152 
 
reality of freedom wherein the corrupt, broken nature is redeemed and healed. 
Judgment is made possible by the promise because redeemed reality gives substance 
to judgment like light creates shadows, as what is broken is judged by that which is 
whole. For our present purposes let us therefore ask what the redeemed reality of 
temporal authorities might look like. It has been established that they are instituted 
by God to be “a terror for bad conduct.” But what might be the redeemed nature of 
an institution with such a purpose? Will there be a wrongdoer in God’s redeemed 
future of freedom? Will there be any violence in need of restraint? If there were, then 
surely it would not be God’s redeemed future, would it? In God’s redeemed future, 
where power imbalances, violence and wrongdoing will no longer be found, what 
could be the need for instituting the coercive mechanisms of temporal authorities and 
their accompanying monopoly of violence?  
Paul claims that the authorities do not bear the sword for no reason (Rom 
13.4). But what about the future when there will be no reason for monopolizing 
violence, putting one human being in authority over another or conducting forced 
taxation to maintain armies or help the deprived? These questions are being asked to 
suggest that there is no way that, theologically, there is anything promised to 
temporal authorities. In God’s future they can no longer have any rationale, any 
reason for existence. There will be no subjugation, no human authority structure in 
the eschaton, when Christ is king. Therefore, all authority structures receive a 
question mark on their existence as it becomes clear that in God’s promised future 
there will be no Roman Empire, no Prussian state nor any U.S. government. As a 
result, the justice that is in place in temporal government must be seen as different 
from that loving justice that is both revealed in Christ and actualized in his subjects. 
The justice of temporal authorities cannot be said to be in the process of being 
gradually perfected to become a heavenly polis. Rather, it must be said to be in the 
process of being supplanted because, as the actualization of the love and freedom 
revealed in Christ is unfolding, the rationale behind political authority evaporates. In 
the eschaton, at the end of time, there will not be any “justice of political 
authorities,” as the manifestations of sin which need to be restrained will no longer 
be actual. As it is expressed in Revelation 21.4, “He will wipe every tear from their 
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eyes. Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more, for the 
first things have passed away.”  
This eventuality does not at all belittle political authority structures. They 
have a substantial role to play and receive positive affirmation in the New Testament 
for good reason. Because, although we know that sin has been judged and conquered 
and that the future belongs to the love and freedom of worship, sin still has 
empirically visible effects in our condition. The visibility of sin yet remains in our 
world as an “impossible possibility,” explaining the role of, and need for, political 
authorities. Indeed, political authorities are clearly very temporal in nature, serving a 
purpose within a certain condition in time. This means that the social structures, 
often called political, can well and rightly be called temporal authorities. Their 
structures are there because of a condition in time. The justice of their institutions is 
there because loving justice has not overcome violence, strife or subjugation. Their 
justice is temporal (meant only for the time being), serving the loving justice, the 
actualization process, which will one day make temporal authorities and temporal 
justice obsolete. But, in this period, in the temporal, there is still policing to be done, 
legislation to be passed and judging to be done.285 This is, ultimately, what makes 
sense of the “yes” and the “no,” the judgment and simultaneous affirmation that 
political authorities receive. 
It has already been established that the unfolding of the freedom of humanity 
is taking place in an actualization of the potentiality of love and justice as revealed in 
Christ. But this actualization process (like all such processes) needs space and this 
space is constantly threatened by non-real but actual manifestations of sin. It is for 
this reason that temporal authorities receive a positive affirmation in the New 
Testament witness together with grave warnings not to overstep its limits. The 
affirmation creates the space needed for people to preach, receive and grow in Christ, 
to actualize their potentiality. Temporal authorities are instituted to protect this space 
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and must find ways not to be an obstruction within it. With the realization of God’s 
promised future such a space no longer needs to be sustained by such a mechanism 
and so temporal authorities will no longer have a rationale. The simultaneous 
judgment and affirmation of temporal authorities is to be understood in this light. 
This explains how the concepts function differently within the realm of political 
government than in most other realities. This generates a separate understanding of 
the word “justice” as it relates to temporal authorities. It is a type of justice which we 
shall call temporal justice. 
We have sought to know whether the language of justice and love relates in 
the same way to temporal authorities as it does to other realities. To this end we 
needed to address judgment and affirmation as they pertain to temporal authorities. 
Our conclusion is that the judgment and affirmation proclaimed for temporal 
authorities is very different from other realities. The judgment of temporal authorities 
will be total and their promise is a promise to be in service of the future that will, 
ultimately, render them obsolete. This entails that the justice of temporal authorities 
is not of the same kind as the justice we have described for other realities. True 
justice is perfected in a future of freedom. Temporal justice will not be perfected but 
rendered obsolete. We have therefore analysed the word “justice” into two separate 
phenomena: loving justice and temporal justice. 
If such a distinction is not allowed, this may result in a confused or even less 
than amicable relationship between the loving justice of the church and the justice of 
the structures of temporal authorities. It can be argued that this is, in fact, what takes 
place in the construal advanced by Stanley Hauerwas, which does not allow for any 
distinction in the function of the concept of justice. Although it may sometimes 
appear as if he wants to dismiss the concept of justice altogether, this is not actually 
the case. Even though Hauerwas tries to explain “why justice is a bad idea for 
Christians”286 he is, by such exaggeration, actually aiming at a common modern 
notion of justice rather than setting the concept of justice aside altogether. He 
believes that the problem with the common modern notion of justice is “that we have 
been taught by the Enlightenment to believe that in fact there is a concept of ‘justice 
qua justice’ that corresponds to an account of ‘rationality qua rationality’ which 
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blinds us to the tradition-dependent character of any account of justice. Prior to any 
account of justice are those societal practices that make appeals to justice 
intelligible.” Therefore, time and time again Hauerwas points back to the church and 
its practices as if to say that the church is the wellspring of all of our ideas of love, 
justice and freedom.287 Therefore, we can never take our eyes off this socially 
embodied reality that is the church if we ever want to speak truthfully on these 
subjects. 
In Hauerwas’s opinion the justice so commonly spoken of in the modern era 
is a justice dressed up abstractly, making it always less than Christian.288 If 
Christians are engulfed by such a separate story of justice and participate in it, this 
clearly erodes the notions of justice sustained by the church in her practices. The 
difference between the modern, public notions of justice and the social life of the 
church is a problem for Hauerwas, who believes that the first social task of the 
church is not to make the world more just but rather to be the church.289 How else 
would the world learn anything about what concepts such as freedom, love and 
justice entail? As Hauerwas writes:  
Furthermore, once “justice” is made a criterion of Christian social strategy, it 
can too easily take on a meaning and life of its own that is not informed by 
fundamental Christian convictions. For example, the appeal to “justice” can 
and has been used to justify the Christian’s resort to violence to secure a 
more “relative justice.” But is this the justice we seek as Christians? 
Put differently, the problem with identifying, or at least closely 
associating, the meaning of the Gospel with the pursuit of “kingdom values” 
such as justice, freedom and equality is that such values lack the specificity 
and concreteness of the kingdom as found in Jesus’ life and death. . . . The 
problem is not that the kingdom brought by Christ is too idealistic to be 
realized. The problem is just the opposite. The kingdom present in Jesus 
Christ is the ultimate realism that rightly calls into question vague, secular 
ideals of freedom, equality and peace. In other words, we do not learn about 
the demands of the kingdom by learning about freedom and equality; rather, 
we must first experience the kingdom if we are even to know what kind of 
freedom and what kind of equality we should desire.290  
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The firm emphasis on the church as the wellspring of these concepts in its social 
practices places great pressure on Hauerwas to explain why the activities of the 
church should be non-negotiable and conducted without any apparent diminution of 
the Christian ethical demand as witnessed by the church. Such a diminution would, 
within the Hauerwasian view, entail a loss of the wellspring of true virtue as it is 
sustained by the practices of the church. This creates the possibility of an either/or 
relationship between the loving justice of the church and the justice of temporal 
authorities. Because how could temporal authorities, within the Hauerwasian 
scheme, be said to be the enactors of justice without fully mirroring the activities of 
the church? How could it be justice at all, if it is not in accordance with the socially 
embodied tradition of the church? 
The paradigmatic example of how this plays out concretely is in the example 
of non-violence, which Hauerwas heralds as the defining virtue of Christians. How 
can one be a Christian (which, according to Hauerwas, entails a strict adherence to 
non-violence) and simultaneously be a public official who organizes or participates 
in the police force or military affairs? Is not the possibility of violence an essential 
factor in the function of temporal authorities, thereby rendering any participation in 
such orders off limits for the Christian, according to Hauerwas? Hauerwas has 
contested that this is the case. He has claimed that violence is not a necessary or an 
essential factor to the state and that, therefore, the Christian is not necessarily obliged 
to withdraw from the secular order wholesale. However, he does maintain that 
Christians cannot have any hand in governmental actions that can be considered 
violent:  
I do not believe it entails an indiscriminate rejection of the secular order. 
Rather, I maintain that Christians must withdraw their support from a “civic 
republicanism” only when that form (as well as any other form) of 
government and society resorts to violence in order to maintain internal 
order and external security. At that point and that point alone Christians must 
withhold their involvement with the state. Such an admission, however, 
hardly commits me to a sectarian stance, unless one assumes, as some do, 
that every function of the state depends on its penchant for violence.291 
 
As we noted in chapter 1, we are still left with a problem of definition concerning 
what counts as violence. Do we employ wide or narrow definitions? Almost every 
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law and regulation could be considered violent when wide definitions are employed. 
It therefore sounds hollow when Hauerwas claims that a Christian must not withdraw 
from the state or supersede it completely. He himself concedes this in part, in 
discussing himself and John Howard Yoder, as he writes: “neither Yoder nor I are 
‘sectarians.’ We are rather theocrats. It is just very hard to rule when you are 
committed to nonviolence. But we are willing to try. ‘Try,’ however, means that 
politics is always a matter of persuasion.”292  
One must be reluctant to call this a recipe for any type of authentic 
engagement with temporal authorities. Moreover, there are surely other criteria for 
Christian living than non-violence which are also to be greatly revered and these 
must create similar problems for the Christian wanting to have a share in temporal 
politics when political processes are not perfectly aligned with the ideal of the 
church. In the end, Hauerwas must be said to allow for little or no difference between 
loving justice and temporal authorities. Either temporal authorities mirror the loving 
justice of the Christian or else there is cause for retreat. This breeds an unstable 
either/or policy of triumph or retreat. Importantly, this would be somewhat 
ameliorated if Hauerwas were to appreciate that temporal authorities provide an 
important service in the temporal and that, therefore, this service has its own 
rationale and demands an appropriate Christian discipleship. 
But not any of differentiation within the concept of justice is satisfactory. 
This is seen in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr does differentiate between the 
justice that takes place in temporal authorities and the justice that is found on a more 
intrapersonal level. But this difference that Niebuhr emphasized was not one of type 
but rather of degree and does not, therefore, fully make the correct distinctions 
between types of justice. The rationale for imagining the difference to be one of 
degree is that, according to Niebuhr, although love may reign mostly free in the 
relations of two persons, matters change “as soon as a third person is introduced into 
the relation.”293 At that point, “even the most perfect love requires a rational estimate 
of conflicting needs and interests.”294 
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This is an important point in Niebuhr’s theology of love and justice. It means 
that, according to Niebuhr, the demands of justice change the minute more persons 
enter into a relation or a situation. This assumption could possibly influence how 
temporal justice ought to be conceptualized, or so one would be inclined to think. 
But as we approach Niebuhr on the issue of love and temporal justice we find that, 
while he realizes that there is a difference between his general idea of justice and 
temporal justice, he makes it out to be a difference in degree rather than a difference 
in type. The reason perfect love must receive a compromised shape (and become 
justice) is that “even if perfect love were presupposed, complex relations, involving 
more than two persons, require the calculation of rights.”295 This means that at the 
point in which many persons become a part of a deliberation about ethical action, the 
moral scene changes and love must be compromised. Furthermore, as the number of 
participants and affected agents increases, this compromise becomes ever more 
necessary and pronounced. Within Niebuhr’s schema, one can almost say that love 
must compromise itself to be love (perfect justice) because justice “that is only 
justice is less than justice.”296 
This is why “the moral ideal of Christ,” according to Niebuhr, is indeed 
difficult to achieve in general but especially so on the level of social groups and 
nations: “This new life in Christ represents the perfection of complete and heedless 
self-giving which obscures the contrary impulse of self-regard. It is a moral ideal 
scarcely possible for the individual and certainly not relevant to the morality of self-
regarding nations.”297 So, although Niebuhr clearly understands that there is a 
difference between general justice and temporal justice, this difference is one of 
degree and not of type. The reason why temporal justice is often different is that, 
typically, so many parties are concerned in deliberations on temporal justice. 
Contrary to our contentions in this thesis, this has little to do with the specific task of 
temporal authorities. It is simply that the compromise of love should, within 
Niebuhr’s schema, become greater the more people are party to a moral situation. 
The justice exercised in temporal authority is plainly an even more compromised 
form of perfect justice (love) but not a justice with a specific criterion that depends 
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on its specific role. This we must judge critically. However true it may be that a 
judgment concerning justice will become complicated with the greater the number of 
parties to a situation there is, it does not explain the calling and responsibility of 
temporal authorities. Temporal authorities are of a different kind insofar as they 
serve a future they will have no share in and yet clearly are called to serve it. 
Therefore, it must be argued that justice should be analysed into loving justice and 
temporal justice. Niebuhr clearly fails to do this although he recognizes that a change 
occurs in the demands of justice the more complex the situation becomes. But that 
does not provide any helpful guiding criteria for determining the shape of justice 
practiced by temporal authorities. We have argued here that such a differentiation 
must be made. But to make better sense of what “temporal justice” might mean, let 
us now seek to describe the relationship of love to the type of justice we have named 
temporal justice. 
 
B. Temporal Justice 
The fact that it has now been established that temporal authority is given to sustain 
the space needed for the potentiality of loving justice to be actualized has further 
implications for our conceptualizations.  
One can no longer say that love becomes justice, because the justice of 
temporal authorities should mirror, or be analogous to, the loving justice Christians 
proclaim and hope for. Christian love does not, simplistically, become Christian 
legislation. Neither is there a peaceful boundary between love and temporal justice. 
This is because there is another criterion for the interrelationship between love and 
justice to be deduced from what we have established. Temporal justice is the space 
created that allows love to be actualized. This means that the criteria of the exercise 
of political judgment for the queen, the statesman or the democratic citizen would be 
whether such a person is ready to give Christians, or people of other persuasions, the 
social space within which to actualize love as they imagine it should be. 
Now, according to what has been said, love is surely involved in our temporal 
governance. But this is not a love that forces others to comply, or share its objects of 
affection. It is a love that seeks a temporal justice that allows for love to take form. 
Consider the civil rights movement in America. Leading that movement there were 
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surely people who had a conviction about the proper content and expression of love. 
They surely championed their cause against much hatred and scepticism. However, 
the legislation that was implemented as a result of the civil rights struggle was not 
legislation that forced people to stop hating each other and start loving. Such a thing 
cannot be commanded. However, the civil rights movement, spurred by people’s 
love, demanded that temporal authorities carve out a space for people so that they 
could learn how to love one another. Love was surely involved in the construction of 
temporal justice—just not in the crude way often imagined when love and temporal 
justice are collapsed in theory. 
In the present thesis we have, therefore, already brought forth helpful 
guidance which shows how temporal justice is responsive to love without the 
dangers of theocracy and how temporal justice avoids quietist unresponsiveness to 
love. This means that the state is not theocratic in its leanings nor is it unresponsive 
to the demands and political relevance of love. This is, in itself, simple, but it might 
still be that the mind is somewhat unaccustomed to this way of thinking about such 
things. After all, the human mind seems prone to a certain type of binary thinking 
which does not allow for such a synthesis. How can temporal authorities be 
responsive to love without over-determining the lives of its citizens, that is, without 
being, to some degree, theocratic? How, can it, at the same time, circumscribe the 
role of love without falling into the common pitfalls of liberalism, in which little or 
no vision sustains or guides the civil community? This, of course, should already be 
clear. But in order to facilitate the visualization and crisp understanding of the theory 
already laid out let us now, first, explain the concept of space and then, later, present 
a helpful clarification by way of an architectural metaphor. 
 
i. The Notion of Space 
The concept of space has now been used repeatedly and the hope is that it has 
gradually become clearer in what way the concept functions in this thesis. But let us 
recapitulate and elaborate it as a concept. Three forms have already been introduced. 
First, we discussed space in connection with human love, second, in connection with 
human justice and, third, in connection with temporal justice. In each instance space 
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was a concept of central importance. In our discussions of human love, we 
established that human love is a creative but risky undertaking which seeks to create 
and sustain spaces wherein freedom/potentiality can actualize. When we treated 
human justice we concluded that human justice involves refraining from certain 
actions as well as actions that protect spaces within which freedom/potentiality could 
actualize. Finally, when laying out temporal justice we described temporal justice as 
the creation and sustaining of spaces wherein human love can actualize. It should be 
pointed out that, although this thesis has tackled five major concepts of love and 
justice, the concept of “space” has appeared only in the discussion of the three 
particularly human forms of love and justice. This has to do with the difference and 
distinction between the activity of God and the activity of humankind. It is God who 
accomplishes the determination of humankind as free in communion with himself. 
Furthermore, it is not humankind that can, by its own power, directly actualize God’s 
determination and promise. Rather it is up to God, who can empower humankind’s 
actions to contribute to his glorious future. This means that, strictly speaking, 
humankind does not directly accomplish that for which it works. From the standpoint 
of its own subjectivity it can only seek to create spaces where God can be received 
and where there will be fewer hindrances and other forms of resistance to the 
actualization of his will: “Prepare the way of the Lord” (Mark 1.3). In this way the 
concept of space is, obviously, somewhat of a metaphor for a more complex and 
messy reality. But it is, nonetheless, a very helpful conceptualization that captures 
well the inner logic of the relationships we have sought to tease out between love, 
justice and freedom/potentiality. But since temporal justice refers to both human love 
and human justice (and is in fact subsumed by them), its accompanying concept of 
space functions somewhat differently from its functions in other domains. 
But what then is this space which is central to our descriptions of “temporal 
justice”? First it was said to be a type of space created and sustained so that human 
loving justice could actualize. This type of space is created and sustained by 
temporal authorities and therefore must be understood with reference to the legal, 
structural and institutional forms that temporal authorities have as their focus. 
Temporal justice is shaped by its ongoing relationship and interaction with love. 
Loving activity creates a form of life, a presence that requires space. To some degree 
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its sheer presence already colonizes or makes use of pre-existent spaces. In another 
way it may put pressure on the pre-existent legal and structural norms. In what way? 
Well, the form of life created by the activity of love, for example the love of 
Christians, might entail actions that go beyond or counter to the forms and structures 
already maintained by temporal authorities. If, and when, this is the case it might 
require a response from temporal authorities. Furthermore, such communities of 
loving activity might bring certain concrete requests to temporal authorities, seeking 
changes which help the actualization of love as they understand it. 
We find an obvious example of this in the case of Quakers in the United 
States. Quakers can be exempted from military service because of their pacifist 
beliefs. By this it can be seen that the space created and sustained by temporal 
authorities is a social space that concerns legislation, societal structures and 
institutions. But to some this might sound as if we are simply discussing a form of 
negative space, synonymous with discussions of negative freedom wherein loving 
activity is freedom from restraint. There is some truth in that but the truth is not 
unilateral. It makes temporal authorities within our scheme sound too reactive and 
not engaged enough in an act of political judgment. Criteria of judgment will be 
better discussed below. At this point we can say that one would certainly be right to 
assume that there is something like an aspect of negative freedom (or something 
analogous to it) involved in political judgment. But that is not all. Pointing to Jesus’s 
confrontation with Pilate we have, it is true, described temporal authorities as 
“knowing nothing of truth.” But, again, the truth of that statement must be seriously 
qualified by the still very practical task of temporal authorities to maintain the basic 
peace and order for loving activity to resume without much threat. And the social 
domain, as was said before, and as the Scriptures are very sensitive to, is a place 
susceptible to strife and factionalism. It is, simply put, a very delicate entity that 
needs to be engineered with respect and care for that very reason.  
It can in like manner be said that temporal authorities will not choose the 
route of completely determined, positive space, upholding only a positive freedom. 
Such measures will suppress and likely be maintained (in more diverse societies) 
only by the violence from which temporal authorities are meant to protect people. 
The spaces of temporal authorities, therefore, will be described neither as negative 
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nor positive spaces but as suggestive spaces. These notions of social spaces as 
negative, positive and suggestive can be very helpful for explaining the relationship 
between love and temporal justice. However, their use, at this point, might be 
confusing without further grounding or explanation. Therefore, let us explain these 
concepts by reference to an architectural metaphor. This metaphor will help us not 
only to understand the concepts of positive, negative, and suggestive space, but also 
to better understand our most fundamental contention concerning love and temporal 
justice. 
 
ii. Temporal Justice: The Architectural Metaphor 
Someone might wonder why we would need any help from architectural metaphors 
to explain our project. It might seem less than obvious what the connecting points are 
with the present thesis. Yet it has been made clear that the concept of space is 
integral to our conceptualizations as well as our understanding of the interplay 
between love and temporal justice. And it is a fact that space is a domain in which 
the architect is extremely knowledgeable. It can even be stated that “Architecture is 
the thoughtful making of space.” As Herman Hertzberger writes: “If the architect is a 
specialist anywhere, then it is in orchestrating the spatial resources and whatever 
these are able to accomplish. He must accept his social and cultural obligations and 
concentrate on the creating and shaping of space.” 298 
 
a. Positive and Negative Spaces 
In the domain of architecture, space is called “negative space” if it is unshaped by the 
placement of “figures” (figures being the blueprints or shapes of buildings as 
represented on a page, canvas or other background). Space is called “positive space” 
if it has a distinctive shape. For example, a positive space would be created if three 
school buildings are placed into a “U” form, creating a space between them which 
resembles a quadrangle. Such a space could be used for social interaction or 
lingering and would likely be treated as such. A negative space would result if those 
same buildings would be organized in a straight line, promoting movement away 
                                                 
298 Herman Hertzberger, Space and the Architect: Lessons for Students in Architecture, (Rotterdam: 
010 Publishers, 2010), 9. 
164 
 
from the school buildings and discouraging student lingering.299 Negative space is 
anti-social. But when it comes to positive space one can say that there is positive 
space . . . and then there is positive space. A parking lot outside a shopping centre 
may be positive space, but it is an over-determined positive space. It would occur to 
no one to sit down in a parking space to read a newspaper or engage in any type of 
activity other than parking and walking to and from. Also, a public tennis court open 
to all is a positive space but, again, one that is over-determined. In the same way 
there is a difference between the quadrangle formed between school buildings and a 
natural, inner city grass-field with football goals placed on either side. Both might be 
of equal size, covered in green grass and surrounded by buildings, and both will have 
to be described as positive spaces. Yet, the field with the football goals is what we 
are calling an over-determined positive space. 
 
b. Space and Place 
Spaces receive their shapes from places, that is, from buildings. But the distinction 
between space and place can be elusive. This is because space and place remain in an 
interesting, developing relationship. Herman Hertzberger helpfully writes that “Place 
is where you recognize yourself, something familiar and safe, especially for you. 
When a large number of people have the same feeling and derive from it the sense of 
being linked together, it is a collective place.”300 Space is, furthermore, according to 
Hertzberger, something of a necessity for humankind and is expressed as an urge that 
is “aimed outwards” and so is “centrifugal by nature.” However, as we access, live in 
and make use of spaces, human beings engage in what can best be described as 
“colonization” of the spaces given and encountered. As Hertzberger writes: 
If space-accessing desire has centrifugal directionality, once that space is 
colonized our attention turns to ever more drastically opening it up and 
exploiting it in our minds. More and more associations take hold and, with 
these incorporated in our familiar world, our focus in time becomes 
increasingly inward-looking, concentrated on the mentally and emotionally 
newly accessible area.301 
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In the end this is what makes clear the strange dialectic between space and place. 
They are in an ever-developing relationship whereby space becomes place. Consider 
Hertzberger’s words: “This is how our centrifugal desire makes the switch to 
centripetal attraction; space, appropriated and familiar, becomes place.” This is 
important: “space, appropriated and familiar, becomes place.” The result is that 
collective places, given space, can make use of such spaces, and, in the end, these 
spaces might become something like an extension of the place that, originally, was 
just making use of it. 
However, whether a space is simply colonized from its genesis without any 
further potential depends on the process of space-shaping carried out by architects or 
relevant authorities. This danger is implicit in over-determined spaces more than it is 
in suggestive spaces. Here we observe that the good architect seeks as little over-
determination as possible. “The thoughtful making of space” consists in recognizing 
that freedom is not achieved by architecture, but that freedom can only be facilitated 
by it. The architect so fashions a space that the collective place may grow in a way 
that is consistent with the internal logic of the collective itself. And such growth and 
movement should not be forced (read: over-determined), only suggested. Otherwise 
it might risk impeding the growth of both place and space. 
The important lesson here is that certain building plans “allowed” by 
authorities create public spaces between collective places. If this is done, then one 
need fear neither an array of negative spaces nor an urban desert of unconnected 
buildings. Rather there is a space that is suggestive of how it should be engaged with. 
It is a space that is neither simply negative nor simply positive, but suggestive, taking 
into account the existence of the places of the collective. It does not constrain or 
over-determine the use of its public spaces. Neither will it be lacking in positive 
space, as some contemporary suburbs are. Rather, proper architectural 
determinations, following the theoretical instincts of the present thesis, would create 
spaces that neither over- nor underdetermine but instead create spaces that are 
suggestive.  
To apply the architectural metaphor let us move the discussion to an actual 
historical example. When Martin Luther King, Jr. and African American Christian 
communities in the United States mobilized alongside their white brethren with the 
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same cause—to request a space in which blacks and whites could live, love and work 
together—the results ultimately became clear. The space created by authorities was 
not over-determined. No one was forced to love their brethren of another colour. 
Neither was there an under-determination of space. There was no indifference to the 
communal, societal aspect of the issue ending with a “separate but equal” policy. 
Rather, social spaces were opened up so that people of different ethnicities could 
love each other. Here the temporal authorities reconfigured the public space, which 
made the public space neither entirely a simple positive space nor a negative space, 
but a suggestive space. The temporal authorities decided to give a certain expression 
of love the benefit of the doubt and to restructure its internal spaces so that this love 
might move freely without structural hindrances. Then they could contemplate doing 
the same for other public social groups. 
The fact that the temporal authorities decide the extent to which they will 
grant space to certain forms of love means that the state and its institutions create and 
sustain a certain type of space. This granting of space will be determined by temporal 
authorities based on a demand or perceived need for such a space. This means that 
there will be, within the legal and institutional frameworks, clues as to what kind of 
life, or love, temporal authorities deem worthy of such spaces. To continue with the 
architectural metaphor: The state will be reactive, but also deliberative, meaning that 
it will not only fashion negative spaces but also that it will sustain, through the same 
processes, spaces which give suggestions/clues as to what human life and love can or 
should look like. It neither determines a completely prescriptive, positive space nor 
provides an empty, negative space where no one wants to dwell. This describes a 
dynamic between love and the justice of temporal authorities that creates a level 
ground for clarifying their interactions.  
 
c. Spheres and spaces. From Augustine to Luther to O’Donovan 
There are, in the history of theology, political theologies that are not uncongenial to 
theology of the present work. In fact, similar patterns of understanding can be found 
struggling to emerge within the history of theology. It is, for example, first with 
Augustine that we discover a notion of temporal authorities that suggests early 
developments of what we understand here by the notion of space and the temporal 
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understanding of governmental authority on which it rests. Augustine, as is well 
known, employed his use–enjoy distinction to navigate earthly reality, using it to 
explain that God is to be enjoyed, while all of earthly reality is to be used.302 It was 
to be no different when it came to the earthly reality of governmental authority. In 
Augustine’s view, temporal authorities should be used and, indeed there is much use 
for them. Governments, like all other institutions of coercion, are, in Augustine’s 
understanding, both useful and necessary because of sin, harmonizing with what has 
been established in the current thesis with regard to the role of temporal authorities: 
This servitude is, however, penal, and is appointed by that law which enjoins 
the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance; for if 
nothing had been done in violation of that law, there would have been 
nothing to restrain by penal servitude.303 
 
This is further emphasized when Augustine writes that there will be no need of or use 
for such  a mechanism of preservation and restraint in the eschaton, in “that heavenly 
home in which the duty of ruling men is no longer necessary.”304 Thus we find a 
degree of harmony between this point in Augustine’s thought on the nature of 
worldly government and our insight as to what its proper role and function is. Since 
temporal authority is just a preservation mechanism and there will be no human 
government in the eschaton, governments cannot be conceived as ever perfecting 
justice as love does. Government does not hold the righteousness perfected by love 
as it is, by its nature, antithetical to rightly ordered human relationships. It is only 
needed and given because human relationships and justice went so terribly awry. 
Interestingly, this temporal authority, described by Augustine, and the justice 
it wields, a semblance of a criterion for its own operations and its relationship to 
love, one that is similar to the one we are developing here. One can move closer to 
grasping that criterion by looking to another aspect of Augustine’s understanding of 
government, where something congenial to our concept of space can be discerned. 
Augustine thinks that there is a very natural phenomenon that calls for government to 
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come about, the desire for bodily peace. Augustine notes to his readers how animals 
also form protective structures to maintain bodily peace amongst themselves: 
For the most savage animals . . . encompass their own species with a ring of 
protecting peace. They cohabit, beget, produce, suckle, and bring up their 
young, though very many of them are not gregarious, but solitary—not like 
sheep, deer, pigeons, starlings, bees, but such as lions, foxes, eagles, bats. 
For what tigress does not gently purr over her cubs, and lay aside her 
ferocity to fondle them? How much more powerfully do the laws of man’s 
nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far 
as in him lies…305 
 
This also holds true for human beings as bodily creatures. However, there is an 
important distinction to be made in light of the fact that Augustine also sees the 
human being as rational. The fact that human beings are rational makes them desire 
something more than simple bodily peace. They seek to subordinate everything, 
including their need for bodily peace, under their rationality in “a well ordered 
harmony of knowledge and action”: 
But, as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in 
common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect 
may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy 
the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we 
have said, the peace of the rational soul.306 
 
We thereby are told that the rational being seeks a different form of peace that surely, 
like bodily peace, needs food and drink but is not fulfilled by it. There is surely a 
bodily peace that all living beings need. But human beings have, in their rational 
capacity, a need for a rational peace which subsumes bodily peace and gives it 
meaning and direction. Augustine knows this because he recognizes that for 
Christians their knowledge of God subsumes all their understanding. Christians need 
this rational peace that subsumes their bodily peace. Importantly, Augustine 
recognizes that there are multiple conceptions of what the content of the rational 
peace should be, but also that the need for bodily peace is common to all. This is why 
the heavenly city “maintains a common agreement among men regarding the 
acquisition of the necessaries of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the 
peace of heaven.”307 
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This means that, according to Augustine, Christians want bodily peace in 
common with members of the earthly city but also strive for a peace that gives them 
the sphere that allows their loving, rational comprehension of God to subsume this 
bodily peace. One can therefore infer from Augustine that Christians should seek 
forms of government and laws that they judge to be best able to sustain these two 
forms of peace. 
It can therefore be argued that we find, in Augustine, a notion which can be 
likened to the spaces created and sustained by temporal authorities as discussed in 
this thesis. The likeness is, first, that temporal authorities are, for Augustine, more a 
preservation mechanism than a didactic, edifying organization such as we find in 
classical political theory. Second, the likeness is that, according to our reading of 
Augustine, on his view of temporal authorities is they are made to sustain certain 
spheres. In Augustine’s case these are the bodily and the rational spheres within 
which people can grow according to their own inner logic and love. However, things 
are not as neat and simple as they might seem at this point. Augustine did run against 
the grain of that which we have presented here as the kernel of his teaching, in both 
word and deed. A reader of his City of God will eventually reach the description of 
the Christian princes where it says: “They [Christian princes] are happy . . . if they 
make their power the handmaid of His majesty by using it to spread His worship to 
the greatest possible extent.”308 
Here, Augustine seems effectively to say that a Christian emperor should use 
his power to spread God’s worship. The active distinction between bodily peace and 
rational peace is compromised and the notion of rational space is placed in jeopardy. 
This is further re-enforced by Augustine’s deeds whereby he agreed to and supported 
the governmental coercion of the unruly Donatist Christians.309 After all that has 
been established, this surely must be some kind of a contradiction. As is well 
understood in the modern age it is very possible to create laws that “do not cause a 
hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God”310 without actively 
having worldly authorities expanding this very worship. But perhaps this 
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contradiction should not come as a great shock. In ancient times and classical 
political philosophy, faith and government were so intimately connected that it was 
undoubtedly difficult to imagine drawing a strong distinction between them. So it 
seems that even though Augustine laments the fact that Christians have not been able 
to make common laws of religion with Rome and that they have had to be 
“compelled to dissent”311 and “become obnoxious to those who think differently,”312 
he also could hold the view that once the rulers are Christian, they will be active in 
spreading of the worship of the Christian faith on their behalf. We seem to have 
found that Oliver O’Donovan is right in maintaining that for Augustine there is, in 
the case of worldly government, “not a neutral meeting space, a ‘naked public 
square.’”313 
It is nonetheless important to remember that Augustine did offer helpful and 
interesting principles concerning the relationship between church and worldly 
authorities that would transform the shape of that discussion forever. And similar 
principles were to be taken up and rehearsed by the reformer Martin Luther. 
To Luther it was also true that governmental authority is a preservation 
mechanism within the condition of sin and violence that still exists. Because of this 
condition, Luther wanted to affirm a strong distinction between the spiritual sphere 
and the temporal sphere and the principles according to which they are to be 
operated. The spiritual principles of the gospel, according to Luther, have little to 
offer in the reality of temporal governance because  
to try to rule a whole country or the world by means of the Gospel is like 
herding together wolves, lions, eagles and sheep in the same pen, letting 
them mix freely, and saying to them: feed, and be just and peaceable; the 
stable isn´t locked, there´s plenty of pasture, and you have no dogs or 
cudgels to be afraid of. The sheep would certainly keep the peace and let 
themselves be governed and pastured peaceably, but they would not live 
long.314 
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As Martin Luther had a tendency to emphasize opposites he draws a clear distinction 
between “the two governments,” as he calls them: 
Therefore care must be taken to keep these two governments distinct, and 
both must be allowed to continue [their work], the one to make [people] just, 
the other to create outward peace and prevent evil-doing. Neither is enough 
for the world without the other. Without the spiritual government of Christ, 
no one can be made just in the sight of God by secular government [alone]. 
However,  Christ’s spiritual government does not extend to everyone; on the 
contrary, Christians are at all times the fewest in number and live in the 
midst of the Unchristian. Conversely, where secular government or law rules 
on its own, pure hypocrisy must prevail, even if it were God’s own 
commandments [that were being enforced]. For no one becomes truly just 
without the Holy Spirit in his heart, however good his works. And equally 
where spiritual government rules over a country and its people unaided, 
every sort of wickedness is let loose and every sort of knavery has free 
play.315 
 
Martin Luther does not use the concepts of bodily and rational peace, as did 
Augustine, but yet he employs something quite similar. He distinguishes between 
earthly matters and matters of the soul. Temporal authorities create peace for the 
body by its laws and enforcements and peace for the soul by their strict non-
interference into matters of soul. 
Secular government has laws that extend no further than the body, goods and 
outward, earthly matters. But where the soul is concerned, God neither can 
nor will allow anyone but himself to rule. And so, where secular authority 
takes it upon itself to legislate for the soul, it trespasses on [what belongs to] 
God’s government, and merely seduces and ruins souls.316 
 
A distinction between the rule of the church and the rule of temporal 
authorities was, therefore, early very operative within Luther’s thought. But however 
strongly and forcefully Luther tended to emphasize this distinction, the historical 
realities of his time made it extremely difficult. The reformation could not survive 
without assistance from secular rulers. If the reformation was to survive Luther 
needed two things to happen which ran counter to his commitment to a distinction of 
governments, temporal and spiritual. He needed to secure the support of the temporal 
rulers and make sure that unsympathetic rulers would not fight against it.317 This 
tended to create a difficult contradiction in his tracts which James Estes has called an 
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“exercise in admitting the prince into the church by the back door while 
ostentatiously denying him entry through the front door.”318 This tactic appears very 
typically in his letter to the nobility of the German nation. In the letter it is shown 
how Luther argues that when it came to reform within the church the primary 
responsibility should lie decisively with the clergy.319 At the same time, however, 
Luther insisted that when the authorities have strayed from the Gospel they have also 
forfeited their right to be obeyed. Under such circumstances Luther is convinced that 
it is everyone’s duty and call to do what one can do to help and lead the church on to 
its right path.320 Christians who happen to be princes should therefore exercise their 
princely secular authority to manage emergencies within the church.321 In To the 
Christian Nobility of the German Nation Luther writes: 
For this reason the Christian Nobility should set itself against the pope as 
against a common enemy and destroyer of Christendom for the salvation of 
the poor souls who perish because of this tyranny. . . . The nobility should 
restore to the local bishops their right and responsibility to administer the 
benefices in the German nation to the best of their ability.322 
 
While Luther positively affirmed a distinction and a function of temporal authorities 
akin to that for which we have argued here and similar to that of Augustine, its 
principles are not upheld very consistently. Luther finds it impossible, for theoretical 
or practical reasons, to let the word of distinction between the two governments be 
the last word. This should come as no surprise. As a thinker Luther was want to 
create polarities and allow them to play against each other without necessarily 
finding a synthesis, as we saw in our discussion in Chapter 3 of the simul iustus et 
peccator. However, Luther did attempt to find a way to maintain the distinction and 
unity between the operations of the two governments by widening the definition of 
what it meant for secular rulers to “secure peace.”323 Luther began arguing that 
public unity in religion was pivotal, because peace and order were threatened by both 
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false religion and disunity in religious matters.324 Initially, Luther wanted to be able 
to allow some freedom for churches to choose their own ceremonies, for example, 
but then decided that this freedom could be exercised only at the territorial level, to 
ensure order.325 It soon became clear that Luther’s initial demand for a sharp 
distinction between “matters of the soul” and “earthly matters,” between church and 
government, could not be realized, in part for theological reasons and in part because 
of his need for continual assistance from secular authorities.326 
This of course meant that Luther had, at the expense of “matters of the soul,” 
expanded the sphere and importance of “earthly matters.” That is to say, in order to 
ensure peace in earthly matters, Luther had to shrink people’s autonomy or self-
determination in matters of the soul, to use his terminology. And this Luther did by 
granting people nothing beyond the space of their own subjectivity in matters of the 
soul.327 But this developing tendency within Luther’s thought to make matters of the 
soul an issue of peace in earthly matters was to receive a very strong challenge. This 
challenge came from Luther’s contemporary, an educated man with evangelical 
views and a humanist background called Georg Frölich. Frölich worked for the city 
chancellery in Nurnberg, Germany, and decided to write a little memorandum 
concerning religion and government which he then passed on to his supervisors.328 
There he took Luther’s two-government schema and followed it to a different 
conclusion. Frölich emphasized that Luther’s understanding of spiritual government, 
which is concerned with matters of the soul, should include not just the inner realm 
of faith and conscience but all the external aspects of religion, particularly preaching 
and worship.329 
Frölich’s argument was supported to some degree by his claim that, according 
to Luther’s Letter to the Princes of Saxony Concerning the Rebellious Spirit, 
governments should have the authority to punish the wicked men found in all the 
faith communities, and that false teaching should be countered only by the word of 
God. However, a greater part of Frölich’s argument against the importance of 
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conformity in matters of preaching and worship was empirical rather than 
theological. He simply pointed to the kingdom of Bohemia where Catholics, 
Hussites, Bohemian Brethren and a substantial Jewish community lived together and 
managed well to uphold peace and order.330 Fröhlich asked, straightforwardly, why 
this should be any different in other chiefdoms. Fröhlich wrote that one should not 
fear the coexistence of many confessions but rather a world in which “the strongest 
will teach his doctrine to others” as that will spur torture, executions and other kinds 
of violence within or between states.331 In other words, contra to Luther’s new 
insistence, the demand for unity in religious matters was a threat to bodily peace, not 
its guardian. 
However tension-ridden Luther´s writings on theology and politics may seem, 
it must be affirmed that, like Augustine, Luther did offer helpful guiding principles 
for distinctions, boundaries and spheres. And, again like Augustine, he was not ready 
to sever temporal authorities completely, or to regard them as autonomous. In this 
sense, Luther gives a particularly strong expression of the same tendency we have 
seen in Augustine—the tendency to affirm a distinction between the spiritual and 
temporal authorities and yet to affirm some type of unity or dynamic between them 
in the next breath. The only problem is that both Augustine and Luther do this 
without helping their reader make sense of how these two principles work or relate 
together, which they just might. The spheres and spaces they draw out are, in the end, 
not fully effective in mediating a dynamic between love and temporal authorities 
while also sustaining their distinction. They are, in the end, able to consistently 
maintain only the space for bodily peace. 
But someone might want to enquire about the concept of the estates for 
Luther. Is the doctrine of the estates not an example of spaces within which love 
operates? And is it not, therefore, essentially the same notion as the one introduced in 
this thesis? 
It is true that love lies at the centre of Luther’s doctrine of the estates. It is 
also true that the estates name certain social spaces within which love is active. As 
Oswald Bayer writes on the Lutheran doctrine of the estates: “Love is indeed itself 
the formative power, but it operates, according to this tradition, within a space that is 
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already formed.”332 Luther determines these estates, or spaces, to be the household, 
the church and the government, although the terminology varies.333 According to 
Luther’s schema, love operates within these stations and therefore Christian 
discipleship is active within them. But it should be clear that these stations have little 
to do with the spaces that we have discussed here. Here we are trying to understand 
the dynamic between love and the structures of temporal authorities, not where love 
operates universally. Indeed, even if we were to affirm Luther’s distinctions it would 
still remain a momentous question for the thesis how one should describe the 
interaction of the estate of the church and the estate of government. Therefore, the 
estates, while interesting, have little or no bearing on or even similarity to what we 
are doing with its notion of love and temporal justice that are mediated by spaces. It 
is one thing to state that love has no boundaries and is therefore active within any 
and every sphere, but the burning question remains unanswered: What is the 
interaction between the faith and love of the church and the justice of temporal 
authorities? Luther attempted to make sense of that question with his theory of the 
two governments but, as we have seen, while it remains a valuable milestone in the 
history of ideas, it takes us only so far. 
Oliver O’Donovan sees the shortcomings of the Lutheran doctrine of the 
estates and offers instead his own understanding of the social spheres.334 He even 
employs the concepts of space and place which naturally draws our attention. Still, 
O’Donovan employs the notions of space and place a bit differently and for slightly 
different ends. In one part of a chapter called “communication” O’Donovan seeks an 
account of the social whole, “especially an account of what makes them concrete, 
particular and plural, in contrast to the universal fellowship of the human race.” 
When O’Donovan asks, “How are we to understand the concreteness of particular 
societies?” he himself answers by saying: “By identifying them in terms of the place 
in which they are situated: Place is the social communication of space.”335 This is 
how, instead of marking out special estates, as Luther did, O’Donovan makes matters 
more fluid and situates communication as the central criterion that determines the 
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boundaries of spheres. So what determines a place is the social communication of 
space. And place is, in O’Donovan’s words, “the determinant of society.”336 That is 
to say, “place is an abstract concept”337 that “stands for a totality of diverse 
communications.”338 
So, here we have one of the thesis’s interlocutors employing the concepts of 
place and space in ways that might appear not to be uncongenial to our argument. 
Nonetheless, there are important differences. The present work, in line with the 
architectural discussion, sees place as a signifier for a community’s realized 
colonization of a space. O’Donovan sees place as the determinant of society. But in 
our view, something like a society is what takes form in the communication between 
places, in the plural. So, O’Donovan’s focus in using the concepts of space and place 
gives an account of society, making sense of societies as particular and universal at 
the same time,339 a different problematic from the one we are addressing which 
regards the relationship between the collectives of love and the justice of temporal 
authorities. But these points need not be uncongenial to one another. A connection 
could be drawn between the two treatments but they do not treat the same 
problematic, in very much the way in which the Lutheran doctrine of the estates 
would not interfere with our objective to inquire into the dynamic between church 
and temporal authorities.  However, when it comes to the question regarding the 
relationship between love and temporal justice, O’Donovan is heading in a similar 
direction as the present thesis, and speaking the same language. 
According to O’Donovan, the reaction of temporal authorities to the love of 
the church can take place in twofold form. First, the justice of temporal authorities 
begins taking shape from the Gospel message and, according to O’Donovan, this is 
seen primarily in increased mercy in temporal judgments as well as greater humility 
of temporal authorities in light of their received knowledge of God’s ultimate 
judgment.340 Secondly, O’Donovan thinks it important that temporal authorities react 
to the Christian Gospel in such a way that it may self-consciously identify itself as 
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Christian. How else could the state be shaped by the Christian idea of justice if not 
for having received the truth of the proclamation that sustains that idea of justice? Is 
it not just a question of the integrity of the state to recognize its indebtedness to a 
specific confession over others?341 Standing on this ground, O’Donovan does not shy 
away from the obvious inference that a dynamic should be in place between love and 
the justice of temporal authorities. Being sceptical of both clean-cut boundaries and 
open hostilities between the two, O’Donovan confidently claims that the justice of 
temporal authorities must react to the activity of Christian love. It is a position which 
is strongly supported by this thesis. However, we must say that, following such 
statements, there remains much to be said concerning this relationship. 
What, for example, is the process of love’s shaping justice? Where does it 
end, and by what criteria? Is there a criterion for political engagement with love? Is 
there a justice peculiar to temporal authorities which has a relationship to love and is 
differs from that of general justice? In what way might it be different? Such are the 
types of questions towards which we are aiming and the concept of space, as outlined 
above, helps in discovering such answers. This is not to say that O’Donovan has not 
concretized his understanding of the relationship between love and temporal justice. 
He has, for example, helpfully written on issues of justice that do concretize his 
vision in a way that shows how his understanding of the dynamic between love and 
justice plays out. 
We find a good example of this when he writes on the death penalty. In 
writing on the death penalty, O’Donovan describes historical conditions within 
which we find ourselves and which determine what people understand to be the 
content and priorities of justice as well as fitting punishment for injustice: “Societies 
feel differently about different things. Some are more sensitive to physical injury or 
death, others to social humiliation. And these differing sensibilities are themselves 
not arbitrary, but are shaped by the practical possibilities available for punishment 
and the expectations of life shaped by daily experience.”342 O’Donovan takes the 
example that “mild practices of punishment presuppose certain virtues of restraint” in 
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a people. Likewise, “a disposition in society to immoderate anger and revenge will 
create a pressure for harsher forms of punishment.”343 Therefore, the idea of justice 
varies with each scenario and the possibilities of mercy and mildness must to a 
certain extent be adjusted to this. However, the dynamic is there. This is seen, for 
example, in Pope John Paul II’s argument for great leniency with regard to the death 
penalty, although he did not call for complete abolishment. O’Donovan explains how 
this utterance of the pope is to be understood as fitting within the public context of 
the modern “historical possibilities within which we find ourselves.”344 
In each judgment, therefore, an interaction takes place between love and 
justice in a historical situation, ever creating a new public context, a new historical 
condition and possibility, according to O’Donovan.345 This underlines the 
possibilities for love in addressing this justice, restraining it and softening it, without 
suspending it. Without the ultimate suspension of justice, justice can be moderated to 
a considerable degree, depending upon the public, cultural context. This is all very 
helpful. O’Donovan’s concrete example of the death penalty does underline the 
dynamic between love (expressed as mercy) and justice. And it is one to which we 
can subscribe. In addition, we would like to do two things: i) gain an even wider 
scope, by offering an account of love that includes more than mercy in interaction 
with temporal justice, and ii) develop additional guiding criteria for political action 
and judgment as regards the relationship between love and temporal justice. This we 
will do in the coming chapter. 
In the present chapter it has been argued that the concepts of judgment and 
affirmation function differently with reference to temporal authorities than they do 
with reference to other realities. We have discovered that there is a prescribed role 
for temporal authorities that has a reference to sin and disorder and other actualities 
which threaten the actualization of love. In the eschaton, as will be understood, there 
will be no such destructive manifestations and, therefore, no rationale for the 
legislations, enforcements, taxations, policing, and so on provided by temporal 
authorities. Indeed, this is why they are rightly called temporal authorities, in that 
they are meant only for the time being, to serve the actualization of love and justice. 
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Moreover, the concept of space appeared as a helpful concept for conceptually 
mediating the relationship that temporal justice has to love. It was discovered that 
love does not become justice but that they are, nonetheless, not in a static 
relationship. Rather, temporal justice is the space which allows love to actualize and 
therefore has a vocation only as long as love’s actualization is threatened by sin and 
disorder. Therefore, temporal justice has a reactive relationship to love and justice 
and is shaped by interaction with love and justice. Following this constructive work, 
we have traced a trajectory within the history of theology along which we could see 
similar or congenial understandings struggling to emerge. 
With this established, let us get to the work of developing additional criteria 







Criteria of Interaction 
 
As has been stated, we have supported the agenda of this thesis with the contention 
that its conversation partners have either given problematic descriptions of love and 
temporal justice or have yet to provide criteria to determine the balance in the 
interrelationship between the two. But at this point would it perhaps be fair to turn 
the tables on our own argument? By this we mean that it is time that this thesis bring 
its own charge upon itself and ask itself directly: what are the criteria which should 
guide the interrelationship between love and temporal justice? It has surely been 
clearly argued and stated that temporal justice is the space in which loving justice 
can actualize. But we need to know concerning this space how far, and in what 
aspects, love can shape it. And we need to understand what criteria should guide 
political action and judgment. 
Therefore, in this chapter we will learn of the criteria, the limits and 
allowances that determine how love shapes the spaces of temporal justice. This will 
entail discussing the basic criteria for political action and political judgment. We will 
look first to see how far love can go in shaping the spaces of temporal justice. We 
will investigate relevant domains of human existence and seek to discover when the 
space of temporal justice is “over-determined.” Next we will seek to describe the 
conditions of political judgment and discover that it functions according to a dual 
criterion which is able to include the particular judgments of those who wield 
political power. 
 
A. Love and the Spaces of Temporal Justice 
We have argued that love should be given space, that this is the nature of the function 
of temporal justice. But it should be obvious that when love of a certain type is given 
increased space or space of a certain kind, it might very often mean restricting the 
movements of other types of love. When American public space was reconfigured 
following the civil rights movement, it opened up (as has been argued) suggestive 
spaces within which cross-racial love could potentially actualize. However, at the 
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same time, although no one was forced to love a certain way, the spaces opened for 
the expression of love of particularity in terms of race (racist ideology) was shrunk to 
a definite extent. One could no longer create public spaces that allowed entry only to 
people of certain races. So, while loves/beliefs/values of a certain kind were not 
banned or forced they were given restricted space. Granting space to one form of 
love came at the expense of another. This is a very important point to remember as 
one might be tempted to see the process of “space granting” as completely without 
infringement or injury to other forms of love. To the contrary, it is offers a way to 
conceptualize a very real struggle in which love always engages, in a way that helps 
the subjects of love be clearer about the nature of their engagement with temporal 
justice. 
Why does love include struggle? Love, as we explained in earlier chapters, is 
born out of perceptions of a faith which sees the true potentiality of human beings 
and all of reality. There is, therefore, always a truth-contention built into love.  Love 
struggles for the truth of its object, for its object to become fully known and for itself 
to actualize in accordance with the truth perceived. Love, therefore, has a contested 
and a contesting nature because of its relation to truth. This is further amplified by 
the fact that love is an actualization process involving the potentiality it perceives in 
faith and it takes on shapes, activities and social organization that require space, 
which might not always be readily available. 
We must therefore ask ourselves: When a form of love reaches a special type 
of prominence, distribution and audience, how far can it press for space and at what 
point, and by what criteria, might it reach a limit? And now, we should ask this 
question in full understanding that the granting of a certain space to a type of love 
might restrict the space for movements of other types of love. 
There are a several types of spaces or venues within which a limit to love 
could possibly be drawn. The schema of such spatial types could look the following 
way: First, there is the inner belief of a subject, obviously referring to inner 
dispositions, thoroughly known only by the subject. Second, there is expressed belief, 
including both speech and symbolic action performed to advocate the 
love/belief/value in question. Third, we find public belief, the aggregate response to 
expressed belief, sometimes solidifying as a majority consensus. Fourth there is 
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institutionalized belief, which refers to the identitarian aspect of the state. 
Institutionalized belief and the identitarian aspects of the state determine the degree 
to which temporal authorities accept a self-understanding derived from certain 
loves/beliefs/values and codify these in its constitutions or laws. 
 
i. Inner Belief 
If we begin with the first category, inner belief, it seems that there is something very 
minimalistic about granting people the space of their own subjectivity. If “the fool 
says in his heart ‘there is no God,’” how will his belief be changed by forms other 
than preaching and rational persuasion? How can one fail to grant people the space 
of their own subjectivity? Martin Luther wrote of those who engaged in physical 
forcing of belief:  
Those blind and wretched people do not realize what a pointless and 
impossible thing they are attempting. However strict their order, and 
however much they rage, they cannot force people to do more than obey by 
word and [outward] deed. . . . All they achieve is to force people with weak 
consciences to perjure themselves, saying one thing while in their hearts they 
believe another. . . . It would be much easier, although it may mean allowing 
their subjects to fall into error, just to let them err, rather than to force them 
to lie and profess [with their mouths] what they do not believe in their 
hearts.346 
 
This passage portrays a longstanding concern of protestant Christianity, and its 
philosophical progeny, to be critical of the value of those actions that are done 
without the right intention in mind. It is especially this that is at stake in Luther’s 
words. Those very familiar with the political history of the Protestant Reformation 
might be surprised by the quoted passage, knowing that Luther did, in fact, advocate 
constraints on the actions of many dissidents. The important thing to note on that 
point is the rationale which guided Luther. Luther was ready to constrain actions 
primarily in the name of order and conformity rather than as the endorsement of 
orthodoxy.347 For orthodoxy would not be orthodoxy without being a free response to 
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the persuasion of the Gospel. The question for us should not, therefore, be whether 
people should be granted the space of their own subjectivity for their own beliefs, but 
whether that is all that should be granted to them. It is very obvious that banning 
expressions and actions related to beliefs of certain kinds can, over a long period of 
time, be detrimental to the survival and thriving of the beliefs in question. This 
remains true even if the expressed intention of authorities is only to maintain order 
and conformity to sustain peace. So, the idea of subjective belief being given its 
space is as obvious as it is insufficient on its own. It shows us that the second 
category of expressed belief is also a highly relevant category when juxtaposed with 
our first category of inner belief. Finding that to be the case moves us to investigate 
the space for expressed belief and discover whether there are any limitations that 
could be legitimately drawn there. 
 
ii. Expressed Belief 
The category of expressed belief concerns itself with advocacy of love/belief/value 
by way of speech or act. Unlike the category of inner belief, this category refers to 
expressions within social reality. But why should there be any such possibility of any 
type or form? The obvious answer is that, without it, there would be no possibility 
for the actualization of true love apart from direct disobedience and law-breaking. It 
is true that someone could possibly want to say that the process that moves towards 
legitimacy should always be a movement begun in the domain of the illegitimate. 
But that is a very self-contradicting notion. Creating, or imagining, a process of 
space creation that has law-breaking written into it runs against the very rationale of 
law-making. The process of legitimacy is self-contradictory if it is a process that 
requires illegitimate actions to actualize legitimacy. There needs to be some space 
available for the love in question. At the same time, the space given for expressed 
belief does not have to be great. But it must be a space for proclaiming or 
campaigning in some form, by some type of (restrained) speech or symbolic act. This 
is important. Notice that in the previous sentence it is indicated that speech and act 
can be qualified by the word “restrained.” It should already be clear that love can, 
within the realm of possibility delineated in this thesis, have a very extensive 
vocation in writing prescriptions into temporal authorities when creating their laws 
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and institutions. It can seek to restrain speech and it can seek to restrain symbolic 
action. But love’s shaping of temporal authorities cannot go so far that it becomes 
over-determining in a way that goes beyond suggestive space and in a way that gives 
the other form of love in question no room to move or actualize itself publicly. 
The question about expressed belief is therefore the pivotal point in our 
questioning where granting space to love ends and by what criteria. It is, therefore, 
also primarily here that our question as to when space has become positive, over-
determined space is answered. The answer is: When it does not force belief but only 
accommodates belief in such a way that certain beliefs and behaviours are suggested, 
made more sensible within the public space. This means that the forcing of belief has 
become the token of what temporal authorities are requested to refrain from while 
“belief forcing” is very minimally defined to the extent that structures can still favour 
and guide belief towards certain loves/beliefs/values or behaviour without 
transgressing. As has now been said, this can be so even to the degree that certain 
types of dissent are made difficult to some extent. In the end, there can be no forcing 
of belief, and yet, (and importantly) there can be forcing of behaviour associated with 
that belief, but only suggestively, not in a way that is over-determining of love. 
Acted belief (expression in non-verbal act) can, therefore, be curbed and muted to 
the ultimate degree although there would rarely be proper occasions for this. 
Nonetheless, we do have very clear examples of this in modern times. NAMBLA 
(North-American Man-Boy Love Association), for example, is a community which 
has only a very limited type of space for expression, and zero space for acting out 
their idea of love. 
This may still, despite being plainly spoken, sound as vague as it sounds 
shocking. The reason for the remaining vagueness is, at this point, that we are still 
waiting for a clarification as to how we can identify whether over-determination is 
taking place. How do we identify this “over-determination”? What questions need to 
be asked to determine whether over-determination is taking place? The answer lies in 
the following question: Is there a possibility for a subjective rejection (in inner 
belief) followed by some type of speech or action that defies the inner logic of the 
suggestive structures (in expressed belief)? If there is one or both of these lacking, 
then the space created is over-determined. 
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How can this be affirmed and what justifies this judgment that such an inner 
belief, combined with speech or symbolic action, is required not prevent space from 
becoming over-determined? The reason is that if it were not for this type of space 
then, hypothetically, the truest form of love could be barred from the political 
process entirely, meaning that the truest form of love would have no means by which 
to actualize. This point is both clear and important. But perhaps someone would want 
to challenge it by asking why that would be a problem. Are not some pursuits 
morally reprehensible and unfit to see the light of day, for example thievery? Here it 
must be stated that nothing that has been written here suggests that thievery, or 
similar activities, cannot or should not be banned. But if someone wants to become 
an advocate of thievery as a worthwhile pursuit, this should, according to what has 
been argued here, be given some type of space. Now, this type of space does not 
have to be much and can even be greatly curbed. But nonetheless, it ought to be there 
in some form or another. 
This is not to say that thievery cannot be judged and legislated against by the 
temporal authorities. It can and most likely will. But in our meta-analysis here, there 
is no evaluation made of particular value judgments that will be made by temporal 
authorities in the actual act of judgment. That part of the process, the actual act of 
judgment, will be explained with the dual criterion of political judgment below. At 
this point we are concerned primarily with more general criteria which cannot be 
designed to exclude the true manifestation of love when it appears. After all, this has 
been deemed to be the role of temporal justice, to be the space which allows love to 
actualize. Importantly, these general criteria will be active within the dual criterion of 
political judgment, but they will not be the only criteria. 
It goes without saying that the extent and type of determination permissible 
depends upon the issue in question which makes it necessary to treat each issue 
judiciously but, in part, according to the criteria now sketched out. This is what 
explains why there cannot be given any more concrete ways or “a method” with 
which to evaluate the public expression of love according to general criteria. Because 
once the meta-criteria for temporal authorities are established and an actual political 
judgment is to be made, the particular value judgments of temporal authorities 
become operative in the equation, determining spaces. 
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What has been written plainly here might appear, for example to those with 
strong liberal sensitivities, as quite shocking. It might seem that love’s vocation is 
rather grand and far-reaching, possibly too oppressive. But here it is important to 
note that what has been described is how far love’s vocation can reach without 
offending the frameworks and structure of our thesis. It is not a description of what 
love’s vocation should be but what it can be without becoming offensive by some 
irreducible criteria. We have to remember how we described the nature of love 
earlier in the thesis. Loving actions are based on extensive guesswork concerning 
that which they hope to accomplish. What has been established here concerning love 
does not mean that a Christian cannot come to his (non-theological) conclusion that a 
Republican agenda (or the agenda of any other political tradition) might be the best 
long-time arrangement for the actualization of love. It does, however, mean that there 
is a dynamic between love and temporal justice and that this dynamic has an upper 
and a lower mark. There is no such thing as a non-relationship between love and 
temporal justice. What has been shown is that this relationship is real and necessary 
so long as there is both love and temporal justice to be found at all. At the same time 
there is a limit to the determinations love can make of temporal justice in that some 
form of expression, by word or deed, must be possible for the form of love in 
question. 
We must also be clear that although the limits of love have been sketched out 
this way, the notion of “space for love” suggests a process that, in its basis, is not 
predatory on other forms of love. Space is not, in its essence, an infringing 
phenomenon. It is infringing only in those instances in which the space of one cannot 
be had without shrinking the space of another. And this is not the governing aspect of 
space. A space can surely develop in such a way, becoming ever more suggestive 
and thereby ever more determining of other spaces. 
An example from Iceland clearly illustrates such a development. In Iceland, 
homosexual love has, within the last century, received ever more space and 
actualization. Homosexual activity was decriminalized in 1940, anti-discrimination 
and same-sex partnerships were achieved in 1996, adoptions by same-sex couples 
were allowed in 2006, and in 2010 same-sex marriage was made possible. As can be 
seen, things have changed rapidly. So rapidly indeed that now, in 2012, a case has 
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come up in which a teacher in a public school has been removed from his position 
for publicly (but outside the classroom) espousing views that homosexuality is not a 
good form of love. This is how, as the loves and beliefs of the homosexual 
movement have sought changes to temporal justice to accommodate their form of 
love, the structures have become ever more infringing upon the space of others. In 
this case mentioned, they have maximized the possible movements of love entering 
the realm of expressed belief. 
In this thesis we have surely established that love does indeed have the 
vocation of seeking space and that this can be a deeply determining space, even to 
the degree of limiting act and speech to some extent—as can be seen by the limit that 
is, evidently, placed on teachers in public schools in Iceland. But this is not at all a 
necessary demand to be made by love. That love has, in the example from Iceland, 
decided to shape temporal justice to the maximum of its possibility is not the lesson 
one should take from our thesis about creating and sustaining space. In fact, the 
present thesis indicates instead, without necessitating it, a form of co-existence of 
spaces and the organic colonization of these spaces by collectives. Movements and 
collectives that make it their sole agenda to restructure temporal justice do not have 
the focus of love in the right place. Love is found most pre-eminently in its own 
actualization, in its organic colonization of spaces, the development of an authentic 
moral community of love. Those who would take the thesis of the relationship 
between love and temporal justice as space facilitation and turn it into a program for 
the colonization of the structures of temporal authorities have failed to follow the 
internal logic of this thesis. 
The internal logic of the thesis is that the actualization of love is primary and 
is found with the agents of love and the collective/movement of love, not in the 
constant, frustrated rearrangement of temporal authorities. Those changes should 
come as an afterthought, a secondary aspect. They should come as naturally as when 
a child requires new shoes when it has grown out of its older pair. The logical 
priority is not on temporal authorities, the logical priority is on the moral community, 
the collective of love to which temporal authorities are responsive in varying 
degrees. So, although saying that expressed belief and love can be curbed, both as 
speech and symbolic actions, is saying something important and true, it is not saying 
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all that much. Minimums and maximums are important markers to know and keep. 
But the tendency to keep one’s gaze fixed on those can easily lead one to betray the 
inner logic of that of which they are the upper and lower limits. 
 
iii. Public Belief 
Out of the degree of success attained by expressed belief and love, there emerges 
something like a societal consensus of some kind concerning a host of issues. 
Something like a public belief gradually takes form. Public belief is, in large degree, 
a result of successful expressed belief/love. It is a form of majoritarian consensus 
that tends to develop in societies over time. This public belief that takes shape in 
societies further affects political structures and political decisions. However, as we 
are inquiring into the possible limits that could be placed on love in its public 
interactions we cannot say that there is much that needs to be said that warrants 
specifically treating public belief. Public belief cannot have any type of limit placed 
upon it as it is the aggregate reaction to expressed belief, not a phenomenon with a 
single agent that could be addressed, curbed or limited by temporal authorities. 
However, public belief needs to be mentioned, since what emerges from the success 
of expressed belief/love and its subsequent consensus of public belief is the 
possibility of an identitarian state. 
 
iv. The Identitarian State 
Lastly, there is the very interesting question of the identitarian state, referring to the 
degree to which public self-understanding is codified in laws, constitutions and 
institutions. Many of the world’s constitutions and laws do, in fact, refer to God, the 
church or Christianity in one way or another. Yet, within the parameters of the 
current thesis we do not find there to be any demand on the part of political theology 
that temporal authorities receive such a distinct Christian self-understanding. A solid 
theological argument has nonetheless been brought forth on that issue. It argues that 
the state witnesses to Christ and that it cannot witness to that which it has not 
heard.348 It should then follow that, if the state is to be a witness to Christ, it must 
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know of itself as this witness. By this it is meant that, primarily, witnessing is a 
knowing reaction to a truth, expressed in deliberately and self-knowingly 
acknowledging and pointing to a truth. 
The logic of this reasoning is tempting but it is, nonetheless, not built on 
necessary deductions. Even though Pilate did not recognize the authority of God and 
asked Jesus agnostically, “what is truth,” it remained the case that Jesus said that all 
of Pilate’s power was “given from above.” Whether Pilate knows or not, Christians 
will know and understand that he lives, works and rules only by the grace of God. He 
witnesses to the sovereignty and grace of God, willingly or not. No epistemological 
position is necessary on Pilate’s part for this to be accomplished. Now, if one were 
discussing the possibility of Pilate’s being a more direct witness, someone who 
recognizes the truth of the Gospel, that surely would be an open possibility, 
theologically speaking. But this possibility does not constitute any theological 
necessity or demand that we can see. Likewise, as we know that there are countless 
other possibilities of identiarian forms of state, it must be said that the same applies 
in such cases. There can be ethnic identities as well as religious, secular, liberal, and 
any number of other identities. However, there is no theological necessity for a tout 
court rejection of such identitarian authorities. This is not to say that there might be 
no good reasons for maintaining/opposing an identitarian temporal authority/state. 
But it likely means that any reason for an identitarian state must rather be of a 
primarily practical kind and therefore extra-theological. 
Someone might be confused by this. One might want to ask whether it is not 
obvious that an identitarian state would strengthen/threaten one confession/identity 
over another. And, if so, will it not be an obvious theological request that a Christian, 
identitarian, state be sought and any other resisted? The issue remains a matter of 
some debate. Within some Anabaptist circles it is a longstanding contention that the 
intermingling of Christian belief with the state risks a form of idolatry or corruption. 
But let us explore and imagine that it would, indeed, strengthen the position of the 
confession in question for it to be represented in the identitarian aspects of the state. 
Could we then resist the temptation to request from the state that it identify itself 
with one confession over another? Probably not. And it would not be contrary to the 
political theology of the current thesis if someone wanted to follow such a line of 
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thought. That much can be said. But the question as to whether such a campaign will 
help the cause of love will remain the important debate and it is not a theological 
one, at least it does not take place in the first tier of theological reasoning. 
That is not to say, however, that there are no theological touchpoints with the 
concept of the identitarian state. We could still theologically ask (given that such an 
identitarian process is legitimated and sought) whether such a process would have a 
theologically drawn upper limit. Is there any line to be drawn, theologically, in the 
way in which one confession is supported over others in the identitarian aspects of 
the state? The answer is “yes” and is based on what has already been established 
concerning the distinction between love and temporal justice. Just as love must, in 
humility, not pretend to achieve the freedom it seeks, so the state must not pretend to 
achieve the church’s vocation to preach and love according to the Gospel. Temporal 
justice takes shape from love’s movements but it does not seek to move like love. 
Temporal justice creates space for love and this space can be either a limited or a 
strongly suggestive space. This limit of the identitarian state is, in the end, 
determined by the limits already discussed in the categories of inner and expressed 
belief/love/values. 
 
B. Overcoming the Binaries 
At this point a clearer picture of the relationship between love and temporal justice 
has emerged. Yet there will, undoubtedly, remain a request for greater clarification, 
greater concretization, or additional examples illustrating how the process might look 
when applied to one current issue or another. Nonetheless, the conceptual tools 
needed for engagement have already been explained and they should be ready to be 
applied.  
That the continual request for greater clarification and concretization remains 
is understandable and is likely due to common habits of thought that will be hard to 
break. Often it will take time to re-adjust and become familiar with thinking on the 
terms of a new perspective. Our minds, at least in the Western world, seem to be 
shaped by a very distinctive form of binary thinking concerning the relationship 
between love and justice, beliefs and government, religion and politics. Opinions 
seem to vacillate between the idea of a privileged dynamic relating a single idea of 
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love to temporal justice and a public square bereft of any such relationship. Although 
tides may be turning in certain academic circles, it seems that the pluralistic situation 
suggests to most minds that there is a binary choice between “one idea of love 
interacting with temporal justice” or “no interaction at all.” Between the two, the 
option of “no interaction at all” is commonly seen as the fairest response. If we are 
correct in assuming that common thinking in the West defaults to the idea of “no 
interaction,” we should confidently point out that this ignores the fact that temporal 
justice receives its shape and determination only from love. 
 
i. Symptomatic of the Binary 
As this thesis was being written, a very symptomatic issue arose at the University of 
Iceland. There, intelligent people with good intentions attempted to address an 
occurrence that is fairly typical of the increasingly pluralistic age in which we live. 
Like many universities in the Western world, the University of Iceland is shaped by 
the Christian faith in more than one way. One very concrete way in which this 
influence is noticeable is the small chapel that is located in the main university 
building. In recent years, however, the diversity of students in the University of 
Iceland has increased, including an increase in Muslim students. As Muslim student 
numbers increased they organized themselves and formally requested space within 
the university where they could pray during the day as Muslims are wont to do. 
Space is, however, somewhat scarce at the university but a temporary solution was 
found, allowing Muslim students to use the chapel during Ramadan. It was obviously 
a temporary solution because the chapel is very clearly a Christian place of worship 
and neither of the two groups, Christians and Muslims, found this to be an ideal long-
term arrangement. 
That is when the University of Iceland did a very peculiar thing, or so it 
seems from our perspective. They found a small room where Muslims in the student 
body could pray and worship. However, it was strangely added that this room would 
not be for Muslims only but would be “a neutral prayer-room” for every religious 
persuasion under the sun! The public reaction was frustration, but the frustration was 
divided between dissatisfaction with giving Muslims any space at all and frustration 
that Christians still enjoyed the privilege of a chapel within the university. But there 
192 
 
was no noticeable public bewilderment at the strange action of the University of 
Iceland to respond to the specific, Muslim request for space for prayer with a 
“neutral prayer-room for all religions.” Nobody asked about the origins of this idea 
of “all persuasions being cast into a single, uniform, space.” 
One must ask why the University of Iceland made such a decision. Muslims 
within the student body made a concrete request for space within the university area. 
How did the relevant university authorities react? In one broad sweep those in charge 
were going to tackle the complicated web of multicultural society: Every religious 
group, apart from Christians, was to share one room! Somewhere along the way, 
however, the relevant authorities forgot to ask whether anyone else had requested 
space with good reason, such as the Muslims had. No other groups had. The decision 
revealed clearly how greatly our minds tend to think in binary opposition. The 
former polarity is that only one faith community gets to shape society and its 
institutions (“Only a Christian chapel and no space for Muslim religiosity!”). The 
latter is that no faith community is to enjoy any treatment that is not simultaneously 
granted to every other faith community (“No privilege for the Christian faith!”).  
Yet these are not the positions to which we must default. The truth is that 
there is, strictly speaking, no privilege in the relationship between love and temporal 
justice. But, from the position of no privilege, a position of privilege always develops 
for one idea of love or another. By this we mean that no matter the ground-level 
point we seem always to attempt to imagine, against all odds and where no single 
idea of love holds sway, that temporal structures must be given a certain shape. And 
there is no possibility that structures of justice can be shaped by nothing. Love 
actualizes and temporal justice receives a determination from love’s movements. In 
the domain of temporal authorities it is, as we have already extensively argued, love 
that shapes and determines structures of temporal justice. Even from the imaginary 
point of shapeless temporal structures where there is no privilege for one idea of love 
over another, every determination by agents of love or agents of temporal authorities 




ii. Overcoming the Binaries of the Language of Rights 
Nevertheless, former polarities remain habits of thought and old habits die hard. This 
particular habit is, in the modern West, reinforced even more by the uncompromising 
and prevalent nature of the language of rights, what can be called “rights language,” 
which is often disassociated from potentiality and love. 
Merely stating this might, of course, raise the question as to what the place of 
“rights language” is in relation to the argument of the present thesis. The question of 
rights is, however, not of primary concern here. One must, in a sense, choose one’s 
battles and exploring “rights” would put us on highly contested ground. Furthermore, 
we are already tackling a major issue in addressing the relationship between love and 
justice. Nevertheless, because of the prevalence of the concept of rights and its strong 
association with the concept of justice, we feel compelled to adumbrate its possible 
place in relation to our central contentions. Following the logic of the present work, 
and agreeing with Grotius, we can say that the concept of right, or of a right, in the 
strict sense, refers to actuality more than potentiality. Right belongs to justice as the 
concept that denotes judgments and actions that refer primarily to actuality. That is to 
say: rights belong to justice, which looks primarily to safeguard such things that exist 
and are judged to have a part in the future of potentiality. Speaking of rights in this 
regard points to those things one understands to be essential to the safeguarding of 
actuality. In a sense, rights language is explorative (although often declarative in 
expression), seeking to determine a “canon” of justice, a measuring stick determining 
what counts among the basic demands of justice, and what is due in general and 
specific instances, respectively. However, importantly, we are here speaking about 
justice and rights in the general, first-order sense, not as a concept belonging to 
temporal authorities. In effect, as with the concept of justice, we must say that the 
concept of rights has two functions: i) general function and ii) as a function in which 
it applies to temporal authorities. 
As the discussion of rights arises from the general account of justice it 
assumes one of two shapes. First, it takes shape as the question about whether 
something is due to one or another. Second, it can take the shape of an attempt, as 
has been observed, to discern “a canon” for the work of justice, a kind of measuring 
stick as to the kind of things that must be especially safeguarded. In application to 
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temporal authorities, rights are a different affair in that they are, simply, whatever is 
prescribed by law. This law, of course, is made and shaped in dialogue with loving-
justice (as is the nature of temporal justice), which includes the first-order discussion 
of rights just mentioned. However, a similar type of “canon-discussion” occurs 
within the domain of temporal authorities to determine those positivistic rights that 
are to be viewed as of particular importance. These two orders of rights language or 
discourse, general and temporal, can easily be correlated but they cannot be divorced 
from their original setting in which they are, on the one hand, embedded in a 
coherent notion of loving justice and, on the other hand, function in the general 
service of loving-justice within the domain of temporal authorities. 
If the concept of right is both disassociated from general justice and said not 
to be determined by the logic of temporal authorities, then we have moved the 
concept of rights into the realm of faith, where it occupies the same place as the 
religions, with a love of its own and a justice of its own. In this instance, rights are 
not derived from potentiality, love and justice, but take the place of potentiality, love 
and justice. Now it must be said that such notions of “rights” (e.g., some possible 
types of “human rights”) is not a very thick notion of potentiality. This is not to say 
that one cannot hold such an attitude. But to the present thesis rights language must 
have two orders, one embedded with loving justice, the other embedded in positivist 
law-making. The two can easily be put in dialogue: the universal, first-order 
discourse of rights and the temporal, second-order discourse of rights. However, in 
this correlation there lurks the danger of abandoning the embeddedness of rights in 
both loving justice and positive law. Without such an embedded discourse, rights 
language is ripe to lose contact with the wellsprings that originally nourished it, 
spiral out of control and become a stale self-generation or self-referential talk. 
To those with imaginations constrained by the aforementioned categories of 
dis-embedded rights, however, it might be difficult to conceive, juridically, how any 
institutional realities might develop wherein “justice as dis-embedded rights” does 
not always trump love. In the common language of the modern age this would likely 
be expressed in another vocabulary in which negative individual rights should always 
trump any notion of positive liberties. In the popular imagination, it could be argued, 
there is little counter-imagination to the notion that the reality must be a 
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straightforward trumping of one form of liberty by the other, of dis-embedded right 
over love. However, even within this problematic rights language, there is an 
obliterating of negative individual rights by positive right or the dissolution of 
positive liberty of the collective by negative individual rights. Our juridical 
conceptions, if shaped in the dis-embedded manner, need not fall either with the 
modern realities of France or with those of Saudi Arabia. The common language of 
rights need not be conceptualized in this unfortunate and binary light. As has been 
pointed out by the prominent jurist Joseph Weiler, Europe is in fact split down the 
middle between states that can be said to be prone to secularism and states that have 
an identity more openly shaped by the spiritual values of Christianity.349 
Weiler has reminded The European Court of Human Rights that there are two 
fundamental rights at issue, the individual, negative right from religion, and the 
collective, majority right to self-expression in collective institutions.350 Both are to be 
seen as fundamental rights, Weiler claims, as he surveys the constitutional landscape 
of Europe. And, as fundamental rights, they both need to be taken into account. The 
fundamental right to collective, indentitarian self-expression cannot default to a 
tradition/ideal that hopes to exclude traditions/ideals. This would mean that any 
deliberation would have only one possible outcome and therefore would not be a 
proper deliberation regarding the issue under discussion. In fact, there is no need to 
choose between “either France or Saudi  Arabia.” Somehow, half of Europe lives 
under constitutional arrangements that recognize both individual rights over and 
against religion together with the collective right to self-expression and identitarian 
institution-building. Falling neither with France nor Saudi Arabia, we find England, 
                                                 
349Weiler claims: “There is a huge diversity of State-Church arrangement in Europe. More than half 
the population of Europe lives in States which could not be described as laïque.” See Joseph Weiler, 
“Oral Submission by Professor JHH Weiler on Behalf of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, The Russian Federation and San Marino – Third Party Intervening States in the 
Lautsi Case Before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights,” The International 
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350 Weiler asks: “How does one negotiate the individual and the collective rights at issue here?” 
Concerning the European Union in particular, he writes: “First, under the Convention system all 
Members must, indeed, guarantee individuals freedom of religion but also freedom from religion. This 
obligation represents a common constitutional asset of Europe. It is, however, counter balanced by 
considerable liberty when it comes to the place of religion or religious heritage in the collective 
identity of the nation and the symbology of the State.” He then adds: “The Europe of the Convention 
represents a unique balance between the individual liberty of freedom of and from religion, and the 
collective liberty to define the State and Nation using religious symbols and even having an 




Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Italy, and others. They represent realities that 
should help us see that even the prevalence of dis-embedded rights language does not 
necessitate binary thinking. If we are to have rights language, it would be a benefit to 
have it without this binary that can lead only to a predetermined outcome. 
 
C. Temporal Authorities and Truth Procedure 
Let us now focus on the agents of temporal authorities. They are the ones 
deliberating, making determinations and judgments, according to the criteria that we 
have laid out. Still, even with these criteria in hand, it remains to be explained what 
their relationship is to the truth content of the various ideas of love as seeking 
actualization and space. In making a judgment or determination, what relationship 
does the queen, statesman or demos have with the truth-claim that underlies the idea 
of love that is under political evaluation? It might surely sound to some as if the 
notion of temporal authorities reacting to a “collective of love” is a strongly 
democratic idea. It might seem to suggest that temporal authorities are only reacting 
to power in numbers and organization. This would mean that the criteria of the 
current thesis would be fitting only for democratic arrangements. But this is not the 
case. 
Truth-content is important to those making determinations of temporal 
justice. That this is the case entails that temporal authorities may run against the 
majority will, although it will remain true that practical concerns will often guide 
them to be deeply attentive to the demos. But the important thing to note is that the 
final political judgment should not be conflated with a truth-procedure or a truth-
event. The collective of love is the agent and custodian of the truth-event, the idea of 
love and the executor of the truth-procedure. Temporal authorities will never be 
agents of capital “T”-truth. They will be, to varying degrees, reactive to capital T-
truth but, in being negotiated alongside other concerns, truth will be compromised. 
The political judgment will certainly be valued by the champions of truth, but will 
ultimately be judged as a half-truth, if not an outright lie. This indirect relationship 




Again, temporal justice is reactive to love according to two criteria. First, 
temporal justice reacts to love with reference to its own general nature as temporal 
justice. Second, it is reactive to the “truth-value” of the specific love in question in 
the particular event of political judgment. This means that temporal authorities are 
not an outgrowth of the collective, or an extension of it. They do however provide an 
important service to it and are not inattentive to truth-value. Temporal justice 
sustains the space so that the actualization of human potentiality can take place. This 
process of actualization, this movement, we called by the name of love. The 
implication is that temporal authorities give service to love, the movement from 
potentiality to actuality. Temporal justice is one which, indirectly, serves the love 
and justice of the collective of love. This it does by sustaining the space for truth to 
be known and enacted. In this process it makes judgments based, first, on this 
specific role they have as temporal authorities and, second, in respect to what they 
judge to be the truth-value of that to which they react. 
That is to say, first, that there is a primary criterion which is based on the 
general role of temporal authorities with regards to ideals of love, and, second, a 
secondary criterion which has to do with the inevitable and necessary estimation and 
appreciation of the content of the specific ideal of love in question. There is, in 
effect, a dual criterion at work in political judgment, one practical (looking to the 
general service that temporal authorities provide) and another which concerns the 
veracity of the specific ideal of love in question (which makes a specific judgment 
with regard to a specific ideal of love.) This is not to be confused with the notion of 
simply making a distinction between metaphysical and empirical judgments. While 
such a distinction can, undoubtedly, be made, at least in part, our argument is, rather, 
referring to another, basic disposition in making judgments. In this disposition there 
is, first, a basic and a primary role which belongs to temporal authorities which then 
guides their judgment. This basic and primary role is to be in service of love in a 
general sense, to be reactive to love in a way that makes sure that true manifestations 
of love will be allowed the possibility of actualizing within the domain of the 
legitimate (as opposed to moving through illegitimacy to reach legitimacy). In this 
way the true manifestation of love would always be able to find ways to seek to 
198 
 
colonize spaces and influence the structures of temporal justice to the degree that this 
is demanded by its internal logic. 
Alongside this basic and primary criterion for political judgment we find the 
secondary criterion, which is the inevitable judgment temporal authorities must make 
with regard to the veracity of the ideal of love that vies for space at any given time. 
As temporal justice takes shape from specific ideals of love, it must make judgments 
with regards to specific ideals of love and this must be done by looking to their 
internal logic and structures. 
This links back to the second chapter, where we discussed the nature of 
theological rationality as it engages in ethics and politics. There, in relation the 
process of ethical deliberation and action, we described a two-tiered process.351 The 
first tier was described as a meta-analysis which is provisional, but less so than the 
second tier of ethical and political deliberation. The difference was that the second 
tier of deliberation brought natural, empirical, and speculative resources of other 
kinds into the deliberation process, making it even more provisional than the first tier 
of meta-analysis. In it, it became clear that once a meta-analysis has been achieved 
one must still deliberate and act within a specific context, and make certain 
speculative and practical assumptions within that context. And even though our 
meta-analysis will always remain provisional, it is in this second phase, or tier, of the 
process that things grow more uncertain. Nonetheless, it is a necessary part of human 
ethical/political deliberation and action and must be included in every account of it 
because, although we have established certain meta-criteria for political judgment, 
this latter part of the deliberation process, wherein specific human beings act within 
specific contexts, must be taken into account. The dual criterion of judgment 
therefore both acknowledges and is partly built on the second tier of ethical/political 
deliberation. 
This dual criterion might also be of help in addressing the concerns of those 
who might hold a strong creation ethic (or even some types of resurrection ethics). 
These concerns would include the idea that the general, meta-criteria of interaction 
between love and temporal justice that have been sketched out fail to exclude 
attitudes that could be considered morally offensive and should, therefore, be off the 
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table of political discussion. They might, for example, find it frightening that the 
criteria seem to allow morally outrageous things, such as “the recreational torture of 
whales,” to be on the table of political discussion. But here it must be remembered 
that once actual political judgment takes place, according to the dual criterion, the 
public expression in favour of the “recreational torture of whales” can be curbed to 
the highest degree. This means that proponents of “recreational torture of whales” 
could, for example, be barred from making their case via print media. A similar ban 
is upheld by law in Iceland regarding the smoking of tobacco, as a case in point 
which cannot receive a positive appraisal through advertisement or print media.352 
So, although the proponents of “recreational whale torture” should, according to the 
criteria of temporal justice, be allowed some form of space for the expression of their 
belief/love, this space can be rendered very slender once an actual political judgment 
has been made. The dual criterion includes this possibility of near-exclusion because 
the secondary criterion of political judgment is the truth-commitment or love held by 
whoever exercises political judgment at any given time. Importantly, however, the 
general criteria of interaction between love and temporal justice do not, in 
themselves, include particular judgments regarding particular issues. Otherwise, the 
true manifestation of love, might, hypothetically, be found to be excluded from the 
political process, by definition. 
In his book, Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society, Basil Mitchell 
navigates a very interesting disagreement that can be illuminating for this important 
point concerning the dual criterion of temporal authorities. The disagreement informs 
the extended conversation between H. L. A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin concerning 
the relationship between politics and morality.353 In that conversation Lord Devlin 
argued for a form of dynamic between morality and politics while Hart had more or 
less argued against such an understanding. Lord Devlin’s contention was that 
“without shared ideas on politics, morals, and ethics no society can exist.”354 Hart 
agreed but noted that these shared ideas should apply only a minimal restraint from  
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inflicting harm,355 to which Mitchell responded that much enforcement of morals 
“could also be described as a straightforward case of preventing harm.”356 
Another difference navigated by Mitchell is that while Hart tended to think 
there to be some minimal universal restraints that can be discovered and legislated, 
Lord Devlin disagreed. Lord Devlin maintained that, for practical reasons, a society 
must legislate morals above the minimal degree of direct physical injury which Hart 
prefers. Unlike Hart, Lord Devlin did not argue for a universal set of principles but 
rather maintained that the morality that finds its way to legislation will depend on the 
society in question. Mitchell’s interpretation of Lord Devlin is the following: “We do 
not know how much cohesion is necessary for a society to exist, but we know that 
some cohesion is necessary. Some degree of shared morality is essential to this 
minimum of cohesion, and any weakening of moral belief may reduce it below this 
minimum; hence we cannot bind ourselves not to use the law to safeguard existing 
moral beliefs, no matter how peripheral they may appear to be.”357 But construing 
matters in this way entails that it could be said that Lord Devlin sees only one 
criterion for politics and morality—the survival, peaceableness and order of the 
society in question: 
I have said that a sense of right and wrong is necessary for the life of a 
community. It is not necessary that their appreciation of right and wrong, 
tested in the light of one set or another of those abstract propositions about 
which men forever dispute, should be correct. If it were, only one society at 
most could survive. What the law-maker has to ascertain is not the true belief 
but the common belief.358 
  
Faced with this Mitchell worries that “we are committed to the view that the positive 
morality of a given society is beyond criticism. . . . If the test is survival, any 
surviving society, however unjust, has automatically passed the test.”359 “But,” adds 
Mitchell, “mercifully, Lord Devlin is not consistent.”360 To explain what he means, 
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Mitchell observes that Lord Devlin’s writings often introduce the contradictory 
figure of the “right-minded” man and he points out that Lord Devlin at one point 
insists, criticizing John Stuart Mill, that “rulers must be free to act upon what they 
believe.” The direct quote is the following; “What we believe to be evil may indeed 
be evil and we cannot forever condemn ourselves to inactivity against evil because of 
the chance that we may by mistake destroy good. For better or for worse the law-
maker must act according to his lights.”361 This surely may seem as a contradictory 
thing for Lord Devlin to write after having argued for the primary importance of 
social order and cohesion. 
How can one claim that the important matter for societies is to have a 
common belief, not the right belief, and yet discuss the importance of the right-
minded person and argue that rulers act upon their individual beliefs? However, as 
Mitchell navigates Lord Devlin’s seeming tension further, he concludes that Lord 
Devlin is, in fact, not contradicting himself. We agree with that estimation. It seems 
rather that Lord Devlin is very attentive to the dual criterion for political judgment, 
both that of truth/right and that of order/cohesion. The primary concern of temporal 
authorities is their task of securing space for the actualization of potentiality. 
However, in providing this service to the collectives of truth, they also, inadvertently, 
and rightly, make a judgment regarding the truth of which they are judging. 
Balancing the two, pragmatic concerns related to their special task as temporal 
authorities and the truth of that to which they are reacting constitutes the basis of 
judgment for temporal authorities. 
What has been argued entails that we must reject some of Jürgen Habermas’s 
contentions regarding the proper place of religious and moral reasoning in politics. 
Not being entirely content with the ideas of John Rawls and Richard Rorty, that 
religious reason should be excluded from debate and policy, Habermas has carved 
out a way that weakens limitations on religious expressions. However, this does not 
mean that the space Habermas carves out is by any understanding great in 
magnitude. According to Habermas, while religious reasons can be used in public 
political discussion, they must be filtered, or rather translated, into non-religious 
speech. Therefore, even though Habermas seems to be making a diplomatic gesture, 
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he nevertheless can be found claiming that it is important that citizens must 
“recognize the principle that political authority is exercised with neutrality towards 
competing world views. On both these points we must disagree.362 We have already 
described how, while it is true that there is a specific rationale that guides the 
judgments of temporal authorities, this is not the whole story as they are also to be 
reactive to specific ideas of love. Habermas does not see the priority of love in the 
relationship between love and temporal justice. He seems to imagine that the only 
sufficient criteria of policy are “secular” and that differing ideas of love, differing 
beliefs, must be translated into the language of “the secular” in order to be acceptable 
resources in policy.363 All this registers strangely in light of our arguments. 
This thesis does indeed recognize criteria of judgment that pertain only to 
temporal authorities (secular authorities in Habermas’s vocabulary) and have a 
generic relationship to love. However, importantly, there is also a secondary, yet 
necessary, criterion which has its reference to specific ideas of love. If there were 
only the generic relationship to ideas of love, this would result in, well, nothing. For, 
if temporal authorities would determine themselves by an equal regard for all forms 
of love, what shape would the structures of the temporal/secular take? This question 
is asked to imply and show that the more generic and shapeless a political judgment 
is, the greater the dissolution of communal structures it threatens to cause. In our 
view, a charitable interpretation of Habermas would understand his notion of 
“secular” to be referring to a certain cultural hegemony of certain assumptions that 
have been described as secular but which include a whole array of concepts and ideas 
born out of millennia-long cultural experience in the West.364 The same charitable 
interpretation would see his notion of “secular translation” to be a necessary 
acknowledgment of this hegemony by people who find themselves at odds with it. 
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See Nigel Biggar, “Not Translation, but Conversation,” in Religious Voices in Public Places, ed. 
Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 171–172. 
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However true that might be, it is hard to see by what argument Habermas can 
legitimately place the ethical burden upon Christians and people of other faiths that 
they must limit their expressions by not uttering that which cannot be directly 
translated into the hegemonic language of politics in the current age. In terms of a 
strategy for any given idea of love, Habermas might be right that an idea of love 
might have the greatest success by seeking a wide appeal in the way it constructs its 
expressions, for example, in “translating” them. But, other than that, it is difficult to 
see what it is that gives Habermas the warrant to give such allowances. When 
Habermas writes that it is important that “every citizen must know and accept that 
only secular reasons count beyond the institutional threshold that divides the 
informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations,” we 
must, therefore, again, disagree.365 We have already described how, while it is true 
that there is a specific rationale that guides the judgments of temporal authorities, 
this is not the whole story, as they are also to be reactive to love. 
 
i. Is Temporal Justice a Form of Loving Justice?  
Having now explained the dual criterion of political judgment, we can answer 
questions that may have arisen earlier in the thesis when we had a specific focus on 
temporal justice. Earlier we did not have all of the tools to answer them but now we 
should. The question is: Should temporal justice be viewed as a species of justice 
within the more general category of loving justice? Or to ask more directly: Is 
temporal justice a type of loving justice? 
This is a legitimate question. How else can we describe the motives of 
representative agents of temporal authorities when they engage in judgment and then 
determination of temporal authorities? Will it not have to be viewed as a form of love 
(loving justice)? As we now have presented the dual criterion of temporal authorities 
for temporal justice we can more easily explain how this is not the case. As the 
primary criteria for action on the part of temporal authorities is not a specific idea of 
love, their action cannot be seen as being an act of love, as that is always to be seen 
as derivate of an idea of love. The fact that the primary criterion for the acts of 
temporal authorities are not a specific idea of love does mean that temporal justice is 
                                                 
365 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 9. 
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not a species of justice within loving justice but a separate phenomenon that still 
exists in a dynamic with ideas of love. 
But how then, someone could legitimately challenge, does the act of 
judgment performed by temporal authorities (to create space for acts of love and 
freedom) differ from an act of loving justice performed by private individuals? To 
ask that same question more directly: How does a law about the funding of education 
differ in kind from the private donation of a scholarship? The answer is that, while 
temporal authorities make space for love, the private individual engages in loving 
action in the hope that freedom (potentiality) may be actualized. Temporal authorities 
work with a dual criterion of judgment (holding in view both their role as guarantors 
of peace, order and space for love and the Truth-value of the idea of love under 
evaluation). Under that condition they then make a judgment regarding truth, for 
example concerning certain types of education that should be funded. They may 
surely seem as if they function according to the same criteria as the private donator. 
But they clearly do not, as their primary rationale for existence is the securing of 
space in which love can actualize, while a judgment regarding the truth-content of 
that love is only secondary. For the private person this is not the case. The private 
individual primarily engages in loving actions hoping that doing so may contribute to 
a future of freedom. Temporal authorities are primarily reactive to that love 
generally, only secondarily reactive to it specifically (making truth-judgment), and 
therefore provide a service for love. 
This explanation might beget another question concerning the relationship of 
temporal justice to love. That is: If political acts are there to make space for loving 
acts then must not temporal authorities have some notion of what a loving act is and 
what it is not? Otherwise would they not simply be creating space for acts, loving or 
otherwise? This question is absolutely on point. And it helpfully brings us back to the 
aforementioned dual criterion. It is true that temporal authorities will have to make 
some judgment regarding the truth-content of the form of love under evaluation. But 
the truth-judgment is a secondary, but necessary, part of the political judgment made 
by temporal authorities. 
Now, with all of this established let us address the concepts of space again, 
especially suggestive space. Because with the dual criterion we can now have a fuller 
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view of what the suggestive spaces amount to, how they are not simply negative 
space, and yet how they escape being over-determining. When agents of temporal 
authorities make judgments they make them, as has been established, according to a 
twofold criterion. The first aspect of the criterion regards the general role of temporal 
justice. The second aspect of the criterion, however, concerns the agents of temporal 
authorities as moral agents, as the subjects of a specific ideal of love. When agents of 
temporal authorities make judgments they first hold in view the basic role of 
temporal authorities in relation to love and, second, their own truth-commitments and 
their own loves. What takes place in an actual political judgment is that any form of 
love vying for space will be evaluated by the agent of temporal authorities referring 
both to the general role of temporal authorities to create space in which love can 
actualize and the particular judgment that the agent of truth may hold regarding the 
ideal of love in question. 
What ensues is that, while some space will have been granted to the ideal of 
love in question, its shape and size will have been determined by the agents of 
temporal authorities making the judgment. This means that the judgments leave a 
certain imprint, a certain shape, a certain space, that is suggestive as to how it should 
be interacted with. If, for example, the activity of smoking is legalized, but only in 
private residences, this is suggestive of how private spaces might be viewed, how 
smoking might be viewed and how public spaces might be viewed and interacted 
with. If, on the other hand, as is the case in Japan, smoking is allowed in certain 
prescribed and marked public areas, this is suggestive, in a slightly different way, of 
how one might view and interact with smoking and public spaces. This entails that 
suggestive spaces are not to be viewed as negative spaces. Because they do have a 
shape, an imprint of the beliefs and loves that jostled for it and were operative in the 
particular political judgment. That is to say: As temporal authorities make judgments, 
these judgments accrue to form certain types of spaces which, in being reactive to 
specific types of love, have a certain shape, a certain suggestibility as to how life 
might be lived within them. But this shape does not fully determine how one should 
live or interact within the spaces of temporal justice. To a degree, and to varying 
degrees, there is a lack of determination of the spaces of temporal justice, which 
holds open such spaces for other types of engagement or non-engagement. This lack 
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of determination is secured by the general criteria for the interaction of love and 
temporal justice drawn out before. The more specific forms of determination, partly 
reactive to particular forms of love, are guaranteed by the judgment of the agents of 
temporal authorities. In this the political relevance of this conceptualization of space 
is apparent. 
While the space we are discussing here is not material in the sense that 
normally pertains to architecture, it is nonetheless real in that it does operate with 
boundaries, constraints and, simultaneously, an openness and an allowance. It is 
furthermore clear that spaces receive imprints from the organic activity of the 
collectives of love combined with the judicious response to them made by the agents 
of temporal authorities. This is the political process of temporal justice and 
understanding that process helps us interact with it. 
 
D. A Recapitulation of the Criteria of Interaction 
We already know that love has a relationship to temporal justice which is 
characterized by temporal justice serving love, both generally and specifically, by 
creating and sustaining spaces in which love can actualize. What has now been added 
to this knowledge are certain criteria which help explain it and guide judgment, both 
for agents of love and for representatives of temporal authorities. We can recapitulate 
these criteria in the following way: When the representatives of temporal authorities 
make judgments they do so according to a dual criterion. The primary criterion will 
be the role of temporal authorities and their general relationship to love. The 
secondary, yet necessary, criterion is the judgment representatives make of specific 
ideas of love. This creates a sequence of judgments which accrue to form certain 
types of spaces. These spaces will not be negative spaces, which would form if 
temporal authorities would judge only according to the primary criterion. Neither 
will the spaces be overly determined positive spaces, which would form if temporal 
authorities judged only according to the secondary criterion. Rather, through 
employing the dual criterion, temporal authorities will form spaces that are 
suggestive of how to live and love.  
An important question we can ask to determine whether spaces exceed being 
suggestive is whether there is a possibility for a subjective rejection (inner belief) 
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followed by some type of speech or action that defies the inner logic of the 
suggestive structures (expressed belief). And importantly, the internal logic of this 
thesis is that the actualization of love, not the shaping of temporal justice, is of 
primary importance. The actualization of love is found with the agents of love and 
the collective/movement of love, not in the constant, frustrated rearrangement of 






Conclusions and the Future Trajectory 
 
A. Conclusions 
At the beginning of the thesis we laid out the problematic that we were going to be 
addressing. This was the relationship between love and justice in political structures. 
On our way there we have learned that justice can be analysed into two forms, one 
being loving justice and the other temporal justice. We therefore found ourselves 
subsequently inquiring specifically concerning the relationship between love and 
temporal justice. 
We learned that it cannot be argued that love simply becomes temporal 
justice, insofar as the justice of temporal authorities should be the same as the loving 
justice Christians proclaim and hope for. Christian love does not, simplistically, 
become Christian legislation. Neither is there the opposite, a peaceful boundary 
between love and temporal justice. This is because there is another criterion for the 
interrelationship between love and justice to be deduced from what has been 
established here. Temporal justice is the space created that allows love to be 
actualized. This means that the criteria of the exercise of political judgment for the 
queen, the statesman or the democratic citizen would be whether she is ready to give 
Christians, or people of other persuasions, the social space in which to actualize love 
as they imagine it should be. 
Now, according to what has been said, love is surely involved in our temporal 
governance. But this is not a love that forces others to comply, or share its objects of 
affection. Love’s criterion for engaging with temporal authorities is seeking temporal 
justice, forms of space that allow love to take form. However, love is most concerned 
with its own actualization and works on the justice of temporal authorities only when 
the actualization of love is deemed, by the agents of love, to be hindered in some 
important way. 
Through this dynamic, which can be rather extensive, although never over-
determining, the spaces sustained by temporal authorities receive a shape. The spaces 
will be neither negative nor positive but suggestive spaces. In being judiciously 
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reactive to ideas and collectives of love, temporal justice takes a shape that is 
suggestive of how one should live without being over-determining. In this way it 
always has an indirect relationship to truth in that truth is both reacted to and 
compromised by the judgments of temporal authorities. 
This conclusion means that there is, contrary to the contentions of the realist 
theologians, a very distinctive form of justice called temporal justice, and that love 
has a very distinctive vocation in regard to it. It also means that, contrary to the 
understanding of the radical theologies, there is no hostility between the Christian 
ideal of love and the concept of temporal justice. It furthermore grants us clearer 
criteria for understanding the dynamic between love and temporal justice than has 
been hitherto developed by gradualist political theologies. 
 
B. Our way there  
We have reached our conclusions through a simultaneously constructive and critical 
engagement. We began by addressing the basic questions regarding what type of 
theological thought would guide our subsequent reasoning. To accomplish this we 
sought to trace the cognitive effects of the Gospel event. The results of the event for 
human thought were shown to be radically determining for human subjectivity in that 
all theological thinking necessarily must find its sole ground in that event. The 
important result for our objective of political theology was that empirical and natural 
actualities were deemed not to be part of the properly theological part of political 
theology. 
Building upon this foundation we could move towards engaging with the 
thesis’s very central concept of love. There we investigated love in its two forms of 
eros and agape. We described love as a movement of eros which, when confronted 
with the Gospel, is transformed into its contrary movement of love, agape. It was 
nonetheless recognized that despite the differences between the two forms of love 
they could both be treated under the same signifier “love.” Furthermore, love was, 
importantly, described as a movement towards the actualization of potentiality 
perceived in faith, which our theology described to be freedom in Christ. This 
highlighted the distinction between love and that for which it strives, 
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potentiality/freedom. It was therefore argued that human love is an activity that seeks 
to create space so that freedom (potentiality) may be actualized. 
Following this we wanted to understand and explicate the connection of love 
to justice. We found that love and justice, in both their divine and human forms, are 
deeply connected and can well be treated under the same concept of loving justice. 
But, importantly, the application of the concept of justice was found to work 
differently in the realm of temporal authorities. This is because of the status of 
temporal authorities vis-à-vis God’s judgment and affirmation. Through investigating 
the concepts of judgment and affirmation in relation to temporal authorities we 
learned how the rationale behind temporal authorities evaporates with the coming of 
the eschaton. Temporal authorities, nonetheless, were shown to have a distinct role in 
relation to love, the actualization of potentiality. They are the guardians of temporal 
justice which is found in the creation and sustaining of the space which allows love 
to actualize. 
 Throughout this argument rich concepts were employed and explained. We 
used the conceptual pair of potentiality and actualization. Potentiality described the 
perception of the ultimate goal of humanity as perceived in the position of faith (or 
belief). Actualization described the necessary movement which is set about by this 
perception. Space described the necessary natural and social condition under which 
actualization can take place free of great hindrance. The concepts of love and justice 
were furthermore employed and found to have strong connection to the concepts of 
potentiality and actuality, in that love and justice are found in actions that seek to 
create or sustain space for the actualization of potentiality. Temporal justice was a 
concept whose relation to love and justice was found to be subservient in a way 
similar to the subservient role love and justice have to potentiality. Temporal justice 
is to be described as the space created and upheld so that love and justice may freely 
actualize. 
 Now, as we arrive at the end of the thesis, we understand that love does not 
become justice by simple translation and that there is not any type of static boundary 
between the two concepts. Likewise we know that temporal authorities operate with 
another conception of justice according to their type, and that between the two there 
is a dynamic relationship wherein temporal justice takes shape according to the 
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movements of love insofar as temporal justice creates and sustains space in which 
love can actualize. This space that develops is suggestive space in that it forms in 
judicial response, first to the general purpose of temporal authorities, and second to 
the particular expression of love in question. Knowing this helps us better understand 
and work with the fundamental problematic of the relationship between love and 
temporal justice. We are, therefore, at the end of this thesis able to speak and act 
concerning these matters with greater clarity than before. 
 
C. The Forward Trajectory – Expanding the Scope 
There is a direction that is implicit in the thesis as it has now been presented although 
it is a direction that takes us beyond its immediate scope. It points towards and has a 
possible reference to a very important, although sometimes mute, figure in political 
theology. This is the figure of the non-Christian neighbour, the one with whom we 
share so many pivotal things while yet remaining divorced in matters of ultimate 
importance. How can this thesis be of help in conversations that often take place with 
that challenging figure? How can a theological conversation concerning faith and 
politics take place, as we have done in the present thesis, without its being unfruitful 
in any common conversation between the two figures, Christian and non-Christian? 
It must be asked whether, if the matter is addressed solely on the grounds of 
Christian resources (as we have done it here), it need not exclude any possibility of 
coming together on these important political questions. This tends to be the case for 
much political theology and implies that these are the right questions to ask but they 
should, nonetheless, not give rise to despair. The future trajectory of this thesis points 
towards a bridge and gives hope for mutual ground to be had between the two 
figures, the Christian and the non-Christian, on these important questions. Up to this 
point we have offered categories and criteria in our interaction with the content of the 
Christian faith. These are the categories of love and justice, of love and temporal 
justice as well as of potentiality, actuality and space. A legitimate question would be 
to ask how our concepts and solutions will be of use in discussions with non-
believers or people of other religious persuasions. 
In responding to such a question one could point to an analogy that takes us 
outside our immediate subject for a brief moment. Alain Badiou is a prominent 
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French philosopher working on, amongst other things, basic questions of human 
rationality and the notion of truth. So it was that Badiou developed a very solid 
notion of truth structured in part around the categories of the Event and the 
Subject.366 Some years later, Badiou wrote a book called Saint Paul and the 
Foundations of Universalism.367 In that book Badiou presents his discovery that the 
writings of Paul the Apostle are a great illustration of how he understands the 
relationship between Truth, the Event, and the Subject. Badiou even writes in his 
Being and Event that “all the parameters of the doctrine of the event are thus 
disposed within Christianity.”368 
Now, let us imagine that it would have happened the other way around. Let 
us imagine that Badiou, in contemplating questions of truth, read through Paul’s 
writings and from there derived his understanding as to how truth functions. And let 
us keep open the possibility that a Christian could read through Badiou’s work and 
find in it an excellent way of formulating the Christian relationship to Scriptural 
Revelation. The Apostle Paul, through his own specifically theological truth 
procedure, provides the atheist philosopher with an understanding and an inspiration 
concerning a general account of truth. Such an occurrence provides a model that is 
both actual and accessible to us. Atheist thinkers can access the writings of Saint 
Paul and understand how Paul’s way of approaching the event of Christ’s 
resurrection and his subsequent thinking of that event is a paradigmatic example of 
how they approach their own notions of truth and event. From something specifically 
theological, something more widely applicable can be deduced. Widely applicable 
categories of human thought are teased out in the confrontation with and in the 
thinking through of God’s revelation. Having found this to be the case let us ask the 
obvious question. If a thinker of a different persuasion would enter into our 
specifically theological procedure of thinking about faith and politics, will he not 
find workable criteria that aid his understanding and match his own way of being and 
thinking in the world? Will he not discover something generally valid and applicable 
to his own categories of belief and thought by being attentive to what has been 
                                                 
366 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2007). 
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Stanford University Press, 2003). 
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written in the current thesis? To ask this question more directly: Will not the non-
Christian find that he has a notion of love and a notion of justice? Will he not realize 
that he too operates with notions of human potentiality and actuality and will he not 
then recognize the importance of space for the actualization of his potentiality? Our 
hope is that by our theological thought procedure we have derived categories that can 
be appropriated more universally. And we can confidently assume that, on the basis 
on these concepts and these criteria, we can have a conversation that will be open to 
the non-Christian without any demand for compromise of core beliefs. It will be free 
from the demand commonly brought to the Christian that he must translate his 
concern into the language of secularism. It will, similarly, also be free of the opposite 
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